20th March 2017 MRE Shotfiring Incident 3rd February 2017
Today Monday 20 March, a meeting was held at Grosvenor Coal Mine. In attendance were Compliance Managers Mr Les Marlborough, Mr Cec Ivers and Inspector of Mines Paul Brown.
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the shotfiring incident that took place on the 3/02/17. The context of the meeting involved discussing Investigation material supplied to the DNRM by the SSE Mr Garde.
At 15:55 LW ERZC and Shotfirer ZZZZZ fired a rock on the face at 97 roof support onLW101. He had been given the all clear to fire the rock by the Control Room Operator, XXXXX.
The TG ERZC YYYYY was in the TG roadway at the time of the shot being fired in between 9ct and 15ct and had not given the all clear to conduct the shot.
Standard Operating Procedure – While there were matters identified what could be improved in the current SOP, if the procedure had been followed diligently as it was, the incident could have been prevented. There is however justification to conduct a review of the SOP and underpinning WRAC. The SOP has references to P3 and P5 type explosives as one example of information to review. It is recommended as part of this review to map the requirements of the Coal Mine Regulations 2001 QGNI 1 Handling Explosives in Underground Mines, the Explosives Regulations 2003, Explosives Act 1999 and the Australian Standards 2187.1 & .2.
The current Underground Shotfiring Permit form – Lacks detail for scope, this is an area for improvement. Working examples from other mines were viewed and discussed.
The JSA for Popping Rocks on LWIOI – There is no date entered onto the JSA, the Outbye ERZ Controller and Shotfirer on the day of the Incident had not signed or indicated a review was conducted of the JSA. The JSA should reflect the individual task being undertaken, there is no indication this was considered. Access to the TG was not identified. Blast fumes are not identified as a hazard* Use of Sentries not identified, again as discussed if the SOP had been followed to control access, use of Sentries and conduct communication it could have been prevented.
Again, if SOP followed would not occur.
Nearly every rule for Initiating a shot has been broken by the Shot-firer
SWI for Shotfiring on the Longwall – A number of items were discussed, section 3 demonstrates the use of a Panther drill slung by a chain block, this is not a safe system for drilling as the drill unit is not designed to be suspended and does not have lifting points, Panther steels can be ordered at different lengths starting at 300mm, it is recommended to maintain fit for purpose drill steels and review the SWI on this matter.
ANOTHER RECOMMENDATION. NO ACTION TAKEN
Section 6 of the SWI, this section identifies an electric detonator only half inserted into a chub of Senatel, the detonator is taped in place. This does not represent the safe method of inserting an Electronic Detonator recommended by the OEM Orica. There is risk of causing a premature ignition by impact damage / crimping when tamped into a hole or, at the least, possibly cause misfire by less than adequate amount of detonator within the chub of explosive. Mr Ivers agreed the SWI is incorrect and must be reviewed.
ANOTHER UNSAFE/ILLEGAL PRACTISE.
Mr Ivers agreed the SWI is incorrect and must be reviewed?
How and When did this occur?
NO ACTION TAKEN TO ISSUE DIRECTIVE.
ISSUES RECOMMENDATION and then “REQUIRES” the SSE to REPLY within 17 calendar days to each of the 5 points in the RECOMMENDATION
ICAM – The ICAM investigation IN. 160558 was discussed, there were a number of items requiring review due to lack of detail or inappropriate actions recommended. Inspector Brown recommended a review of the ICAM to ensure an acceptable level of risk is achieved.
Number Recommendation Due Date
1 Explosives NIA
As an outcome of a site meeting and details within the attached MREI the SSE is recommended to review the following documents
- , The ICAM Incident Investigation Report (Incident number 160558), report date 26/02/171 incident date 3/02/17 for Procedural non compliance during shotfiring activities.
- The underpinning WRAC for SOP 221, referenced in the CMS&HR 2001, regulation 203.
- The Standard Operating Procedure referenced in the CMS&HR 2001, regulation 221.
- The Standard Work instruction (SWI) for GRO-8809-SWI-Sh0tfiring on the Longwall, VI .
- The mines Permit to Shotfire system, (this is linked to the SOP).
The SSE is required to give a response to the recommendation by close of business 7/04/1 7, the response should include references to each line item with action plan timeline where applicable.
