



Mine Name	Mine ID	Operator	Activity Type	Activity Date
Moranbah North	MI00750	Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd	Inspection	09/06/2021

Mine Record Entry

This report forms part of the Mine Record under s68 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999. It must be placed in the Mine Record and displayed in 1 or more conspicuous positions at the mine in a way likely to come to the attention of workers at the mine.

Note that inspection or audit activities conducted by the Mines Inspectorate are based upon sample techniques. It remains the primary responsibility of Mine Personnel to identify hazards, and risks associated with Operations and ensure those risks are at an acceptable level.

Executive Summary

Mine Record Entry Detail

Today at 8:45am, Wednesday 9 June 2021, I attended Moranbah North Mine to conduct an announced inspection of the surface installations and facilities currently in operation or on stand-by for dealing with the situation associated with LW605 where there had been a recent mine evacuation triggered from a spontaneous combustion incident. This was predominantly to fully acquaint myself with the layout, type of equipment and understand the operational complexities that the Mine has to deal with in effectively maintaining control of the on-going situation.

I was met by Mr [s.73 Irrelevant inform] (Technical Services Manager) and Mr [s.73 Irrelevant infor] (Seam Gas Manager).

The SSHRs had been informed by email of my presence at the Mine but were not in attendance at the Mine.

1.0 Introductory Meeting

We were joined by Ms [s.73 Irrelevant informa] (Systems Safety Officer) who minuted the meeting in the absence of Ms [s.73 Irrelevant informa]

Mr [s.73 Irrel] informed me that the LW605 was just 5 shears from CT21 where major AFC and TG drum works were to be undertaken. He explained that heavy conditions meant that the face was to be held for roof control works. We later were informed the plan was reversed and cutting would continue until the planned maintenance position had been reached.

Mr [s.73 Irrel] then explained the monitoring data gathered since Wednesday 2 June when Inspector Stephen Smith gave notice to the Mine that the Directive holding production

had been met.

A copy of the data is attached to this MRE. Mr [s.73 Irrel], by reference to the layout plan of LW605, showed all inertisation and monitoring points, illustrating production v effects at each monitoring point to explain deviations from the steady state that existed before recommencing production.

All deviations were understandable with no fluctuations of concern. The matter is receiving constant examination, as planned, with adjustments made to drainage applied, inertisation directed and sampling protocols where necessary.

The only slight deviation is the increase to 16ppm CO associated with borehole SO 1107 which was explained by the goaf drainge holes no 369,368 and 367 which had been put under extra suction thus drawing methane away from 1107 – this will be closely watched and it is expected to reduce when the face repairs are undertaken.

(FOOTNOTE - I revisited the Mine on the following day and because cutting had been suspended the CO level had fallen back to previous levels as predicted.)

Mr [s.73 Irrel] explained that TARPs 11 and 13 would remain as part of the Mine's future spontaneous combustion management system.

The information I had been shown, but in simplified form, had provided the basis for daily updates at the pre-shift briefing meetings.

2. Surface Layout for Inertisation

I was taken to the surface facilities deployed to deal with drainage monitoring and inertisation by Mr [s.73 Irreleva] and Mr [s.73 Irrel]. Each location, use, flexibility of purpose, and current status was explained by reference to a layout plan.

I asked when the Simtars Laboratory might become otherwise deployed and Mr [s.73 Irrel] replied that if another more pressing incident occurred elsewhere it would be despatched now that a steady state existed at Moranbah. He added that there was a contingency plan to increase bag sampling if the need arose.

I was satisfied generally that all equipment viewed was tidily arranged but advised it would be a worthwhile exercise to review traffic management in the area to ensure that vulnerable all items were adequately protected – Mr [s.73 Irreleva] indicated that a one-way sign would be placed to provide better signage on one of the routes travelled.

3. Close out Meeting

I held a close out meeting with Mr [s.73 Irrel] and Ms [s.73 Irreleva] where I explained that there were no circumstances where it was necessary for Directive or Substandard Condition or Practice.

I reiterated my intention to return to the Mine tomorrow to conduct an underground inspection and asked that the SSHR be informed.

Ms s.73 Irreleva then assisted me to gain access to the Incident information Box. This facility has been used to give RSHQ officers electronic access to all relevant data to avoid unnecessary 'paper copies' to be exchanged.

I departed the Mine at 12:05pm.

Richard Gouldstone
Inspector of Mines

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