Procedural non compliance during shotfiring activities “popping” rocks on Longwall Face. At the time of the shot being fired an ERZC was  on return side. The ICAM investigation IN. 160558 was discussed, there were a number of items requiring review due to lack of detail or inappropriate actions recommended.

Before I return to the Mines Inspectorate MRE’s and Methane this MRE gives another insight into how Grosvenor Mines Mandated SHMS Procedures for Specific regulations are followed.

MRE – Grosvenor Coal Mine Shotfiring LW – 20.03.20147.pdf

Inspector Brown towards the end of the MRE identifies the reasons for the Inspection by Inspector Brown

ICAM – The ICAM investigation IN. 160558 was discussed, there were a number of items requiring review due to lack of detail or inappropriate actions recommended.

As a point of interest, Les Marlborough is one of the Two Anglo Compliance Managers in the meeting with Inspector Paul Brown over the Shotfiring Incident.

I wonder if Grosvenor will be better at following their own procedures and, properly investigating and reporting them with appropriate actions, when he was Compliance Manager; than when he becomes Mines Inspector a bit later in 2017?

It also demonstrates the lack of appetite of the Mines Department to address system non compliance for well known potential hazards.

NO DIRECTIVE IS ISSUED, ONLY RECOMMENDATIONS to REVIEW without calling up any of the Inspectors Powers under the Ac

In this case firing shots in an ERZ 1, in this case breaking rocks on the longwall face using Explosives.

You can read the Non-Compliances for yourself.

They are too plentiful to summarize without just copying the MRE.

However I will say it is hard to imagine a scenario in which more fundamental many parts of Coal Regulation 221, the Explosives Regulation, Explosives Act and Australian Standards in one go.

From , an electric detonator only half inserted into a chub of Senatel, the detonator is taped in place to

No Sentries

No date entered onto the JSA,

Outbye ERZ Controller and Shotfirer on the day of the Incident had not signed or indicated a review was conducted of the JSA.

SWI for Shotfiring on the Longwall – A number of items were discussed, section 3 demonstrates the use of a Panther drill slung by a chain block, this is not a safe system for drilling as the drill unit is not designed to be suspended and does not have lifting points,

MRE – Grosvenor Coal Mine Shotfiring LW – 20.03.20147.pdf

Today Monday 20 March, a meeting was held at Grosvenor Coal Mine. In attendance were Compliance Managers Mr Les Marlborough, Mr Cec Ivers and Inspector of Mines Paul Brown.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the shotfiring incident that took place on the 3/02/17. The context of the meeting involved discussing Investigation material supplied to the DNRM by the SSE Mr Garde.

Standard Operating Procedure – While there were matters identified what could be improved in the current SOP, if the procedure had been followed diligently as it was, the incident could have been prevented. There is however justification to conduct a review of the SOP and underpinning WRAC.

The SOP has references to P3 and P5 type explosives as one example of information to review. It is recommended as part of this review to map the requirements of the Coal Mine Regulations 2001 QGNI 1 Handhng Explosives in Underground Mines, the Explosives Regulations 2003, Explosives Act 1999 and the Australian Standards 2187.1 & .2.

The current Underground Shotfiring Permit form – Lacks detail for scope, this is an area for improvement. Working examples from other mines were viewed and discussed.

The JSA for Popping Rocks on LWIOI

– There is no date entered onto the JSA,

the Outbye ERZ Controller and Shotfirer on the day of the Incident had not signed or indicated a review was conducted of the JSA.

The JSA should reflect the individual task being undertaken, there is no indication this was considered.

1. Access to the TG was not identified.
2. Blast fumes are not identified as a hazard
3. Use of Sentries not identified,

again as discussed if the SOP had been followed to control access, use of Sentries and conduct communication it could have been prevented.

SWI for Shotfiring on the Longwall – A number of items were discussed, section 3 demonstrates the use of a Panther drill slung by a chain block, this is not a safe system for drilling as the drill unit is not designed to be suspended and does not have lifting points,

Panther steels can be ordered at different lengths starting at 300mm, it is recommended to maintain fit for purpose drill steels and review the SWI on this matter.

Section 6 of the SWI, this section identifies an electric detonator only half inserted into a chub of Senatel, the detonator is taped in place.

This does not represent the safe method of inserting an Electronic Detonator recommended by the OEM Orica. There is risk of causing a premature ignition by impact damage / crimping when tamped into a hole or, at the least, possibly cause misfire by less than adequate amount of detonator within the chub of explosive.

Mr Ivers agreed the SWI is incorrect and must be reviewed.

ICAM – The ICAM investigation IN. 160558 was discussed, there were a number of items requiring review due to lack of detail or inappropriate actions recommended. Inspector Brown recommended a review of the ICAM to ensure an acceptable level of risk is achieved.

Number		Recommendation	Due Date
1	Explosives		NIA

As an outcome of a site meeting and details within the attached MRE the SSE is recommended to review the following documents

• , The ICAM Incident Investigation Report (Incident number 160558), report date 26/02/171 incident date 3/02/17 for Procedural non compliance during shotfiring activities.
• The underpinning WRAC for SOP 221, referenced in the CMS&HR 2001, regulation 203.

3. The Standard Operating Procedure referenced in the CMS&HR 2001, regulation 221.
4. The Standard Work instruction (SWI) for GRO-8809-SWI-Sh0tfiring on the Longwall, VI .
5. The mines Permit to Shotfire system, (this is linked to the SOP).

The SSE is required to give a response to the recommendation by close of business 7/04/1 7, the response should include references to each line item with action plan timeline where applicable.

REGULATION 221 Standard operating procedures

1. An underground mine must have a standard operating procedure for using explosives and explosive-powered tools based on the risk assessment carried out under section 203.
2. The procedure must provide for the following—

a) transporting explosives underground;

b) storing explosives underground;

c) selecting, handling, preparing, charging and firing explosives;

d) using explosive-powered tools;

e) inspecting for flammable gas and combustible dust before a shot or explosive-powered tool is fired;

f) inspecting for flammable gas, airborne contaminants, blast damage and misfires after a shot is fired;

(g) establishing the location of—

 i) other workplaces likely to be affected by the shotfiring; and

ii) persons likely to be affected by a shot or explosive-powered tool;

h) warning persons mentioned in paragraph (g)(ii) and, if necessary, evacuating them or preventing them from entering a dangerous place;

i) preventing persons being affected by fumes from used explosives;

j) protecting strata supports, ventilation control devices, equipment and other structures from blast damage;

k) dealing with misfired explosives or things likely to contain a misfired explosive;

l) testing equipment used for shotfiring;

m) conditions under which, and locations where, only explosives declared under the Explosives Act 1999, section 8 to be authorised explosives may be used for shotfiring purposes;

n) recording blasting details;

o) disposing of explosives safely.

HPI

Event – At 3.55pm 3/2/17 shot firing took place  on the long wall 101 face “popping rock”. At the time of the shot being fired an ERZC was  on return side in TG 101 “C” HDG 14 to 15 inspecting  area. (no injury occurred) The shot firer was XXXX. From initial statements all actions taken by the shotfirer were in line with procedures.

ERZC  was supervising activities in the tailgate of the longwall. Control contacted the tailgate workgroup to confirm all persons were out of the tailgate as per procedure. ERZC  was allegedly present at the time of the phone call where supervisor confirmed with control that the tailgate area was clear. Control then gave the all clear to the shot firer to fire the shot.

• Shot firing took place at approx. 97# on face  ( 1 x shot  , 7 x rounds ,1 ¾ sticks)
• Long wall face CH 1553  (just o/bye 16c/t )

ERZC then proceeded into the Tailgate and when returning outbye received the UG PED message that the shotfiring had been completed. His PGD peak reading was at 9ppm CO. Incident was reported to undermanager.