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| Mine Name | Mine ID | Operator |  Activity Type Activity Date |
| Grosvenor Coal Mine | M102976 | Anglo Coal(GrosvenorManagement) Pty Ltd | Inspection - Unannounced 20/02/2018 |

Vision: Our Industries Free of Safety and Health Incidents

# Mine Record Entry

This report forms part of the Mine Record under s68 of the Coal Mining Safety and

Health Act 1999. It must be placed in the Mine Record and displayed on Safety Notice Boards.

Note that inspection or audit activities conducted by the Mines Inspectorate are based upon sample techniques. It remains the primary responsibility of Mine Personnel to identify hazards, and risks associated with Operations and ensure those risks are at an acceptable level.

l, Inspector Les Marlborough today, Tuesday 20 February 2018, I conducted an unannounced inspection at the Grosvenor Mine. I was met by Mr Wouter Niehaus, Acting UMM and an introductory meeting was held. Mr Wouter gave his apologies as he was leaving to attend a meeting off site and he also explained that Mr Mark Kirsten, SSE was off site.

1.0 Introductory Meeting

An introductory meeting was held and was attended by Trent Griffiths, Technical Services Manager, Ian Hawkins, Seam Gas Manager and Kate Bachman, HSE Manager.

I explained that the purpose of the unannounced inspection was to review the incident that occurred at the mine on Sun 1 1 Feb when an Arrow Energy gas pipeline was hit by an excavator whilst rehabilitation works were underway on the LWIOI Goaf Drainage wells. I explained that I would also like to conduct an inspection of the surface gas drainage works.

Mr Hawkins gave me an update of where the investigation was and some initial findings. The root cause appears to be that the pipeline was 30 m away from the location showed on the plans supplied by Arrow Energy. A detailed discussion was held regarding the initial findings of the investigation.

I explained that this incident was not immediately reported by the mine as required by CMSHA s198(I). There was discussion regarding the joint interaction management plan that was in place and there was some confusion at the mine regarding whether or not this incident should be reported as an HPI or not to a Mines Inspector. I made it clear that the joint interaction plan does not remove the requirement for the SSE to notify an inspector to meet the requirements of CMSHA s198.

I raised the letter issued by the Chief Inspector on Friday 16 Feb 2018 regarding the use of

PI Permitted Explosives in an underground coal mine. I explained that, as per the letter,

Inspector Brown will be contacting each underground SSE regarding the letter. I also

explained that the use of PI Permitted explosives was not authorised by the chief inspector of explosives for use in coal mines to be used in coal This must be implemented by mines immediately,

I then discussed the mine's Management Structure and confirmed with Mr Hawkins that he did not, as yet, hold the competency RIIMCU 603 A — Establish and Maintain the Gas

Drainage Management Plan. The document states that Mr Griffiths hold this competency and until Mr Hawkins attains the competency then the responsibility lies with Mr Griffiths. I explained the implications of this in regards to who was responsible for the obligations associated with gas drainage operations. Mr Griffiths, as the person named on the s55 Management Structure Document, is the person with the obligations for this work. It was explained to me that Dennis Black had been organised to conduct the training for Mr Hawkins in early March.

## Surface Inspection

Accompanied by Mr Griffiths and Mr Hawkins we conducted an inspection of the surface gas drainage work areas. Surface roads were in good condition

I inspected the scene of the incident that occurred on 1 1 Feb. The site was still fenced off and the pipes that had been damaged were visible. We discussed the marking standards and signage to identify buried gas pipes and services. Mr Hawkins explained that the standard for buried gas pipes was a sign at every change of direction of the pipeline and every 400m of the straight sections. I recommended that the mine needs to establish their standard for identifying buried gas pipes as this seemed to be no adequate to clearly identify buried pipelines in light of the work involved on the surface of the mine.

## Lucas Drill Rig DRS026

I next inspected the Lucas drill rig DRS026. This rig was drilling a goaf drainage hole above LW 102. We met Mr Noel Dahlheimer, Rig Supervisor (Lucas) and were given a local site induction by Mr Jeremy McDonald, Drill Offsider (Lucas). The induction was comprehensive and ran through the hazards and controls and the emergency procedures for visitors visiting the work site. I noted that there were two Lucas drill rigs, DRS026 and DRSI 18 working in close proximity to one another (approx. 50 m apart). It was explained that there were separate inductions required for visitors visiting each drill rig. The Lucas personnel were very familiar with the SLAM and risk management processes and in discussions with them they demonstrated a good attitude towards safety.

We then took the light vehicle to the designated parking area for rig DRS026. I pointed out that the car parking area was located beside the drill rig operating area and to gain access to the parking area the vehicle had to drive through the operating area of the rig. I could see the same situation for the other rig. Located between the two rigs was the stonedust tank used to pump stonedust down into the LW 102 TG for trickle dusting the TG. There was a high level of interaction between the three activities and the access road along the 102 goaf line which ran adjacent to the 3 operations. There was no fencing around the drill rig sites to control access to the drill site. I pointed out that the car parking area should have been located away from the drill rig operational area and possibly on the other side of the access road that ran past the rigs. The only access control to the site was a line of 6 or 7 cones placed beside the road but tyre marks indicated that there was often access through these cones.

Further inspection of the rig site revealed that there were several areas that were considered restricted access areas but there was no fencing to delineate these areas.

I noted several fire extinguishers that did not have test tags fitted to them. Mr Hawkins instructed the rig supervisor to change these extinguishers out for in test extinguishers. We went onto the rig and I had a discussion with the rig operator. He was very conversant with the operation of the rig and he explained the emergency processes and how the operators could shut down operations in an emergency. He showed the location of emergency stop switches and explained their emergency procedures very well. When asked about respirable dust monitoring, none of the crew could recall taking part in dust monitoring. It was pointed out that, because the rig conducts wet drilling there is very little dust created from the drilling operations. Housekeeping around the drill site was acceptable with no housekeeping hazards identified.

I asked about managing operators exposure to heat, being as the outside temperature at the time of the inspection was over 36 degrees. It was explained to me that the previous week, drilling during the day shift was suspended because of excessive heat and only conducted on the NS.

During the drive back to the surface I observed a small Manitou Forklift carrying 2 x 1 tonne bags of stonedust that were not secured to the forklift. The forklift was driving along the road in the opposite direction to us so we turned around and signalled the operator to stop. I had a discussion with the operator regarding the requirement to secure the two bags of stonedust to the forklift. The operator was unsure of the requirements for securing loads as per the Mine's SOP for Using Mobile Plant. I directed him to unload the dust (which was on a pallet) in a cleared area beside the road and to go and collect some tie down straps to secure the load before continuing.

Control Room

I went into the control room. I observed the goaf drainage monitoring screen which showed the active goaf wells and the horizontal goaf hole draining the goaf of LW102. The monitoring showed the flow from each individual hole and the gas levels in each hole (CH4, 02, CO and C02). Mr Griffiths pointed out the last two holes immediately behind the LW face that had not yet come on line. This was causing Methane issues in the TG and although they had not had any incidents with Methane exceeding 2.5%, the Longwall was stopped at the time due to Methane greater than in the TG and the shearer was stopped awaiting gas levels falling below 2% GB. I observed the Methane trend for the previous 2 weeks and it was apparent that methane level in the TG was rising as the LW got further and further away from the last active hole. Mr Hawkins explained that the holes were drilled 20 m above the seam roof every 50m. They were cased with 9 5/8" steel casing. The capacity of the goaf plant was 12,000 1/s and current goaf drainage was running at approx. 4,000 1/s. He also explained that the mine was about to trial a "floating" casing in these holes to prevent necking off of the goaf holes.

Close Out Meeting

Attending the close out meeting were Mr Griffiths and Mr Hawkins. We discussed the items observed during the inspection.

I explained that there was a lack of fencing and delineation of hazardous areas around the Lucas Rigs, I would issue an SCP for the mine to review the barricading and site security of all drill rigs on site to ensure that access to drill sites is controlled and that hazardous areas are securely barricaded to control risk.

We discussed the incident with the forklift and the unsecured load. Mr Griffiths stated that he would raise an incident report on site regarding this. I request a copy of the incident investigation report and the actions taken as a result to prevent reoccurrence.

We discussed the management of heat for surface workers at the mine. I requested a copy

of the relevant part of the SHMS that deals with the management of heat exposure for surface workers at the mine.

I suggested to the mine that they review their respirable dust sampling programme to ensure that the surface drilling crews are adequately monitored in the appropriate SEG.

I suggested that the Fire Officer should conduct an audit of all surface drill rigs to ensure compliance with fire extinguisher testing standards at the mine.

With regards to the management Structure document, I stressed that it must be made clear under Mr Griffiths Competencies Held, that he does hold the competency RIIMCU 603 A— Establish and Maintain the Gas Drainage Management Plan. As far as Mr Hawkins obtaining the competency I requested confirmation of the date for when it was expected that this would be completed,

With regards to the HPI that occurred on 1 1 Feb when the gas line was hit with a backhoe I requested a copy of the full investigation report when it was completed.

I thanked the people for their time.

Number Substandard Condition or Practice Due Date

1 Barricading Standard For Surface Drill Rigs 16/03/2018 The mine to review the barricading and site security of all drill rigs on site to ensure that access to drill sites is controlled and that hazardous areas are securely barricaded to control risk. The review to also include setting up sites so that light vehicle parking is separated from the drill rig work area to control site access.

Please provide a written status report on each SCP together with the actions taken to  address each item by their due dates

Les Marlborough

Inspector of Mines