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Moranbah North Spontaneous Combustion Event. MRE 10th March 2021. “I Expressed My Concern About The Risk Assessment Team Not Having Access To All Information Available (Technical Expert Reports). Access To Evidence Is A Basic Fundamental For Assessing Risk. This Matter Must Be Resolved So That It Doesn’t Erode The Re-entry Risk Assessment.” Anglo Are Behaving Worse Than George Mason At Moura No 2

Moranbah North Spontaneous Combustion Event. MRE 10th March 2021. “I expressed my concern about the risk assessment team not having access to all information available (Technical Expert reports). Access to evidence is a basic fundamental for assessing risk. This matter must be resolved so that it doesn’t erode the re-entry risk assessment.” Anglo are behaving worse than George Mason at Moura No 2

It is the opinion of the Inquiry that events at Moura surrounding assumptions as to the state of knowledge of the night shift on 7 August, and the safety of those at the mine, represent a passage of management neglect and non-decision which must never be repeated in the coal mining industry.  Mineworkers place their trust in management and have the right to expect management to take responsible decisions in respect to their safety.  They also have the right to expect management to keep them informed on any matter likely to affect their safety and welfare.

 It is regrettable that the air of caution, arising out of uncertainty, which was exhibited at the mine in order to bring forward the sealing of 512 Panel did not extend to the general safety and welfare of the workforce and, in particular, to informing and keeping persons out of the mine for a time subsequent to that sealing.

https://www.publications.qld.gov.au/dataset/moura-mining-disaster-inquiry-reports/resource/a8e96409-52a3-4075-b4a6-b1224ecc8e63

On the 10th Of March 2021 Inspector Brown returns to Moranbah North for an Inspection that includes the areas above LW605 where 5 inertisation boreholes have been drilled and are situated above the Longwall 605 goaf and in close proximity to the current face line workings.

20210310 MRE

The issue of how the contents of the two Technical Expert reports have quite deliberately withheld from the production and engineering workers on the re-entry risk assessments.

They are only provided with a Summary written by Anglo Management and told trust us.

  • We are telling you all we think you should know.
  • It is all under some sort of claimed Legal Privilege anyway and we (Anglo) are not going to give it to you.
  • Anglo could waive this so called Legal Privilege and give you all the information we have to assess whether its safe to order you to go underground, but we will not waive that made up and uncontested legal privilege.
  • Its all totally unrelated to the Anglo Grosvenor Ministerial Board of Inquiry starting the same day.
  • Anglo refuses to give the two Technical Reports to Inspector Brown and therefore the whole of RSHQ as well, so why are the likes of you our employees so upset upset

This quite deliberate action by Anglo Management is far worse than that detailed against Moura No 2 Management and Undermanager George Mason in particular in the Moura No 2 Inquiry.

Worse, it is all no doubt all in written confession within the Anglo Moranbah North, Corporate and in some form the RSHQ system.

I have a question for RSHQ CEO Mark Stone.

Why have no prosecutions been launched against at least the Moranbah North SSE before the Statutory Time limit was deliberately allowed to expire.?

Why did RSHQ Inspectors Smith and company not mention any of this at the Grosvenor Inquiry

 

By far the most interesting section is that of firstly the Close out meeting Site Meetings which occur with a full shift of actual underground miners rostered on that shift

Close out meeting

I held a close out meeting with Mr XXXX (SSE) and Mr YYYY (Operations Manager)

While I did provided a brief summary of the inspection, the main discussion centred on the level of anxiety held within the workforce about understanding what has occurred, if the mine is safe to re-enter and how to prevent reoccurrence.

I expressed my concern about the risk assessment team not having access to all information available (Technical Expert reports). Access to evidence is a basic fundamental for assessing risk.

This matter must be resolved so that it doesn’t erode the re-entry risk assessment.

The risk assessment team is recommended to consider the basic rules of evidence when referencing material to support their assessment, is the material or document Valid, Sufficient, Authentic and Current?

For the moment the mine is still working through a process to be able to form the response to the Directive

Site Meetings

We returned to the Moranbah North muster area to attend the Start of Tour address facilitated by the SSE, during the course of this presentation I participated in the discussion with the crews.

I provided an explanation how and why the Directive was given as well as the function of a Mines Inspector. Further I explained that dealing with the Directive to determine an acceptable level of risk is present is priority, in parallel the site have also engaged a number of both internal and external technical experts to analyse what has occurred on the 20/02/21 and what the data indicates both before and after this event. To date I am yet to received copies of these reports, the expectation is they will support the SSEs pending response to the Directive.

I later participated with Mr XXXXX in a meeting with just the Longwall 605 crew discussing the ongoing matters that have occurred since the incident 20/02/21.

The Longwall crew raised a number of concerns which require review by the management team with regards how the initial response was managed. Understandably there is a high level of concern held by Coal Mine Workers about what has occurred as well as understanding the mechanism that produced the overpressure.

A significant concern of the coal mine workers is also about having all available evidence accessible to the risk assessment team, currently two of the reports are withheld through legal privilege and a short summary of this information has only so far been provided to the risk assessment team. The discussion extended over an hour and was constructive as well as helpful for myself as the Lead Investigator.

 

I could write about this for pages and pages and point out how deeply flawed the whole process so called Risk Assessment Process Anglo are engaging in.

Instead I will just quote from Mining Warden Windridge’s Moura No @ Report and then just ask a few questions.

 

 

  1. How are the small number of miners representing a cross section of the Production and Engineering workers supposed to  participate in a proper Risk Assessment.? How when all the Management Representatives and Internal and External Consultants present in the Risk Assessment have no doubt read the 2 Reports mentioned in full, while all they get is a Summary provided by the same Anglo Management? Especially as they will be outnumbered at least 2 to 1. Does this meet the Standard required for such Risk assessment?
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