KEY ISSUE 2 ADEQUACY of the MINE’S RESPONSE to HPI’s on LW 103 and 104 between 1st JULY 2019 and 5th MAY 2020

KEY ISSUE 2 WORKER INVOLVEMENT ADEQUACY of the MINE’S RESPONSE to HPI’s on LW 103 and 104 between 1st JULY 2019 and 5th MAY 2020

 FINDINGS

1.  ANGLO GROSVENOR MANAGEMENT DO NOT INVOLVE CONTRACT PRODUCTION and ENGINEERING WORKERS in DEVELOPMENT of OR REVIEW of PRINCIPAL HAZARD MANAGEMENT PLANS as REQUIRED under the CMSHA and CMSHR
2.  ANGLO GROSVENOR MANAGEMENT DO NOT INVOLVE CONTRACT PRODUCTION and ENGINEERING WORKERS under their CHANGE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

 RECOMMENDATIONS 

1. CHANGE MANAGEMENT be INCLUDED as an ADDITIONAL PRINCIPAL HAZARD for UNDERGROUND COAL MINES.
2. CHANGE MANAGEMENT be INCLUDED as a PRINCIPAL HAZARD for OPEN CUT COAL MINES

 EVIDENCE
SECOND WORKINGS PROCEDURES

 There has been nothing presented to the Grosvenor Mine Inquiry that demonstrates PRODUCTION and ENGINEERING WORKERS in DEVELOPMENT of OR REVIEW LW104 SECOND WORKINGS PROCEDURES.

 This is the only Reference and there is nothing to Indicate the ACTUAL Cross Section

4.1         Risk Summary

A Workplace Risk Assessment and Control (WRAC) GRO-10671-RA-LW104 was conducted on the 04 December 2019 following the principles outlined in AS/NZS ISO 31000 format and complying with the Anglo American Integrated Risk Management requirements. 

• A representative cross-section of affected coal mine workers were involved and identified hazards that exposed personnel to an unacceptable level of risk.
• The proposed controls have been deemed to provide an acceptable level of risk.
• No hazards identified were deemed unquantifiable.
• No non-consensus issues were raised during the risk assessment.

THERE ARE MAJOR CHANGES FROM the THREE PREVIOUS LONGWALL BLOCKS

 Email above (including attachment) forwarded from UMM to DNRME Inspector of Mines – “We will have a second TG roadway for the first couple of pillars in LW104 and looking for a suitable way to manage this. We have multiple options and just want to run our preferred option past you to see if we have missed anything. (Especially with the new legislation changes)”.

 Unlike previous longwall blocks the perimeter road will be sealed off prior to production commencing. A dual purpose (upcast/downcast) shaft has been installed adjacent to the LW104 install road. The shaft will operate as an upcast shaft during installation of the longwall, generating additional ventilation.

Once all risks have been assessed and addressed the shaft ventilation will be reversed and bulk air coolers will deliver chilled air to the longwall face

 MRE 6^th JUNE ROOF FALL DEVELOPMENT TRAPPING 4 MINEWORKERS at FACE

1.0 Incident – Fall of ground MG102 C Heading inbye 18CT

Our attendance at the Mine had been prompted by the telephone call from Mr Bull to Inspector Graham Callinan at 5am earlier in the day.

Mr Bull reported a High Potential Incident in 102 MG ‘C’ heading where a roof fall had occurred approximately 36m inbye from 18CT. The dimension of the fall was 14m long to 5m high with only 0.8m width to either side of the fall remaining of the roof.

The fall occurred at 22:10pm Sunday 5 June, after the ERZC had noticed rapid movement on a tell-tale at chainage 45m. He directed the shuttle car driver to park the vehicle at the boot end and told the CM crew to tram the Joy 12CM12 outbye to commence Code B secondary support.

However the roof failed as the ERZC was again reading the tell-tale he took evasive action, running outbye of the fall.

Once the dust cleared he returned to the edge of the fall and guided the four crew members from inbye the fall to safety outbye of the fall.

Movement on the tell-tale had been reported from the previous shift and deteriorated quickly at the commencement of the nightshift.

Major roof fall that occurs in MG 102 at C heading inbye 18 c/t that occurs at 22:10pm on the 5th and Inspectors not made aware of until 5 am

 The Inspectors indicated that they intend to –Identify the process the Mine has followed to deal with change management

 Support condition – The fall had occurred approximately 10m inbye of the support pattern for 18CT intersection and stopped approximately 20m from the face of the heading. A 8x 1.8mJX bolt per metre(roof) pattern was being utilised and failure had occurred between the 2 outermost bolts.

The support pattern had been changed from that installed in 102MG previously by removing the need to install 2x 8.2m Megabolts at 4m spacing.

 This had been subject to a change management process dated 20/05/16. Inspector Gouldstone asked if a staged reduction in roof support had been considered

 The decision to dispense with installing megabolts as primary roof support at the cut face had been reached after wide ranging discussion and input from technically qualified personnel from both the mining and geotechnical disciplines with the outcome being to move to installing only 8×1 JX bolts as Code A support.

There is an anomaly which I asked the Mine to clarify. The Mine Change Management Procedure which I was presented with shows that if a ‘low or medium change to the risk category is assessed at Step 2, in change of impact type, then a JSA is to be undertaken and a SWI may need to be written’.

It was reported to me that a JSA was not conducted but that crews were consulted through the process.

I asked for proof of consultation in that regard. I ask that the Mine produce any risk assessment process they followed which included coal mine workers.

The email from M.KasanguIa to M.Smyth with a tool Box Talk for crews outlining the trial of removal of Megabolts and highlighting the installation of tell-tales every 15m is ambiguous.

I would ask the Mine to clarify if the decision to close tell-tale centres to 15m has been complied with. The exchanges between M.Kasangula and Undermanager, 5 June which are contained in the fourth document section 7 suggest that he reiterated that they should be installed at 15m centres intervals.