GROSVENOR SUBMISSION. ISSUE 5 (11) SUBMISSION 1. Accident and Incident Investigations. Changes to Regulations and Act Mandating Production and Engineering Coal Mine Worker Involvement
Whether the operational practices and management systems in existence at Grosvenor Mine 5 part 11
Investigation Teams LFI’s 19 to 20
Incident Investigation Report GM016 – high flow intersection.docx.pdf
The Submission minus some transcript and Regulation 15 is below
GROSVENOR SUBMISSION. ISSUE 5 (11) SUBMISSION 1
Whether the operational practices and management systems in existence at Grosvenor Mine, or at higher corporate levels, were apt to adequately respond to the mines understanding of the difficulties it was having with Longwall 104.
FINDINGS
- NO or MINIMAL ONE KEY CONTRACT MINE WORKERS in METHANE HPI INVESTIGTIONS
A One Key Contract Mine Worker is part of the Investigation team In only one (1) of the twelve (12) Grosvenor LFI’s tendered to the Grosvenor Inquiry One Key Contract.
(Attachment 1; summary of each Grosvenor LFI)
Observation
An 8+ % RATE OF CONTRACT MINEWORKER INVOLVEMENT would be the equivalent rate of worker involvement as identified during the Torbanlea Royal Commission of 1900.
This is totally contrary to all concepts of Coal Mine Worker involvement in ensuring a safe workplace.
2. POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCE to REGULATION 15 CMSHR Investigating accidents and incidents.
The make-up of Grosvenor Mine LFI Investigating Team into Site investigations for “accidents and incidents” does not always include an ERZC as required.
Reference Document
Incident Number: 162084 Classification: HPH; Incident Title: Intersection of GM016B – Expected grouted borehole; Incident Date: 23 February 2017; Report Date: 8 March 2017
3) POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCE to SECTION 105 of the CMSHA 1999.
105 Protection of site safety and health representatives performing functions
A coal mine operator, site senior executive, contractor or other supervisor must not—
(a) prevent or attempt to prevent a site safety and health representative from performing his or her functions; or
It does not appear that a SSHR (Site Safety and Health Representative) is ever involved in the 13 LFI’s examined. (12 Grosvenor Exhibits + Borehole intersection).
The same situation by Evidence at the Grosvenor Inquiry is that the same situation exists at the Anglo Grosvenor Mine.
OBSERVATION
This is contrary to all concepts of elected coal mine worker Site Safety and Health Representatives.
This extends to not providing investigation findings to the SSHR’s at Grasstree Mine.
This if proven would be a clear breach of the Coal Mining Regulations and the Coal Mining Act.
15 (1) (b)making the investigation findings available to the mine’s coal mine workers;
This is evident from the Affidavits and Testimony of the Grasstree SSHR’s Joe Barber and James Hoare.
JOE BARBER SSHR Anglo Grasstree Mine
Statement
- “I have never received a single written notification about an LFI. I have only been verbally notified about them.”
53. The was an incident at the oaky North Mine in relation to a worker being electrocuted in 2019. I had heard about and was allowed to look at the scene the next morning, but that was as far as my involvement went. I heard nothing further about the matter, including the outcome of the investigation. That was despite my repeated attempts to try and find out more information, which were always rebuffed.
4 INVESTIGATION TEAM MAKE UP
There are problems with make-up of Investigating Team into highest level Site investigations into ‘accidents and incidents” that involve methane management processes FAILURES.
Four (4) of the twelve (12) Grosvenor LFI’s tendered to the Grosvenor Inquiry have a Department Head as an Investigation Team Member who is part of the Acceptance of Investigation Report Senior Management Sign Off Group.
They are signing off on an Investigation they were part of, for an area of Responsibilities and Duties for the Department they are in charge of.
There is a clear potential for Conflict of Interest.
This is further shown in the LFI for a methane borehole intersection incident
Reference Document
Incident Number: 162084 Classification: HPH; Incident Title: Intersection of GM016B – Expected grouted borehole; Incident Date: 23 February 2017; Report Date: 8 March 2017
- The Investigation Team has The Ventilation Officer and Seamgas Manager as participants. They both signed off on the Gas Drainage Authorisation Form, dated 10th August 2016.
- The Seamgas Manager participates in the Investigation and signs off and accepts the Investigation Report
- The UMM signed off on the Gas Drainage Authorisation form dated the `10th August 2016 and then the UMM signs off Acceptance of the Investigation Report
RECOMMENDATIONS
1) NO or MINIMAL ONE KEY CONTRACT MINE WORKERS in METHANE HPI INVESTIGTIONS
The Inclusion of either the on Shift Statutory Official in charge of the ERZ or excavation in the Open Cut has been clearly mandated.
If the ERZC or OCE who was on shift is not available, then another ERZC or OCE from the ERZC or Excavation has to be included.
Involvement MUST include being on the Investigation Team.
There needs to be an addition to Regulation 15 to cover work areas of both Underground and Open Cut Mines not presently catered for.
These include.
- Washplants and associated coal stockpiles, load out facilities and rejects,
- Workshops and all electrical and mechanical activities
- Ancillary areas such as Offices
INCLUSION of SUB SECTIONS CMSHR Regulation 15 Investigating accidents and incidents
UNDERGROUND
“Coal Mine Worker from the ERZ in which accident or incident who was on duty when the accident or incident happened.” or
if it is not practicable to involve a Coal Mine Worker in subparagraph (X)—another Coal Mine Worker for the zone.
OPEN CUT EXCAVATIONS
Coal Mine Worker from the excavation and on duty when the accident or incident happened; or
if it is not practicable to involve the Coal Mine Worker mentioned in subparagraph (X)—
OTHER WORK AREAS of UNDERGROUND and OPEN CUT MINES
It has long been identified that workshops and engineering tasks are areas of the Mines where fatalities regularly occur.
There are also washplants and associated coal stockpiles and train load out facilities.
These are not specifically covered in the accident and incidents investigation regulation for ANY involvement of Workers in the Investigation.
There needs to be additional additions to Regulation 15 to MANDATE the involvement of Production and Engineering Coal Mine Workers from the work area in the Investigation TEAM.
2) POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCE to REGULATION 15 CMSHR Investigating accidents and incidents.
INVOLVEMENT of ERZC and OCE in Accident Investigations
- RSHQ MINE INSPECTORS TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE TO REGULATION 15 (2) at ALL COAL MINES.
- RSHQ MINE INSPECTORS TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE TO REGULATION 15 (1) at ALL COAL MINES, Subsection 15 (1) (b) in particular.
“making the investigation findings available to the mine’s coal mine workers;”
3 POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCE to SECTION 105 of the CMSHA 1999.
RSHQ MINE INSPECTORS MAKE IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION into POTENTIAL BREACHES of SECTION 105 CMSHA 1999; at ALL ANGLO COAL MINES
105 Protection of site safety and health representatives performing functions
A coal mine operator, site senior executive, contractor or other supervisor must not—
- prevent or attempt to prevent a site safety and health representative from performing his or her functions; or
- AMENDMENT TO CMSHA 1999 100 Powers of site safety and health representative.
ADDITIONAL POWER for PARTICIPATION/INVOLVEMENT in “Accident and Incident Investigation.
4) INVESTIGATION TEAM MAKE UP
AMENDMENT OF CMSHR REGULATION 15 Investigating accidents and incidents
AMENDMENT TO PREVENT THE POSSIBILITY of PERSONS SIGNING OFF and ACCEPTING INCIDENT/ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT for DEPARTMENT they have DIRECT MANAGEMENT DUTIES and RESPONSIBILITIES under the CMSHA 1999, CMSH REGULATIONS and the MINES SAFETY and HEALTH MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
