Mackay District Office

P.O. Box 1801, MACKAY QLD 4740

 Queensland Government Phone: (07) 4999 8512, Fax: (07) 4999 8519

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| Mine Name | Mine ID | Operator | Activity Type | Region | Activity Date |
| Grosvenor Coal Mine | M102976 | Anglo Coal (Grosvenor Management) Pty Ltd | Inspection | Central | 19/07/2017 |

Vision: Our Industries Free of Safety and Health Incidents

# Mine Record Entry

This report forms part of the Mine Record under s68 of the Coal Mining Safety and

Health Act 1999. It must be placed in the Mine Record and displayed on Safety Notice Boards.

Note that inspection or audit activities conducted by the Mines Inspectorate are based upon sample techniques. It remains the primary responsibility of Mine Personnel to identify hazards, and risks associated with Operations and ensure those risks are at an acceptable level.

Site Safety & Health Reps Consulted: Josh Smith

I attended Grosvenor Mine at 8am, Wednesday 19 July 2017 to conduct an announced inspection. I was met by Mr Adam Garde (SSE) and we were joined by Mr Wayne Bull (Operations Manager)

Mr Cec Ivers (UMM)

Mr David Thomason (TSM)

Mr Michael Webber (VO) Mr Chris Englebrecht (Seamgas Superintendent)

1.0 Introductory Meeting

Mr Garde explained that he was working toward strengthening the management team by increasing resources (eg 4x UMM Certificate Holders) and investing more in development and training - (eg Deputy Leadership Courses). The aim is to provide greater strength in depth and more peer support on back-shifts and weekends to assist in critical decision making.

I had explained by email to Mr Garde what my intended agenda for the inspection was to be and he had gathered much of the information in readiness.

Knowing that Mr Garde was unable to be available for the whole day, because of other issues, I raised the following matters before he left the meeting.

I was satisfied an incident relating to personal exceedences in regard to exposure involving chemicals had received attention from the Mine in conjunction with Inspector Fritz Djukic.

I

HPI Reviews

1.1.1 GB Methane Exceedences

DNRM had two received reports of Methane GB levels of +2.5% dated 6/07/17 as an NRI and 10/07/17 as a HPI. I indicated that it is important for all such exceedances to be reported by any mine and, with an explanation of the circumstances to support why it is considered as a Non-Reportable Incident (NRI) rather than a High Potential Incident (HPI).

The first incident was reported by the mine with the explanation -

"Advice of a sudden and temporary increase in general body concentration of Methane in TG 101.

At approx. 4.15am this morning the 6th July 2017 a sudden release of CH4 from what is believed to be a goaf flush increased the GB concentration of CH4 to a peak 2.52% at the shearer speed control sensor (260m outbye of the Longwall face). This sensor (RT37) remaining over 2.5% for a period of 3 minutes only, as shown in Figure 1 The ventilation was obviously capable of clearing this concentration given the short duration of the event. The background value of RT37 at 4:13am was 1.59% CH4.

At the time of the event the LW was not cutting due to a core imbalance on the shearer which had stopped the shearer approx. 15 mins prior to this event. The shearer was heading to the MG at 40 chock. The shearer had just completed 2 Uni-Di shearers after being down for 2 hours for a MG Thermal overload on the crusher, as shown in Figure 2

Since production resumed last Thursday the TG gas levels have been around 1.4% background and depending on shearer position would go up and down as the shearer went in and out of the Tail gate. In this case the shearer was nowhere near the Tail Gate. "

This is exactly what is required and in the circumstances it is accepted as an NRI. In the latter incident detail was given which showed that there had been a failure of the surface goaf drainage plant. Mr Chris Engelbrecht explained the circumstances of the back-up battery problems a remedy for which has now been provided.

The principle to be observed in deciding if it is a I-IF)' or NRI is whether control of the situation has been lost. An instantaneous or short term spike is acceptable but not if associated with other controllable contributory factors eg , VCD damage or misuse, methane drainage shortcomings, or, anticipated barometric variations. Each exceedence reported will be examined by at least two inspectors and over time a series of criteria can be established which will make the qualification of either NRI or HPI more readily obvious.

1.1.2 CMW pinched finger during drilling operations 28/06/17

The full ICAM is still to complete and I asked that the Mine provide a copy upon completion. We discussed the salient points that included, operatives being distracted and less than adequate clearances as the drill mast retracted in the configuration that existed.

Mr Garde then excused himself from the meeting.

1.2 Mining update

LWIOI is now at 1 1 CT, 690m from take off position. The cutting horizon has now been altered to take 600mm of floor dirt, extracting a height of 3.9m leaving a thicker coal roof (7 to 800mm). The longwall has been subject too a long period of down time with the damage incurred to the drift conveyor, 21 days commencing 9 May 2017 and then followed by AFC problems.

Before Mr Garde left he had shown the triggers and responses now used to control operations on the longwall in regard to broken roof, face spall and when to consolidate or continue cutting, and, who should be part of the decision making. The improved communication and discipline employed had so far proven effective in more continuity of cutting operations.

LW102 block is now developed with faceline secondary support completed. Casing of a borehole is nearing completion in readiness to install a pluegar pump. The development conveyor has been withdrawn to 14CT.

LW 103 block is at 24CT where trials with Novabolts and Mufflerbolts have taken place to control the ribs below the Tonstein band. At the location of 29CT a shaft, N07, has been sunk and a shotcrete lining is planned in readiness for the development to hole into.

The Mains has progressed to 26CT, E to F headings, with a belt chamber still to complete, the aim being to give access to drive MGI 04.

## 1.3 LWIOI Sealing Plan

I asked and it was explained what significant ventilation changes were anticipated once the district was ready to seal up. Mr Webber explained that in fact other than establishing the travel road ex LWIOI as a return for LW102 there would be less than normal disruption in regard to pressure changes across LWIOI goaf than in most cases.

I am now satisfied that the plans to seal LWIOI are developed sufficiently for me to acknowledge the sealing plan for LWIOI and asked Mr Ivers to apply for acknowledgement in the normal manner. I later visited the sites for all seals and consider there should be no problems in regard to being able to effect a good standard of seal construction.

1.4 ERZ Controllers Statutory Reports

I read all statutory reports for the previous 24 hours and make the following comments -

* + All were of an acceptable standard with some of high quality
  + Sign-off in some instances was incomplete and the Mine need to check that this is dealt with - some omissions may have been just time related  Occasional non-entries in regard to counts for Slams/VFLs/POPs
  + All TARP conditions were properly referenced

2.0 Inspection

I was accompanied underground by Mr Bull, Mr Ivers and Mr Webber.

## 2.1 LWIOI Seal sites

Seal sites were inspected at Seal 1 - TGIOI 3-4CT

Seal 2 - LWIOI TG N02 chute road

Seal 3 - LWIOI MG Nol chute road

- MGIOI 2-3CT C Hdg

Seal 5 - MGIOI 3CT

All seal sites were in well supported stable ground. Only Seal 4 was still to be marked for exact position. The other sites had also been pre-grouted.

The chute roads were already concreted with the floor works to complete once the longwall had reached it's final position.

Considerable secondary support had been introduced. In the Tailgate the E-frame was already in position and the cribs in place to the face finish position. Roof movement will be continuously monitored through take-off.

There was very little scrap or debris and roadways were adequately stonedusted though will require further applications prior to sealing. Some stowage from floor grading at the chute roads was present but I was assured that it would be moved before the next shift.

2.2 Introduction and completion of secondary support as an outcome from strata failures in 2016

I chose to travel sections of LWIOI Belt and Travel roads to inspect the standard and level of completion of secondary support designed in the aftermath of two significant strata failures last year which resulted in a Directive from the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines requiring that an Engineering Study be conducted into strata support.

We traveled the Belt road from 3CT to 6CT and the Travel road from OCT to 8CT.

Mr Bull identified for me the original and supplementary bolting at each stage and was able to produce, on return to the surface an example of where the plans/patterns had changed. Each stretch of roadway was supplemented with a design appropriate for what had already been installed. The plans examined were MGIOI Belt Road Secondary Support 2CT to 5CT MGIOI Belt Road Secondary Support 5CT to 9CT

2.3 Other Matters

1. Posting notice of work in progress

Three weeks had elapsed since secondary bolting had been in progress between 5 and 4CT. While doing so an activity board is posted where the current bolting activity is taking place and it contains within it a copy of all relevant support rules and JSAs as a reference point for operatives. Caution tape is also installed inbye and outbye of the work area to warn approaching Coal Mine Workers. The ERZ controller explained that it moved forward with the work. I suggested that when no work was in progress the board should be cleaned and closed - Mr Bull undertook to adopt the suggestion.

The two platforms used for work over the belt were in good repair.

1. Tripper withdrawal preparation

The tripper drive at 5CT will shortly be withdrawn and lifting equipment had been placed at the cut through in readiness. All equipment was properly tagged and in date.

1. Conveyor cleanliness

All rollers were free from fines and the belt was free of excessive accumulation of fines or spillage from 3 to 6CT.

1. CMW Slams/Emergency Procedures

I asked a CMW Fitter about his SLAMs for the shift and he explained the pressure testing process he was undertaking including isolation, and that he had passed it to the district official. He was also able to inform me of the action he would take if he needed to self escape and where he would locate the nearest cache.

v) Airborne dust

The travel roadway conditions were, for the most part good, but it was evident that roadway dust was being lifted as our transport passed most cut throughs in the

LWIOI travel road and then again from the mouth of the M & M drift to the park-up adjacent to the muster area. Mr Bull dealt with the matter immediately.

3.0 Close-out Meeting

The close-out meeting was attended by Mr Wayne Bull (Operations Manager)

Mr Cec Ivers (UMM)

Mr David Thomason (TSM)

Mr Michael Webber (VO)

Mr Chris Englebrecht (Seamgas Superintendent)


We discussed the matters contained within the detail of this MRE and I asked Mr Ivers to formally apply for acknowledgement to seal LWIOI. I was satisfied that if the Mine wanted to begin seal site construction they could do so.

I reiterated the request for a copy of the ICAMs relating to items raised at 1.1.1 and

1 . 1 .2.

I would also request that a copy is forwarded to me of the PHMPs recently reviewed for both Strata Control and Ventilation. Mr Garde had explained to me the process now adopted for managing support design and effecting changes when required.

There were no items in dispute and I departed the Mine at 2:30pm.



Richard Gouldstone

Inspector of Mines

Central Region