WHY DID MINISTER VAUGHAN BURY THE COAL MINE EXPLOSION RESEARCH PROJECT 1990? WHAT SCARED THE GOVERNMENT SO MUCH??
Minister Vaughan has been quoted as saying
“Publishing the Report is not in the Interests of the Industry or the Relatives of those killed in Moura No 4 Disaster”.
Here we are 30 years later and another Labor Government and Mines Ministers are Inquiring into the Grosvenor Explosion.
An Inquiry with deliberately narrow terms of Reference.
Well what is in the best Interests of the Industry, Relatives of the Deceased, and those that still work in the Industry?
Keep pretending that The Industry understands all the mechanisms likely to ignite Methane and getting rid of the Flame Safety Lamp has fixed everything.
If we do not understand the likely/possible sources of ignition from 30 years ago, that is a complete fallacy.
Also pretend that the Mines will always control the methane concentrations at the working face to below the explosive limit.
Also keep telling ourselves Management will not just continue exposing workers to explosive mixtures of methane time after time.
Lastly, keep blindly believing that the Mines Inspectors and Government of the day will stop Management continually exposing workers to explosive mixtures of methane, time after time.
Mining Warden Frank Windridge’s words still ring true
The previous three Inquiries into major explosions in Queensland coal mines have consistently made recommendations aimed at addressing perceived deficiencies in the coal industry’s arrangements for training, or the state of knowledge of industry personnel. There has also consistently been the conduct of seminars and symposia as a response to those disasters, accompanied by the production of publications about the hazards of underground coal mining revisited in the course of those Inquiries. These measures have, however, clearly not been effective in the longer term with the industry displaying, as it does, a capacity to lose sight of the lessons of the past and to not maintain an adequate knowledge base among key personnel.
In response to the Moura No 2 incident, the subject of this Inquiry, there will no doubt be an early spate of training, the conduct of seminars and symposia and, probably, the production of more publications. The immediate past track record is that these measures will be effective for somewhere around a decade with fundamental problems beginning to re-emerge somewhat earlier.
