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| Mine Name | File No. | Operator | Activity Type | Region | Activity Date |
| North Goonyella | 8,550  | PEABODY (BOWEN) PTY LTD | Inspection | Central | 04/12/2014 |

Vision: Our Industries Free of Safety and Health Incidents

# Mine Record Entry

This report forms part of the Mine Record under s68 of the Coal Mining Safety and

Health Act 1999. It must be placed in the Mine Record and displayed on Safety Notice Boards.

Note that inspection or audit activities conducted by the Mines Inspectorate are based upon sample techniques. It remains the primary responsibility of Mine Personnel to identify hazards, and risks associated with Operations and ensure those risks are at an acceptable level.

Site Safety & Health Reps Consulted: John Pearson

Today (04/12/14) I conducted an announced inspection of the North Goonyella coal mine. I arrived on site at approximately 9:30am to be greeted by Mr David Craft (Compliance Manager). After signing in and partaking in an alcohol breath test we proceeded to the conference room for an initial meeting with Mr Steven Stook (Technical Services Manager) and Mr Wouter Niehaus (Underground Mine Manager).

The discussion began with an explanation around the Outburst events which have recently occurred in the 9 Nth Development panel. The first event occurred in B Hdg 9Nth 21m inbye of 9c/t at 8:58pm on Tuesday 25th November. The most recent event occurred on Tuesday of December in A Hdg 31m inbye of 9c/t. The 9Nth panel is a super unit with two auxiliary fans, one located in 7c/t and one located in A Hdg o/bye of 8c/t. A known shear zone cut across the panel in between 9 and 10c/t. The area of the shear zone had proven difficult to drain and the compliance cores showed gas contents of in excess of 10m3/tonne. The outburst which the mine had experienced in the previous panel (8Nth) was also associated with the shear zone.

The panel is conducted under remote mining conditions. That is, there are no men at the face during the cutting process. The miner is operated remotely at a position called the FAB at 8c/t in B Hdg. The process is that both miners cut coal simultaneously. When the planned cutting of 0.5m of coal is complete the face is planned to sit idle for 15mins to allow time for an outburst to occur. The B Hdg event occurred after a wait time of 19 mins.

The A Hdg event occurred while the miner was cutting coal. There are thrust faults in 6c/t that when extrapolated line up with the outburst site in B Hdg.

The mine is aiming to investigate the ability to predict the onset of future events by detecting things such as seismic movement, if that is proven to be a trigger. I suggested to Mr Stook that SIMTARS are trialling micro seismic detection equipment which may be worth investigating.

I raised the discussion Inspector Brennan had with the mine on the previous day (3rd Dec) in regards to the monitoring of Methane drawn through the auxiliary fan. Inspector Brennan issued a directive for a review of the SOP for the use of auxiliary fans. The mine indicated that they were not convinced that monitoring and tripping the power to the fan if excessive

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amounts of methane were found in the tube line was the best way to control the risk. I advised that the issue needs to be risk assessed. The scoping of the risk assessment needs to be conducted well and prior to the assessment so that all involved understand the issues very clearly. Whatever the result of the risk assessment, the process needs to conducted diligently so that the process can be validated and defended.

The underground inspection began at around 1 1 :30am in the presence of Mr Niewhaus and Mr Craft. Prior to going underground I went in to the control room to ascertain the state of the atmospheric monitoring. Control Room Officer for the day was Ms Helene Swan. Monitors in alarm were 8Nth T/G real time @ 1.34% ch4, 7Nth MIG real time @ 1.25% ch4 and 4Nth Bleeder shaft inlet 1.04% ch4.

We travelled to 9Nth development panel where we exited the vehicle in B Hdg o/bye of 6c/t. We inspected the 6c/t gas drainage stub. Wilsons contractors had just completed consolidating the face by injecting the coal with Fenaflex. A brattice wing was erected into the stub. The stub contained 3 x LHD pods. The Ventilation readings at the inbye end of the wing was 2.3m/s and at the stub end 0.8m/s.

Mr Niewhaus explained that each heading had been equipped with 2 x additional CH4 monitors. Both 20m outbye of the miners. 1 x to trip the power to the miner if the gas came back outbye of the miner and 1 x to log the gas quantities on a continual basis. One more additional monitor was mounted in A Hdg outbye of 7c/t.

We then proceeded inbye towards the face and were met by the ERZ controller for the panel, Mr Harold Fay and SSHR Mr John Pearson. Mr Fay explained that he was in the process of completing his initial inspection and had found 0.35% CH4 in the Bhdg cavity, 0.25% CH4 in the general body Bhdg and 0.31% general body in A Hdg.

We inspected sites of both A Hdg and B Hdg outbursts. B Hdg had been cleaned up and supported and the face had been advanced 3m past the outburst site. The B Hdg site has a noticeable cone shaped depression located a bit over head height in the LIH rib parallel to where a bolter operator would be standing. The main cavity revealed a deformation in the top of the seam at the stone and coal interface on the R/H side. 50 tonnes of material had been associated with the B Hdg event.

The A Hdg site had yet to be cleaned up. The material ejected from the outburst was still captured behind the apron and head of the miner. It was difficult to get a good appreciation of the scope of the outburst.

At 2:25pm a debrief was conducted on the surface of the mine. Present in the meeting were Mr Pearson, Mr Craft, Mr Niewhaus and Mr Mike Carter (SSE) on speaker phone from Brisbane.

Further discussion was had in relation to the outbursts and my observations and the issue around the monitoring of gas in the auxiliary fans. My earlier communications were repeated for the benefit of Mr Carter.

The discussions were concluded with an update on the actions resulting from the Safeguard audit conducted at North Goonyella earlier in the year. The discussion included:

• The improvements in the stonedusting application and analysis at the mine. Mr Craft explained that the colormetric analysis is conducted by personnel with the required competency. Photos of all colormetric samples are photographed and kept on record and some of the samples are sent for lab analysis with the normal monthly samples to gauge the ongoing validity of the system. The mine closely monitors the amount of stonedust

used and has developed a rule of thumb measure of 1 tonne of stonedust used to 1000 tonne of coal produced to maintain compliance.

 The spon Comb and Ventilation PHMP's have been reviewed and audited by Mr John Rolands. A work order is in the maintenance system to review each of the PHMP's through out the year.

e The relationship and link between the Peabody cardinal rules and the SHMS is under development. The first attempt to communicate this needs rework.

e Competency assessment system is under review. Presently the ERZ controller refresher has been update to include training in LWTCC. The management structure has been reviewed in association with the BBRA. 18 hazards were identified and risk holders and risk managers allocated for each. The TNA has been conducted for roles in the management structure.

e Safety and health feedback to the workforce has been reviewed. All backlog ICAM investigations have been completed and the results communicated to the workforce. A feedback/communication session will be conducted by the safety and training department on a fortnightly basis. This will include updates on all aspects of safety and training. The statutory repolts for the mine are reviewed weekly at the compliance meeting and any actions are logged in the system for completion.

e Emergency sealing of the mine was discussed. The man and materials drift now complies with the legislation. Plans are underway and money allocated in the budget to install steel guillotine doors at the entry to the longwall panel for emergency sealing use. The doors will be activated form the surface via a wire rope and borehole. I suggested that the mine consider the Sth Blakefield solution using Rocksil plugs. This allows the seals to be put in place where they are required at the time and reduces the amount of open roadway which needs to be inertised.

Mr Carter committed to come to Brisbane on 22nd December with the necessary information to close out the actions from the Safeguard Audit. I had committed to conduct a meeting with the Ventilation Officer (Mr Michael Webber) but Mr Webber could not be located.

Inspection concluded at 3:41 pm.

Russell Albury

Inspector of Mines

Central Region



NGC close out sign off sheets.pdf

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