Queensland Coal Disaster Cover Up? RSHQ only provided the Prosecutor a limited scope of Information related to only the 6th May 2020 at Grosvenor? The actual day of the Methane xplosion
Whichever way you look at it the lack of prosecution action against Anglo Grosvenor Management is a giant, unacceptable and disgusting failure for Queensland Mine Workers Safety and Health oversight.
How many Sections of the Act and Regulations have to be broken?
How negligent or incompetent does Management have to be to be?
Do Mine Workers have to be killed at work for anyone to be held to account?
Isn’t what these five men have had to endure and do so for their rest of their lives enough?
What happened at Grosvenor to those 5 men is nothing short of a Disaster for them.
The horrific burns, rescuing themselves and each other off the face, having to be put in induced coma’s for weeks, ongoing operations and the associated permanent physical and mental trauma.
Let alone the workmates and emergency response workers who in a number of cases suffered long term PTSD.
Information is that the RSHQ (Mines Inspectorate) only gave the Office of the Work Health and Safety Prosecutor (OWHSP) a limited scope of information to investigate.
The events on May 6th 2020 was all that the Prosecutor were allowed to investigate.
The WRAC was also signed off on the same page as Mr Niehaus’s comments by the the Site Senior Executive Mr Griffiths and the Process Manager on the same date.
Finding 30
The Board makes the following findings in relation to planning for gas management on longwall 104 (LW 104):
m) Mining on LW 104 should not have commenced without that spontaneous combustion risk assessment being conducted;
q) Although there was no obligation to do so, the Inspectorate was not advised at any time that no risk assessment for spontaneous combustion associated with increased goaf drainage at LW 104 had been conducted, nor that none would be conducted until the end of May 2020, well after production commenced.
Finding 60
Grosvenor’s history on previous longwalls was such as to require close attention by the Inspectorate to the mine’s gas management systems and practices at LW 104. This did not occur, with the result that there was a lost opportunity to discover that the mine’s production rate exceeded the capacity of its goaf drainage system.
The Inspectorate should have been more proactive.
transcripts of public and private hearings of the committee involving Queensland public servants and consider the extent to which those officers cooperated with and assisted the committee, including whether or not any public servant misled the committee or otherwise breached the Code of Practice for Public Service Employees Assisting or Appearing Before Parliamentary Committees.
R 317 Risk assessment
- The underground mine manager for an underground mine must ensure a risk assessment is carried out under this section to decide a safe method of extraction for second workings at the mine before the second workings start.
- The risk assessment must have regard to at least the following matters
d) the anticipated gas make
g) the proposed methods for the following—
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- strata control and support;
- ventilation;
- controlling spontaneous combustion