Mackay District Office

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| Mine Name | Mine ID | Operator | Activity Type | Region | Activity Date |
| Grosvenor Coal Mine | M102976 | Anglo Coal (Grosvenor Management) Pty Ltd | Site Meeting | Central | 04/05/2017 |

Vision: Our Industries Free of Safety and Health Incidents

# Mine Record Entry

This report forms part of the Mine Record under s68 of the Coal Mining Safety and

Health Act 1999. It must be placed in the Mine Record and displayed on Safety Notice Boards.

Note that inspection or audit activities conducted by the Mines Inspectorate are based upon sample techniques. It remains the primary responsibility of Mine Personnel to identify hazards, and risks associated with Operations and ensure those risks are at an acceptable level.

Today Thursday 4 May 2017, Inspector of Mines Paul Brown returned to Grosvenor coal mine to conduct a close out meeting for an inspection conducted on Wednesday 3 May 2017.

Attending the meeting was:

SSE Mr Adam Garde

Inspector of Mines Mr Paul Brown

I summarised my observations from the inspection by the detail within the MRE dated 3/05/17, In brief discussion points were:

* Feedback on meetings attended at 05:30hrs and 06:00hrs on the day of the inspection.

 ERZ Controller reports, majority of reports were of a high standard, there are still gaps or incomplete components of the reports occurring in some circumstances.

A reminder to all ERZ Controllers their reports are a permanent record and, should always be written in a manner that leaves no doubt or questions as to locations inspected, findings of the inspection and, actions taken.

* I questioned the process followed of persons working on the faceline whilst using Rocksill product, Mr Garde was able to provide an explanation of circumstances and controls implemented.

e Surface Statutory board maintenance. Mr Garde explained the recent changes in positions on site, the management of this notice board would be addressed.

* Longwall 101 conditions and inspection feedback.
* Longwall 102 install face feedback.
* MG 103 Development feedback.
* Respirable dust SEGs. Discussed the interaction with Techserve employees on the day and how they have not been flagged for monitoring. I requested Mr Garde to investigate this further if there are people consistently missing this opportunity. With the added focus the monitoring has had since 2013 and changes in Legislation it is now time to review the effectiveness of this system.

e We discussed the reasons for the auxiliary fans having not only an external methane detector required by Legislation but also an internal sensor within the ducting that also has a trip latching at 2%.

 The MG 103 floor heave events were discussed in detail.

I highlighted the incident report dated 1/05/17, this incident report identified "Off Scale" alarms on the 4 gas Altair instrument. The report also identified 1.35% methane present within the fan ducting. The incident report does not contain the level of detail required to fully understand all circumstances and actions taken. The fact the Altair is recorded as off scale should escalate the investigation process and determine if CMW's where exposed to danger being, methane greater than 2.5% in general body.

The incident dated 2/05/17 does not identify the level of gas that tripped the auxiliary fan which was stated by UMM Ivers to be 2.01% methane, again more detail and further investigation required.

There are numerous reports of floor heave through Statutory reports from 3/05/17 and back to 6/03/17 (which was as far back as I checked while on site).

There was a report on the 6/03/17 (report number 12984) of an auxiliary fan trip due to surge of methane.

Another report on 9/04/17 (report number 14091) of an auxiliary fan trip due to surge of methane after floor heave event.

My concerns from these events is there is a lack of follow up investigation into the circumstances. The current phenomenon of floor heave in the gateroads is not fully understood meaning understanding and tracking the mechanism that is initiating the heave and, where is the reservoir of methane that is being released during the floor heave events? The hazard is not currently identified on the Geological Hazard Plans and is not referenced within the Permit to Mine. A Directive was issued to the SSE in relation to the risk presented by the floor heave events.

Number Directive Due Date

Pursuant to section 168 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999

1 Floor Heave and uncontrolled Methane release 26/05/2017 To reduce risk by:

1 . Conducting investigations into the floor heave events causing uncontrolled releases of methane contained within MREs dated 3/05/17, 4/05/17. (to be completed by 19/05/17) and:

2. Identify SHMS controls to be developed or reviewed specifically for identifying, managing and controlling the risk of uncontrolled methane releases induced by floor heave. Provide the Inspector with a report of actions taken immediately and proposed actions to address the issue. (to be completed by 26/05/17)

Please provide a written status report on each Directive together with the actions taken to address each item by their due dates



Paul Brown

Inspector of Mines

Central Region

