The closest thing to the truth about what happened at North Goonyella Spontaneous Combustion Fire and Explosions. 190 Page Affidavit in New York Supreme Court

It is well over 4 years since the fire, explosions and bulldozing of the portals at North Goonyella.

All that the geniuses at the RSHQ have ever published about North Goonyella is a one page statement in 2019 and 2 press releases about court cases saying that there is court action about removing the unspecified Statutory Tickets of two officials they do not name 

https://www.rshq.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/1453361/north-goonyella-high-potential-incident.pdf

https://www.rshq.qld.gov.au/media/2021/former-north-goonyella-mine-officials-statutory-certificates-of-competency-cancelled

https://www.rshq.qld.gov.au/media/2022/court-refuses-stay-of-enforcement-action-against-former-mine-officials

There is another a public document that is 190 pages in all. However it was not published in Queensland or even Australia.

It was part of a class action against Peabody for misleading the Stock Market and filed in the New York Supreme Court on the 21st of March 2021

2021-03-19 – 0038 PEABODY ENERGY – AMENDED COMPLAINT (3023799.1) (1)

All the RSHQ have ever said about the events is

At this time, persons of interest have exercised their right under the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 not to be interviewed by the inspectorate unless compelled by law to do so. As such, no interviews have been conducted yet.

The mines inspectorate investigation is ongoing. However, the following preliminary observations may be relevant to the nature and cause of the incident:

• Review of the mine’s records suggest that gas trends were not given sufficient consideration. This may have impacted the way in which TARPs were applied and actioned.
• Some key reports relating to the mine’s ventilation plan, gas alarm system and explosion risk zone controls do not appear to have been reviewed or countersigned by key personnel, as required under the mine’s safety and health management system.
• There is evidence that some boreholes located deep within the 9N goaf region were insufficiently sealed, allowing ingress of oxygen into active goaves, with the potential to escalate conditions for spontaneous combustion.
• There is evidence to suggest that the gas drainage system was being operated to focus on management of methane instead of the potential spontaneous heating event that was occurring underground.
  There is evidence to suggest the mine did not follow its own procedures relating to major ventilation changes.

I have no doubt at all that the Grosvenor Mine Explosion would not have happened when and how it did, if RSHQ Inspectors had of remotely done their job in releasing the findings and Recommendations of their Investigation Report into North Goonyella; and followed up with other mines to ensure the other Mines actively reviewed their Spontaneous Combustion plans and methane management plans.

As far as the 190 page filing in New York, it seems as far as RSHQ, the Resources Minister or the State Government are concerned it might as well be written in Swahili. 

Here we are 4 years along since North Goonyella, over 2 years since Grosvenor Explosion, 18 months since the Ministerial Inquiry into Grosvenor, months since a formal decision of no prosecutions against Anglo Coal or its Officials at Grosvenor.

I do not understand and never will why the RSHQ just will not publish anything about their Nature and Cause Investigations into first North Goonyella and also Grosvenor beyond fear of ridicule, allegations of failure in regulatory oversight and/or incompetence.

North Goonyella and Grosvenor mine the same seam and are probably 20km apart as the crow flies

If anyone can tell me that the Grosvenor Explosion would have occurred when and how it did; after RSHQ getting proper information out to the Industry and follow up ensuring that other Mines actively looked at what went wrong and reviewed their procedures, please do so.

There are 9 unnamed coal mine workers who were interviewed and provided statements for the lawyers acting for the  Oregon Public Employees Retirement Fund.

Except for CW 9 who was a Regional Inspector of Mines at the time, the other 8 are all senior management from Peabody, the majority directly employed at North Goonyella.

I imagine there is a good chance that these unnamed people refused to speak to the Mines Inspectorate.

2021-03-19 – 0038 PEABODY ENERGY – AMENDED COMPLAINT (3023799.1) (1)

For those interested please take the time to read the affidavit.

The comments about the events when the Underground Mine Manager Romanski and a small volunteer team went underground are interesting. In part they state

 

CW-7 recalled that about 10 days into the period of elevated gas levels, CITEC still detected the ethylene, which was uncommon in mines.

CW-7 explained that this gas was more common at plants where timber was burning and signified to miners that there is trouble and certainly an “event” is occurring. According to CW7, the presence of ethylene was brought up by employees at the morning briefings and discussed at meetings of the critical incident team.

132. CW-7 recalled, in response to this concern, Romanski took a group of three or four people into the mine to adjust the position of the monitors. CW-7 explained that Romanski thought the readings were inaccurate and a result of incorrect positioning of the equipment.

According to CW-7, one of the men that entered the mine was an electrician, who upon exiting told CW-7, “I am not [expletive] going back in there” and made it clear to CW-7 that he would refuse to re-enter the mine if asked.

 

 

• CW-1 was employed as a Manager – Financial Modeling – at Peabody’s Australian headquarters in Brisbane from November 2018 to December 2019. Prior to that, CW1 was the Commercial Superintendent North Goonyella Coal from June 2012 to November 2018.
• CW-2 was employed as a Process Engineer for Peabody from February 2014 to July 2018 and rotated between the Moorvale, North Goonyella, and Wilpinjong
• CW-3 was employed by Peabody as Manager of the Accounting team throughout the Class Period.
• CW-4 was employed with Peabody throughout the Class Period and served as a Business Director during the Class Period at Peabody’s St. Louis, Missouri headquarters
• CW-5 was employed at Peabody from before the Class Period through early summer 2018.  CW-5 served as a Project Manager and Engineer with a focus on Longwall Move Optimization, including at North Goonyella
• CW-6 was an employee of Peabody from before the Class Period until August 2019, most recently as the Health Safety Training Manager.²² Following the North Goonyella “spontaneous combustion” (referred to herein as “spon com”), CW-6 was assigned to the Incident Management Team (“IMT”) at North Goonyella and served as the scribe for that team.
• CW-7 was employed as a Superintendent by Peabody at the North Goonyella mine from March 2018 to October 2018. During this time, CW-7 had responsibility for the nitrogen pumps that were tasked with reducing oxygen levels in the mine. Prior to his time with Peabody, CW-7 worked as a consultant for other major coal companies in Australia.
• CW-8 was an Engineer for Peabody from May 2018 to January 2021. CW-8 began his tenure with Peabody working with the engineering team at North Goonyella Mine before transitioning to the Incident Management Team (“IMT”) where he took the role of Planning Coordinator for approximately 7-10 months beginning in September 2018
• CW-9 was a Regional Inspector of Mines at the Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy (f/k/a the QMI) in Central Queensland from March 2017 to March 2019. CW- 9 has approximately 44 years of underground coal mining experience including in Queensland, Australia. CW-9’s specialty was ventilation and gas, which made him well-suited to address the issues at North Goonyella.