Mines Rescue Re-Entry Protocols. Mines Rescue Explosibility Matrix and TARP’s
The deployment of the Mines Rescue Brigade Underground in North Goonyella was discussed in the MRE dated the 19th of September..
The Inspectors referred the Mine Management to the QMRS guidelines and procedures.
2014 QMRSGuidelinesforMinesRescueOperations (1)
The most relevant pages are
- 13 Analysis system of a potentially explosive atmosphere,
- 15 Explosibility Matrix and TARP, and
- 17 General Controls
The Inspectors seem to be formally pointing out the Restrictions on Deployment Underground due to the active Heating (Spontaneous Combustion Event) in the 9Nth Longwall.
The highlighted sections of the Matrix and TARP section define the No-Entry Restriction.
There is a “Known Ignition Source” in the Heating including confirmed presence of Ethylene
As the Inspectors point out there is an “unknown explosibility environments”, but we do know that Methane has reached between 10% and 18% at Tube 24 between the 3rd and 5th of September.
The Oxygen ranges from roughly 10.5% to 8%
The Explosive Range of Methane is 5% to 15% mixed with Normal Air.
There would be explosive mixtures in the 9Nth area somewhere and the exact location of the Heating and the content of the atmosphere are of “Unknown Explosibility”
The Mines Rescue Service by their own guidelines must go through their own Independent Risk Management process to decide whether conditions are at an “Acceptable Level of Risk” to allow Mines Rescue Teams to Re-Enter the Mine.
There are no Workers Underground to “Rescue”.
This is an “Asset Recovery Operation” without any pressure to deploy for the “Saving of Life”
“The meeting discussed the explosibility risk and potentially unknown explosibility environments from TB 29 to and around the heating event.
The Inspectors referred NGC management team to QMRS explosibility guidelines and re-entry procedures as a reference.”
