Official Review of Grosvenor Inquiry Request Refused. There is no genuine interest in the safety and health of Queensland’s Coal Mine Workers,
The major problem with the Grosvenor Board of Inquiry is that despite the efforts of the Board, they couldn’t explain the source of ignition for the methane explosion on the longwall face that was the source of the second pressure wave.
This was after finding that the source of the first “over-pressure event” was a methane explosion caused by a spontaneous combustion event in the goaf.
The Board also decided that though there were gas readings taken that clearly indicated an intensifying heating in the goaf in the days leading up to the explosion.
These spontaneous combustion gas indicators and trends had not been identified by either Anglo Grosvenor Mine Site Management or SIMTARS.
I want to draw your attention to these videos, simulations and demonstrations of the Grosvenor Explosion.
Especially the Simulation of an Alternate Theory to explain what is much more likely to have happened
- Board of Inquiry Findings, (2) Grosvenor Explosion BOI Summary Video – YouTube
- MSIA Alternate Theory. (2) 2020 Grosvenor 104 Explosion Alternate Theory – YouTube
- Methane Explosion Demonstration Videos (2) Methane Explosions – YouTube
There is a need to review the findings of the Board of Inquiry and the Board of Inquiry itself on how it could make such findings.
Even worse is perhaps for 2 years now, a demonstrable naïve, incompetent government, and industry can accept such ridiculous findings, from a Board which concluded that there was a spontaneous combustion of coal induced from the PUR; when there is absolutely no evidence of this.
But they had to blame something.
Any competent person who viewed the evidence presented and some of the related findings can only conclude
- Some of the findings of the Board of Inquiry into the Serious Accident at Grosvenor are inaccurate and incorrect.
- There is no genuine interest in the Safety and Health of Queensland’s Coal Mine Workers by the Government Ministers and Public Servants at RSHQ
- There should be a review into the conduct of the Board of Inquiry to determine how an incorrect finding could be made and then perpetuate
- There should be a more defined criteria of an expanded number of BOI panel members with demonstrable mining experience and competence; so that the legislative provisions are used more effectively for Boards of Inquiry.
The Grosvenor Board attempted to identify what was the ignition source for the second ignition on the longwall face but was incorrectly advised by a series of expert witnesses and omitted the probability of a fuel rich methane fire being ignited by the initial explosion.
There is also no evidence of any second source of ignition of any form.
Ultimately the PUR got blamed, because there was no evidence of anything else and of course it had to be something.
The fix was in for the PUR theory from the moment RSHQ put out its safety alert about using PUR 3 weeks before the second tranche of Grosvenor Inquiry hearings
https://www.rshq.qld.gov.au/safety-notices/mines/use-and-application-of-polyurethane-resin-pur-in-underground-coal-mines
There is not one piece of verbal evidence or any technical report or investigations by either Anglo or RSHQ that at any point demonstrates that a PUR fire occurred at any time.
In fact I would go so far as to say that this is the greatest deliberate piece of disinformation and lies ever hoisted on Qld Miners by the so called Regulators and the Government of the day.
The Report into the PUR fire at Westcliffe in 1986 shows what a complete fallacy and fantasy a near instantaneous PUR heating and a PUR fire, that then forever disappears from view equally as instantaneously is.
https://www.qldminingcrisis.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/westcliff-incident-report-part-a.pdf
One of the products of burning PUR is Hydrogen Cyanide one of the most deadly substances know to mankind and it was never detected.
The thick smoke and fumes generated from burning PUR. One of the witnesses and statutory officials underground at Westcliffe stated
“He could not see the tailgate for the fumes coming off.” Yellowish/brown fumes coming off PUR coming from what appeared to be a boiling mass.
How difficult the PUR fire was to put out. Fire extinguishers and stonedust had no effect.
Using water was lengthy and difficult and the PUR had a tendency to quickly re-ignite
For the only Board of Inquiry into a mining accident in over 20 years in Queensland. It was a dismal failure.
A finding based on no evidence and a demonstration of a complete lack of competence of the expert advisor and Board itself. Perhaps even more alarming is that no one has called it out as rubbish since the release of the report until now.
These simulations demonstrate the actual behaviour of a methane explosion and fire which is far more likely to have happened at Grosvenor, not a PUR induced spontaneous combustion of coal that never existed.
Like Donald Rumsfeld said about the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. There are unknown unknowns, the things you don’t know you don’t know, like the Grosvenor Board of Inquiry and what actually happened in the 104 Goaf.
Surely there is a need for a review, not just of the findings of the Board, but the inquiry process, RSHQ and the competencies of persons about spontaneous combustion, methane and its behaviour across the whole industry.
In the words of the last Mining Warden in Queensland, Frank Windridge, a failure to review past accidents is an invitation for new ones. A failure to review the Grosvenor Board of Inquiry is an invitation for future mine disasters in Queensland underground coal mines.
https://www.rshq.qld.gov.au/safety-notices/mines/use-and-application-of-polyurethane-resin-pur-in-underground-coal-mines
