North Goonyella Fire Report Release. Whole Industry is Officially Clueless as to what went wrong.

REASON 2

The only official Information the Mines Inspectorate has ever published is a one page notice put on their website which I have embedded below and the findings. It was published I believe in mid 2019.

The First Principal of Accident Investigation for the Mines Inspectorate is stated to be to be to establish Nature and Cause,

Second is to take all necessary Actions at the Mine Concerned.

Third is to Communicate As Soon As Possible the Results of the Investigation so that all Mines and Mineworkers understand what has gone wrong and to immediately Review their own mine so they are not doing the same thing/or are capable of making the same mistakes

The Moura Number 2 Inquiry only commenced after all Parties, including the Mines Inspectorate and the Company to finalize their own individual Investigations, engage all the expert witnesses they wanted (including from overseas)

In 17 Months from the Disaster all its Months of Public Hearings were completed, extensive written submissions post the Public hearings given and the Findings and Recommendation Published.

By the Completion of the same time as the North Goonyella Fire Investigation, there were Tri-Partite Working Groups involving the Mines Inspectorate, Senior Mining Company Representative and Union Representative.

Most of the 1999 Act and Subsequent 2001 Regulations were in advanced Draft Form.

Recognized Standards were being Developed.

Each Mine was actively taking the Findings of the Moura Inquiry and changing their whole approach to Spontaneous Combustion.

Seminars and Training were being provided all based on what went wrong at Moura.

The Lack of Information/Action from the Mines Inspectorate is beyond disgusting and reprehensible.

In my view they have failed their obligations Under the Act themselves

https://www.dnrme.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/1453361/north-goonyella-high-potential-incident.pdf

The mines inspectorate investigation is ongoing. However, the following preliminary observations
may be relevant to the nature and cause of the incident:
 Review of the mine’s records suggest that gas trends were not given sufficient consideration.
This may have impacted the way in which TARPs were applied and actioned.
 Some key reports relating to the mine’s ventilation plan, gas alarm system and explosion risk
zone controls do not appear to have been reviewed or countersigned by key personnel, as
required under the mine’s safety and health management system.
 There is evidence that some boreholes located deep within the 9N goaf region were
insufficiently sealed, allowing ingress of oxygen into active goaves, with the potential to
escalate conditions for spontaneous combustion.
 There is evidence to suggest that the gas drainage system was being operated to focus on
management of methane instead of the potential spontaneous heating event that was
occurring underground.
 There is evidence to suggest the mine did not follow its own procedures relating to major
ventilation changes.