“The use of “And” (linking triggers) as well as “But” statements (creating conflict) are not acceptable” in Spontaneous Combustion TARPS. RSHQ inspectors MRE MNC Spontaneous Combustion LW 605 1st March 2021
On the 1st March 2021 Video Conference between Four (4) RSHQ Inspectors, a SIMTARS Experts and on site Anglo Grosvenor most Senior Statutory, Production, Ventilation and Technical Management but not the Ventilation Officer.
At the conclusion of the MRE it states
The SSE must provide gas monitoring data that is representative of the area in the goaf where it is suspected a heating has taken place and, the data must demonstrate an acceptable level of risk to be present.
RSHQ Officers Paul Brown (Inspector of Mines) Geoff Nugent (Inspector of Mines), Stephen Smith (Deputy Chief Inspector of Mines), Kevin Poynter (Senior Inspector of Mines), Martyn Watkinson Executive Mining Engineer SIMTARS
This is 8 days before hearings resume at the Grosvenor Board of Inquiry where on the 9th, Inspector Smith is due to be the first sworn witness called. Inspector Nugent the second witness on the 11th and on the 17th Mr. Watkinson from SIMTARS is scheduled to give evidence.
Again not one of the ongoing spontaneous combustion issues at Moranbah North ever get mentioned by any of these appointed Public Servants at the Resource Ministerial Board of Inquiry.
Why not?
The MRE is the link directly below
There are a further Two (2) Anglo Corporate Representatives.
Also Two (2) External Technical Expert Consultants one from the University of Queensland.
The other from a company called Serinus that according to its website amongst other things it specializes in
- Mine gas management advice and training,
- Spontaneous combustion advice and training;
- Risk assessments (technical advice and facilitation),
- Management plan development and review, including principal hazard management plans;
- Mine gas monitoring assessment, advice and training
- TARP development and review
I see that there are several speakers from the 4 named Inspectors giving Presentations at the QMISHC Safety Conference on at the Gold Coast as well as Mr. Watkinson from SIMTARS and Dr Dr. Bharath Belle the Technical Lead/Principal Manager at Anglo American Coal Business in Australia.
As well there is also Dr Cliff from the University giving a presentation about TARPS.
I see that Dr Cliff states
For TARPS to be effective they must be simple, robust and be capable of being applied at all times without resorting to specialist equipment, techniques or external expertise
Perhaps they might all volunteer their views about the use of the word “AND” given the controversy of its use as evidence in the Grosvenor Inquiry.
Also would any of these gentlemen care to give their views on the following in the MRE from the 21st of April about the use of the word BUT in TARPS.
Should the technical and Statutory competence of anyone who proposes putting “ANDS” and “BUTS” in in TARPS be subject to Investigation and the Issuance of a Show cause potentially by the CEO of RSHQ
Moranbah North Mine have a technical report that is referenced for establishing TARP13 and is also used for guidance in TARP0009, the document is “Final Report, Spontaneous Combustion TARP Trigger Review” issued to Moranbah Nth Mine 5 February 2020, IOM
Brown is seeking further advice within the Inspectorate and RSHQ on the technical data contained within the report.
IOM Brown explained the draft TARP0009 was not considered to be conservative enough for re-entry. Examples provided were;
Surface LW605 Goaf Monitoring System including Simtars Lab and Goaf Drainage
The use of “And” (linking triggers) as well as “But” statements (creating conflict) are not acceptable.
I would hope that at least someone who is at the Conference about what they know about Moranbah North and why it was never mentioned at the Grosvenor Inquiry.
Also I would hope that these
After all they are not giving evidence under oath, no one is being prosecuted and no ones Statutory Ticket under threat.
After all not even the Grosvenor Inquiry believed the theory put forward by various so called experts.
56. The Board considers the wind blast hypothesis as unlikely for several reasons:
a. Given the estimated height of the spanning unit, at least 32 metres above the roof line, applying even a low bulking factor makes it unlikely that a sufficient air gap existed to account for the force of the pressure wave;
b. The lack of precedent for such an event in the long history of mining the GM seam militates against this cause; and
57. Having found that a strata fall in the goaf is an unlikely explanation of the first pressure wave, the Board reviewed the evidence indicating a methane explosion in the goaf, ultimately concluding that it is the likely explanation.
This MRE is the first time that Moranbah North Management and likely the Anglo Corporate Management try and justify their theory that the overpressure event was only a roof fall and the active out of control spontaneous event that magically occurred at the same time is just pure coincidence and totally unrelated. You have to give Anglo a gold medal for consistency.
Moranbah North technical experts and staff provided their assumptions of the overpressure caused by a goaf fall, these discussions coincided with viewing of the video footage and gas data screen shots.
Further to the discussion on the cause of overpressure there was extensive discussion on the analysis of the gas data by all Technical experts involved, both Anglo experts and external experts (consultants).
To the credit of the Inspectors involved they seem to have totally dismissed
While some of the results of the data analysed was stated by Technical Expert as inconclusive, the Moranbah North Mines initial findings are that of a heating having occurred in close proximity to the 1600m chainage (not exact) and bias the TG side of mid face zone, the exact location cannot be identified within the data.
Mr XXXX and Mr YYYY provided their assumptions to support the location of the heating and, the current drilling / Inertisation strategy.
Mr ZZZZ explained he understood the legislative requirements involving a review of the sites 2nd workings systems, the Risk Assessment, SOP and subordinate systems i:e TARPs.
Earlier Inspector Brown had written amongst the key points discussed
- References to technical papers for discussion on the assumed goaf wash for LW605.
- Goaf well operations leading up to the withdrawal and their current status.
- Inertisation capacity both pre and post withdrawal, this was consistent with the information provided at the site meeting 24/02/2021 and site surface inspection 26/02/2021.
- Viewing and discussion on video footage from various locations across the faceline.
- Discussion on pressure differential across 605 goaf and collar pressures recorded on Main Fans.
The mines environmental monitoring is stated to be functioning at normal background levels. The principal concern held by Inspectors on this is prior to the event 20/02/2021 and then approximately 12 hours after the event the environmental monitoring was also within normal background parameters according to the mines Real Time and Tube Bundle system, bag samples from the goaf wells were also slowly returning to normal background.
At this point a short break was called for by IOM Brown to discuss the material provided in the presentation with Inspectors.
Prior to resuming the meeting IOM Brown had a discussion with Mr ZZZZ and Mr AAAA about the how the site plans to provide gas monitoring data that is representative of the area in the goaf where a heating is suspected to have occurred and, how any measures taken to monitor and inertise not only for re-entry but also how this may assist the longwall recommencing production, further to this consideration to the period of time planned to be idle at 21 CT MG605 for maintenance and repairs.
On resumption of the meeting IOM Brown provided advice to the SSE regarding evidence required for the Directive response.
The advice was based on the discussion already held with For the response to the Directive the SSE must provide gas monitoring data that is representative of the area in the goaf where it is suspected a heating has taken place and, the data must demonstrate an acceptable level of risk to be present.
http://serinushse.com.au/mine-safety/
Mr XXXX commenced the meeting by providing a site update of Inertisation capability and drilling activities. The timeline of the incident formed part of the initial introduction.
The meeting covered the timeline of events leading up to the whole of mine withdrawal on the 20/02/2021. This included details of the longwalls operational status both before 1845hrs 20/02/2021 and immediately after the overpressure was experienced by the longwall face crew as well as persons in close proximity to the 605 faceline. It was explained there was a brief resumption of production after Coal Mine Workers inspected the faceline for any anomalies and some period later the whole of mine withdrawal was activated on an active goaf TARP trigger for Spontaneous Combustion.
Other key points discussed in this meeting:
- Geotechnical hazards and seam gas content.
- Strata consolidation conducted in the weeks preceding the 20/02/2021.
- Technical data for products used in ground consolidation.
- References to technical papers for discussion on the assumed goaf wash for LW605.
- Goaf well operations leading up to the withdrawal and their current status.
- Inertisation capacity both pre and post withdrawal, this was consistent with the information provided at the site meeting 24/02/2021 and site surface inspection 26/02/2021.
- Viewing and discussion on video footage from various locations across the faceline.
- Discussion on pressure differential across 605 goaf and collar pressures recorded on Main Fans.
- The mines environmental monitoring is stated to be functioning at normal background levels. The principal concern held by Inspectors on this is prior to the event 20/02/2021 and then approximately 12 hours after the event the environmental monitoring was also within normal background parameters according to the mines Real Time and Tube Bundle system, bag samples from the goaf wells were also slowly returning to normal background.
- Moranbah North technical experts and staff provided their assumptions of the overpressure caused by a goaf fall, these discussions coincided with viewing of the video footage and gas data screen shots.
- Further to the discussion on the cause of overpressure there was extensive discussion on the analysis of the gas data by all Technical experts involved, both Anglo experts and external experts (consultants). While some of the results of the data analysed was stated by Technical Expert as inconclusive, the Moranbah North Mines initial findings are that of a heating having occurred in close proximity to the 1600m chainage (not exact) and bias the TG side of mid face zone, the exact location cannot be identified within the data.
