North Goonyella Mine Fire MRE 29th September 2018. “the explosion vent doors on the H40 shaft had been displaced” “Dennis Black (VO) explained the current issues with the monitoring and how most of it was compromised by the current underground environment or else disconnected to prevent analyzer damage.”
MRE – North Goonyella – 29.09.2018.pdf
Explosion vent door on H40 shaft was been blown off.
There is no gas monitoring due it being compromised and equipment not being available.
In other word there has been a methane explosion underground.
SIMTARS mobile gas laboratory and some QMRS equipment had to be recovered from the Exclusion Zone.
North Goonyella Managements action plan of drilling boreholes into the 5 main roadways and remotely sealing will take at least 8 days.
At least 3 days to get equipment on site to seal drifts.
Oh Yes they have decided that there is a “small fire underground”
During the 20 minutes spent at the security gate it was clear to see smoke issuing from the Mine and that the colour and intensity was varying over 24 hours
The Mine explained, that as well as using the GAG and, subject to the degree of success achieved, they were organising to have the ability to introduce seals in the Mains at 52/53 CT by drilling from the surface to introduce plugs into the five mains roadways*
This was estimated to take eight days and will be subject to appropriate risk assessments.
In addition to that equipment is being sourced to remotely seal the portals which is estimated to take three days and again will be subject to appropriate risk assessments. The equipment includes a remote controlled dozer and ‘robot’ to sever the wire rope on the portal emergency sealing shutter.
Drone coverage of the Mine exclusion zone is providing regular feedback. Importantly this had shown that the explosion vent doors on the H40 shaft had been displaced. Peter Baker indicated that this might be timed at 3:30am on Friday where monitoring showed step changes but there was no certainty in that regard.
David Cliff (Consultant) joined the meeting at 9:08am by telephone link.
David Cliff (Consultant) explained the potential for an underground explosion in the present circumstances with reference to all available information, factual and interpreted.
His best advice was that the information available pointed to a small fire.
David Carey (QMRS) explained the potential impact to GAG equipment should an overpressure event occur.
Dennis Black (VO) explained the current issues with the monitoring and how most of it was compromised by the current underground environment or else disconnected to prevent analyzer damage.
The situation at the Mine is constantly changing and this MRE gives the status at 5:06pm today.
Inspectors Richard Gouldstone and Geoff Nugent arrived at NGC Mine at 06:30am on Saturday 29 September 2018. We viewed the Mine from the security gate established to prevent access to the Mine following an escalation in the spontaneous combustion incident currently occurring.
The exclusion zone was subject of a verbal Directive issued on Thursday at 1 Ipm by Inspector Nugent to Mr John Anger (SSE), which is contained in the MRE for that date – i.e.
Due to the unstable and volatile conditions of fire and explosion risk in the underground environment of North Goonye//a Coal Mine and its unpredictable potential to impact any people in all surface areas of the operation both from the risk of an explosion and toxic or irrespirable atmospheres, / Geoff Nugent Inspector of Mines am issuing the SSE of North Goonyella Coal Mine a directive under s167 of the Queensland coal mines safety and health act 1999 to suspend all operations within the exclusion zones established today to remove persons from these until an acceptable level of risk is achieved’
During the 20 minutes spent at the security gate it was clear to see smoke issuing from the Mine and that the colour and intensity was varying over 24 hours* We were satisfied that the main route into the Mine was secure from inadvertent access with suitable security personnel in place.
We travelled on to attend a meeting at the Mine camp in regard to progress on dealing with the spontaneous combustion event arriving at 7:30am.
Update Meeting at 8:30am Saturday 28 September 2018
Attendees —
Dennis Black (VO)
Marek Romanski (UMM)
Neville Impson (Compliance Manager)
Richard Gouldstone (Mines Inspector)
Geoff Nugent (Mines Inspector)
Mike Carter (SSE Millennium)
Peter Baker (Peabody Operations Manager)
Matt Vale (Peabody Legal Counsel)
Gavin Shields (HST Manager)
Brendon Willmann (LW Mechanical Engineer)
Stephen Woods (ISHR)
David Carey (QMRS)
By dial in — John Anger (SSE) and David Cliff (Consultant)
Discussion
Neville Impson gave a commentary on activities and issues during the last 24 hours. This included reference to progress associated with the following risk assessments –
RA generic controls for key hazards, i.e. explosion and fumes
RA and QMRS access to Bleeder fan outside the exclusion zone to scope GAG set-up*
RA assessing ability to connect GAG to bleeder fan
RA each activity to ensure acceptable level of risk
RA for recovering Simtars Lab and QMRS equipment from inside the exclusion zone*
RA for drilling boreholes
RA for installing rocsil plug
The items marked by the asterisks above and a further risk assessment ie Recovery of a lighting tower (just inside the exclusion zone) were forwarded to the DNRME (Inspectors Gouldstone and Nugent) who responded by email to the Mine for each task stating that the Mine had complied with the requirement of the directive issued verbally by Inspector Geoff Nugent on 28/0912018.
The Mine explained, that as well as using the GAG and, subject to the degree of success achieved, they were organising to have the ability to introduce seals in the Mains at 52/53 CT by drilling from the surface to introduce plugs into the five mains roadways*
This was estimated to take eight days and will be subject to appropriate risk assessments. In addition to that equipment is being sourced to remotely seal the portals which is estimated to take three days and again will be subject to appropriate risk assessments. The equipment includes a remote controlled dozer and ‘robot’ to sever the wire rope on the portal emergency sealing shutter.
Drone coverage of the Mine exclusion zone is providing regular feedback. Importantly this had shown that the explosion vent doors on the H40 shaft had been displaced. Peter Baker indicated that this might be timed at 3:30am on Friday where monitoring showed step changes but there was no certainty in that regard.
David Cliff (Consultant) joined the meeting at 9:08am by telephone link.
David Carey (QMRS) explained the intended process of providing protection of personnel who would be deployed to GAG operations. This involved placing a safety bund. Two separate risk assessments will be developed to deal with placing of the safety bund and then operation of the GAG. These were provided later in the day, between 2 and 3pm, to the DNRME who responded by email to the Mine for each task stating that the Mine had complied with the requirement of the directive issued verbally by Inspector Geoff Nugent on 28109/2018.
David Cliff (Consultant) explained the potential for an underground explosion in the present circumstances with reference to all available information, factual and interpreted. He later confirmed by email, to the Mine, his assessment of the situation and the potential likelihood of the hazards presented to the persons undertaking the tasks required to prepare for utilisation of the GAG. The current dynamics of what was seen now to be an underground fire were discussed including its location, origin and various ventilation routes induced with David Cliff drawing from incidents elsewhere to support his interpretation. His best advice was that the information available pointed to a small fire.
David Carey (QMRS) explained the potential impact to GAG equipment should an overpressure event occur. He undertook to include consideration of variation in atmospheric pressure or weather events which may alter the risk profile at the GAG station. This was later addressed in the Mine risk assessment for the task of preparing the site and a second risk assessment for GAG operations.
Dennis Black (VO) explained the current issues with the monitoring and how most of it was compromised by the current underground environment or else disconnected to prevent analyzer damage.
Other matters
The Inspectors later in the day received two risk assessments to, remove drill rods from each of three holes in progress and secondly to relocate the equipment in readiness to begin drilling holes into the mains for the seals as mentioned earlier in this MRE.
The situation at the Mine is constantly changing and this MRE gives the status at 5:06pm today.
