David Routledge Fatality Prosecution by RSHQ. Who’s interest were they protecting, Mr. Routledge or RSHQ and its CEO Mark Stone?
Is RSHQ implicated in death of David Routledge at Middlemount Mine on the 26th June 2019 in the section known as S19 block 3 Southern Terrace?
Is this the reason why there were has been a steady down grading of the charges and no individual held accountable?
Is this the reason there was such a bizarre set of charges laid, because the OWHSP and the RSHQ CEO Mark Stone are more worried about keeping the actions and inactions of the RSHQ Inspectorate out of any sworn testimony, let along cross examination
Are both RSHQ and the Office of the Workplace Health and Safety Prosecutor worried that any RSHQ Officer called to give evidence would be unable to prove that they took action at any stage over more than a year, to achieve an acceptable level of risk that ensured that workers were not being exposed to an ongoing level of unacceptable level of risk while the Safety and Health management System was modified and took action?
Middlemount Mine was given 2 separate time extensions on the so called Directives.
One Directive had still not been due to be finalized for 2 months after David lost his life.
I have attached a HPI notification from February 2018 several Mine Record Book Entries from May 2018, till March 2019.
I have extracted a few comments further below.
I encourage anyone interested enough to read them yourselves. The Directives MRE in July 2018 is some 9 pages long.
After reading the MRE’s just ask yourself the following questions.
Were the actions/inactions of the RSHQ Mine Inspectors appropriate, timely or effective?
Are the actions/inactions of RSHQ Inspectors defensible?
In February 2018 there was a HPI almost killed 2 workers when approx. 2,000bcm (bank cubic metres) fell from the highwall at S17 Block 32 in Feb 2018 partially buried an excavator and also hit a dump truck.
To me the names of the area of the mine mentioned appear to be closely related and likely impacted by the same issues in place at February 2018.
Are the actions/inactions of RSHQ Inspectors the reason that such strange charges were brought against Middlemount Coal and the SSE in the first place?
Are the RSHQ Inspectors actions/inactions behind the steady downgrading of charges against Middlemount Coal, the SSE Cuthbertson and the dropping of charges against the Mining Manager Milner?
It was a further Five months after the February 2018 HPI, that RSHQ Inspectors were stirred to issue two Section 166 Directives in July 2018 with one Directive with a due completion date of the 31st August 2018.
166 Directive to reduce risk
- If an inspector or inspection officer reasonably believes a risk from coal mining operations may reach an unacceptable level, the inspector or officer may give a directive to any person to take stated corrective or preventative action to prevent the risk reaching an unacceptable level.
At least one of the Directives had been given time extensions that were not due to be completed until 31st August 2018 and the second due to be completed by the 30th November 2018.
There were no Section 167 Directives to suspend operations for unacceptable level of risk ever issued
The February 2018 HPI mentions a wall failure of approximately 2000 bank cubic metres.
From the short video of the incident I have seen, the wall failure that killed Mr. Routledge was many times larger; with multiple individual pieces of rock larger than 40 ft shipping containers.
I will be making a further post in the next few days about the issue of why such strange charges for were brought by RSHQ CEO Mark Stone and the OWHSP.
Notice of confirmation form unplanned movement of material off highwall – 11 February 2018
On Sunday afternoon approx. 1.57pm, material (Approx. 2,000bcm) off the highwall in S17 Block 32 has fallen down covering the bucket and half the stick on EX19 excavator and making contact with Pos 6 tyre on DT48.
MRE – E Middlemount Mine – 10.05.2018 (002)
One of the HPl’s, which occurred on 1 1 Feb 2018 was a slump of material from a highwall. We had a discussion about the actions taken as a result. Geotechnical evaluation and investigation has been conducted by the mine and a radar system has been established for highwall monitoring.
We then went to view the radar set up. This was a very capable set up which communicated to the mine and could send text messages to relevant personnel on a TARP basis. There were two large rocks on one side of the haul road in this area that had rolled down from an old dump area. Mr Cuthbertson undertook to have these moved clear of the haul road.
MRE – E Middlemount Mine Directives – 18.07.2018
MRE-Middlemount-Mine-Directives-18072018
General discussion items included;
– overall geotechnical observations – main points/concerns included;
- dog legs in the pit and plans for pit realignment and monitoring of inaccessible corners in crests.
- Water in highwall and concerns for stability (for example, ponding on berms).
- Geotechnical complexity evident in HW and EWs especially at shot 366 and proximity to the Jellinbah fault and zone of influence.
1 Review Radar Risk Management 31/08/2018
Pursuant to CMSHAs166, the Site Senior Executive must review the radar risk management system to ensure the risk from coal mining operations does not reach an unacceptable level of risk.
Part 1 – immediate radar risk management must be reviewed and include consideration for, but not be limited to;
- Monitoring Shot 366 highwall (HW) and endwall (EW) which are known geotechnically problematic walls however, the radar was NOT actually effectively monitoring the EW. EW monitoring must be addressed.
- The optimal angle of the radar set-up position must be considered when determining the most effective radar risk management strategy. – Radar movement thresholds, triggers and TARP.
- DUE Friday 10 August 2018
Part 2 – develop and implement an effective radar risk management system and include consideration for, but not limited to; – Radar system training at all levels,
- Guidelines for set-up ie consider optimal angles for detection of true movement,
- Limit false alarms ie trickling water, machinery movements,
- radar maintenance,
- setting of alarms,
- acceptable movement thresholds,
- calculating cumulative movement,
- data interrogation and data analysis,
- output summary of movement,
- communication of radar data information, – TARP reviews.
- DUE Friday 31 August 2018
Number Directive Due Date
Pursuant to section 166 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999
2 Geotechnical Model 30/11/2018
Pursuant to CMSHAs166, the Site Senior Executive must support the development of a geotechnical and hydrological model which is required for the fundamentals of safe slope design to establish an acceptable level of risk.
The due date for this Directive reflects the short term plan to address this compliance item.
Mid and Long term planning for geotechnical model development will be provided in schedule form eg may include an in-fill drilling program or planned installation of monitoring equipment such as piezometers.
Model is to be developed by Friday 30 November 2018.
A mid to long term plan for continued/further development must submitted by Friday 30 November 2018.
Middlemount Mine E Directive extension MRE 271118
In consideration of the progress made to date in addressing these 2 Directives, I have extended the due dates for both Directives to EOM March 2019. It is expected the next drilling program of 15 holes will be completed by Dec 2018, data collected and collated by Jan 2019 and analysis completed by Feb 2019 allowing for update of the PHMP and GPL criteria.
In the short term, Mr Darren Cuthbertson provided assurances that the current geotechnical risk management strategy is in accordance with the Geotechnical PHMP v9 document and adequately manages the risk of geotechnical failure. It is understood this PHMP will be significantly updated over the next few months and will include updated considerations for the geotechnical and groundwater models.
Middlemount Mine E Directive Ext MRE 210319
Southern Terrace Pit
S19 block 3 Southern Terrace.
Yes what actions have or haven’t RSHQ Played?
If that was my son or daughter and the system treated their lives with this much contempt,
https://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/mackay/police-courts/middlemount-coal-fined-over-safety-gaps-revealed-after-david-routledge-death/news-story/3a36f369c4e3fe25bcc93abf3a0104bf
I cannot put the full article up due to copyright but some of the article is below The operator of a Bowen Basin mine where a South Mackay grandfather was crushed to death in a high wall collapse has been fined $70,000 after a magistrate found there was “no cavalier approach to safety”.
The case against the mine’s site senior executive was dropped over the death of David Routledge in 2019, while operator Middlemount Coal Pty Ltd pleaded guilty to a downgraded charge linked to safety gaps at the time of the tragedy. Workplace Health and Safety prosecutors removed any allegation those safety gaps caused the fatality.
The court heard investigations following the death revealed the mine had been lacking an implemented Ground Control Management Plan, which is an overarching document containing the components of the Safety and Health Management System and “guides the risk management process for ground control”.
As a result the SHMS was deemed “inadequate”. Brisbane silk Sarah Farnden, for WHS, said the mine had been aware of this 12 months earlier when the gaps were identified by the mines inspectorate. The court heard at the time of the death there was a GCMP but in draft state.
An expert hired by WHS determined its lack did not cause Mr Routledge’s death and “had the requirements of the SHMS been complied with by individuals the incident concerning the … wall failure could have been avoided or adequately managed”.
This Post Has 2 Comments
The mind just boggles, seriously talk about holes in the cheese lining up.
Goes from geotech issues, to equipment and multiple people exposed to serious strata failure event as a result of further issues.
What was the investigation outcomes?
What were the corrective outcomes to prevent reoccurrence?
What inspection regime was put in place to monitor and control this Principle Hazard?
What consideration was given to whole body of burden below a known unstable highwall/endwall.
What mine planning, method of mining and most importantly risk management considerations were undertaken?
Only a draft GCMP in place? In my educated opinion a draft doesn’t live in the SHMS, there for the SHMS is inadequate and or ineffective. These over arching procedures are suppose to be in place and easily accessible by all CMW’s.
RSHQ find non compliance issues, issue MRE’s/ directives grant extensions, how on earth can an extension be issued? There is nothing in the Act & Regs that allows this.
RSHQ’s compliance and enforcement policy speaks clearly to the actions they are suppose to adhere to, yet everything I have read fly’s in the face of their own mission statement.
I’d like to see how their actions are measured and by who! One could safely assume this is done by themselves.
In the end it’s easy to blame the dead I guess, dead men tell no lies, or the truth for that matter.
What about the family and friends of David? I can’t fathom what they have gone through and continue to.
Their search for answers to allow for some closure is meet with a door just slammed in their face and left to wonder and mourn knowing David’s life was only worth $70k.
May David rest in peace.
All by design Stuart, the RSHQ is protected from ever being held accountable for their obvious and outright failures. Watch how it happens again in the upcoming findings for our Son Gareth.