

Mine Name	Mine ID	Operator	Activity Type	Region	Activity Date
Grosvenor Coal Mine	M102976	Anglo Coal (Grosvenor Management) Pty Ltd	Inspection	Central	08/02/2017

Vision: Our Industries Free of Safety and Health Incidents

# Mine Record Entry

This report forms part of the Mine Record under s68 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999. It must be placed in the Mine Record and displayed on Safety Notice Boards.

Note that inspection or audit activities conducted by the Mines Inspectorate are based upon sample techniques. It remains the primary responsibility of Mine Personnel to identify hazards, and risks associated with Operations and ensure those risks are at an acceptable level.

Today, arriving at 8am, Wednesday 8 February 2017, Inspectors Keith Brennan and Richard Gouldstone conducted an announced inspection at Grosvenor Coal Mine.

## 1.0 Introductory Meeting

We were met by Mr Wayne Bull (UMM) and Ms Laine Webb (SHE Superintendent). The Inspectors explained that their intention was to inspect both the longwall and developments but as an introduction first made reference to the following.

## 1.1 Safety Alerts, Safety Bulletins and Safety Newsflashes.

Copies of all documents mentioned below were supplied to Mr Bull.

### **Inspectors handing over what DNRME considers applicable to UG Mines**

#### Respirable Dust

Notable Improvement Industry Wide still strong focus 2017

Is Grosvenor part of Improvement? Not likely

- Safety Alert 2016 - Contract coal mine worker suffers cardiac arrest

This is a reminder regarding diligence of Health Assessments and fitness for work capability.

**Give it to Mine it happened at. How about asking where up to with Contract worker engagement, contactor management etc in a Mine of Contractors.**

- Safety Alert 2016 - Fatality involving chain feeder at a wash plant.

Lifting / slinging incidents still occurring, recent example at an open cut mine used of a lifting task not following the SWI in place for the task.

- Safety Bulletin 2015 - Exploding lead acid batteries.

Although underground mines have limited exposure here it should not be ignored as a hazard.

- Safety Bulletin 2015 - Preventing dust-related lung diseases.

A notable improvement has been made industry wide, however this will still be a strong focus for 2017 and beyond .

Inspector Gouldstone provided a copy of the 'Percy Verrall' video to Mr Bull.

Inspectors encourage use of this video supplied by the CFMEU for coal mine workers to appreciate the severity of pneumoconiosis.

- Safety Bulletins 2016 - Fixed plant and mobile equipment fires on surface coal mines.

An example was given of a recent Supercharger failure in an underground LHD. While these incidents are rare on underground equipment, the principles of conducting Ignition Hazard Assessments is still recommended.

- Safety Newsflash 2016 - Effective management of flammable gas in return roadway.

Recent HPI's involving gas management practices were discussed. A request recently from the District Inspector of Mines required all underground coal mines in QLD to supply gas monitoring data and SHMS documents for review. A letter from the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines to all SSE's was issued 30/01/17, the letter provided clarity in relation to legislation requirements that are directly related to recent HPI's involving in dangerous occurrences of Methane above 2.5%.

**At this point no request for Information to be provided how the Mine complied with this**

- Safety Newsflash 2016 - Cleanskin Safety

A recent injury to a contractor identified, after close investigation, that induction and basic training were not aligned to the mine's requirements

**Is the incident referred to Grosvenor Mine?**

**Nothing about where Mine is up to either with its review of Contractor Management of if they have reviewed their system since the Newsflash**

- Safety Newsflash 2015 — Commuting Incident, root cause fatigue.

Two road accidents have occurred, the first in 2016 and a second in 2017, involving vehicle incidents off the mining lease, with coal mine workers either in transit after a . shift or between sites during shift.

- Safety Newsflash 2016 - Serious Injury, Shuttle car driver.

The Shuttle car injury Newsflash provided today with additional detail not previously released, should help the site significantly with understanding the issue.

- Safety Newsflash 2016 - Uncontrolled release of methane.

Diligence is required in sealing operations to ensure that the risk of doors self closing while seals being purged is avoided.

### **WAS THIS AN ANGLO MINE?**

- Safety Newsflash 2016 - Shaft filling incident resulting in dangerous levels of methane present.

Inspector Gouldstone gave a detailed briefing of the contributing factors and root cause. Ultimately prior planning and thorough risk assessment process is the key to prevention of such matters.

### **WAS THIS AN ANGLO MINE?**

- Safety Newsflash 2016 - Shotcrete machine uncontrolled movement.

This incident is applicable to any movements of heavy machinery, again prior planning and risk management a key elements in avoiding uncontrolled movements.

- Safety Newsflash 2016 - Single Vehicle Incident.

This incident highlighted failings in site access procedures and D&A testing process.

- Safety Newsflash 2016 - Smoke Candles.

This refers specifically for surface plant and at Grosvenor this may be plant such as dozers on stockpile work. Smoke candles are used to test cabin integrity for dust ingress during maintenance. The incident involved a CMW accessing a cab which had not cleared of candle fumes causing upper respiratory tract irritation.

- Safety Newsflash 2017 Hazards of stored energy

A tradesperson decided to cut an examination hole in a pressure vessel despite warnings on the vessel in question which resulted an outburst of pressure causing minor burns.

- Mines Safety Alert 2017 - Ethylene and CO fed into sealed areas of a mine

Bearing failure due to poor lubrication caused thermal breakdown of a seal which contaminated the product of the nitrogen generator introducing ethylene and CO into the gaseous product.

Inspector Gouldstone also presented and spoke to the copies of the most recently released Recognised standards -

- Recognised-standard-12 Place change mining operations in underground coal mines.
- Recognised-standard-13 Tyre, wheel and rim management.
- Recognised-standard-14 Monitoring respirable dust in coal mines.

Ms Webb was asked to provide evidence to Inspector Gouldstone of how such matters were communicated to coal mine workers and actions taken to apply learnings where relevant.

## **DID THIS EVER HAPPEN**

### 1.2 Recent HPIs at the Mine

There had been two recent HPIs at the Mine which had not so far received attention by the Department. The first, a shotfiring incident, dated 3 February 2017, was being dealt with separately in liaison with Inspector Paul Brown and the second which occurred on 15 January 2017 was described by Mr Bull .

#### **NO MENTION OF WHAT OCCURRED FOR SHOTFIRING HPI**

A person had to have stitches and corrective surgery to pin the bone in a finger after getting it trapped when sliding the bolter along the spill tray during roof fall recovery work. The Inspectors asked for a copy of the ICAM upon completion. The injured person is unlikely to return to work for another eight weeks.

#### **DID THIS EVER HAPPEN?**

It was noted that the historic cable damage incidents at the Mine have received particular separate attention from electrical Inspectors.

There has been a spate of bolting related incidents throughout underground mines in the Bowen Basin relating to most aspects ie longwall recovery/take-off, development and secondary bolting and remedial work.

#### **INJURIES TO COAL MINE WORKERS REQUIRING HOSPITALISATION FROM NUMEROUS DRILL RIG INCIDENTS.**

#### **WHAT HAVE DNRME, COAL MINE OPERATORS and OEM's TO ADDRESS NUMEROUS INJURIES?**

#### **IS DESIGN OF DRILL RIGS LESS THAN ADEQUATE, (PINCH POINTS etc)?**

### 1.3 Mine Status

Mr Bull gave a brief update on the status at the Mine.

#### **1.3.1 LW 101**

The longwall has retreated to 15CT at MG chainage approximately 1550m.

There had been extremely heavy roof conditions virtually since the start of the longwall particularly more acute from mid-face to the tailgate attributed to the sandstone sills

415m above the seam. Last weekend the face appeared to have begun to move away from this feature however when underground later in the inspection there was another roof-fall which will require cavity filling and strata reinforcement. There is a danger for all concerned in regard to normalising recovery of cavities which requires work on the face-side. Diligence is required at all times to avoid complacency. This was reiterated to coal mine workers later during the inspection of the longwall.

The sandstone horizon is known to move away and thin at approximately 16 CT in TG (i.e. 120m) outbye to be out of the influence of the feature.

Respirable dust control was discussed and the Mine so far has remained compliant save for three dry drilling incidents which have been reported to Inspector Shaun Dobson. A discussion took place in regard to mines having to re-sample in similar circumstances. Such activity may not be considered as appropriate or not likely for some considerable time. The inspectors undertook to provide direction after consulting with others in the Department in regard to how best to satisfy the requirement. In the first instance a discussion with the inspector ought to be conducted in each case as to a practicable way forward.

### **Why is anyone dry drilling in first place? 3 Separate Incidents. Unbelievable**

It is clearly impossible to consider if respirable dust mitigation measures are fully effective until the longwall reaches anticipated/expected production levels.

Mr Bull explained the measures taken and the planned further adaptations in the light of successful trilling at Moranbah North.(ref 'Schultz Slide' & Enviro-Sprays).

The strata reinforcement planned is substantially completed in the perimeter roads for Longwall 101/102 and were now progressed to 1 ICT in the LWIOI belt road. Some 'bagging' was still being experienced behind the longwall in what will be Longwall 102

### 1.3.2 Developments

MG 102 Superpanel has advanced to 31 CT and will drive to 35CT to establish the faceline for Longwall 103. UIS drilling is underway in readiness for this to happen.

### **Methane drainage holes to allow this being done. (What lead time for drainage needed?)**

MG 103 has been driven to 20CT employing only a single machine/crew at any one

Longwall 102 is driven but still to be widened for installation.

Mains drivage has been discontinued temporarily at 104MG due to significant float.

## 2.0 Underground Inspection

### 2.1 CRO

The record of Control Room Environmental Alarm Logs was viewed by Inspector Gouldstone for the previous 24 hour period. The CRO deployed was a temporary appointee while the regular CRO was taking part in a risk assessment. It was clear that temporary deployment time was given for the person to keep his knowledge and skills current by frequent refresher training.

## 22 ERZ Controller reports

Inspector Gouldstone examined the longwall reports while Inspector Brennan did the same with development reports.

A general comment in all cases is, that it appears that items which ought to be recorded on a statutory report are appearing only on the production report. An example of this was 'care with access onto the longwall at the maingate LWIOI<sup>1</sup>.

Development reports show a similar trend. Inspector Brennan reviewed the night shift

**How many MRE will note this time after time. Now seems been little effort to remedy this**

**Inspectors Recommend make sure that right information is included in Statutory report (instead of production)**

**HOW MANY TIMES>. RECOMMEND AGAIN> Nothing will happen**

Statutory Reports for 102 and 103 Development panels. Inspector Brennan identified Statutory Report 12691 102 maingate night shift entry under General Conditions as to Safety Standards "stopped mining and put rubbers on tubes from Auxiliary Fan Site > face SOS - 0.5m/s - after" including "a CH<sub>4</sub> trip and layering at the miner". As a result of what was written on the night shift report a review of the Afternoon Shift Statutory Report 12690 was completed. The Afternoon Shift Report also noted "Extra rubbers to C hdg Tubes, 6 x joins not fitted" CH<sub>4</sub> emissions were also noted as floor blowers, the gas migrating to G/B sensors and adjusting of the venturi.

**Floor Blowers gas migrating from floor to GB sensors and the need to adjust venturi.**

**Floor blowers mentioned in Development again. Never in Longwall**

Inspector Brennan's concerns were ventilation related issues over both shifts namely the requirement to fit rubbers to the ventilation ducting to bring face velocity's to compliance, o Stat Reports both MG 102 and MG 103 highlight poor standards of ventilation installation, not enough tube rubbers fitted. CH<sub>4</sub> trips methane layering at the miner. 0.5m/s after fitting rubbers

**Poor standards alright if after putting vent rubbers on (likely only when they knew Mines Inspectors were on Mine site next shift) and that velocity was only 0.5m/s**

The Inspectors recommend that management look more critically at the reports to ensure that all safety related items, and those specifically listed in, Schedule 5 and referred to in Section 309(3)(b)(i) Coal Mine Safety & Health Regulations 2001 , are included in statutory reports.

**Inspectors Recommend make sure that right information is included in Statutory report (instead of production)**

**HOW MANY TIMES WILL THE INSPECTORS FIND THIS BEFORE ISSUING A DIRECTIVE?**

Longwall was on red TARP strata control with cavities reported 136/149 & 127/131, & soft roof 43/46, 60/61, 58/59 with TG cogged out to 1486m

Methane TG GB varied through nightshift from 0.5 to 0.35% with 2.5% in goaf stream. 3.9 shears for the shift were completed

### 3.0 Underground Inspection

#### 3.1 103 Maingate

Accompanying Inspector Brennan to developments was Mr Bull. We travelled to 103 Maingate. In the crib I spoke with the Bull Gang ERZ controller and reviewed the recently completed statutory report. The section ERZ controller was inbye carrying out an inspection.

The B heading continuous miner was down due to the failure of the MODE light. The light consists of a Green and Red colours, the relevant colour is used to identify access to the miner. In C heading 20 - 21 ct rib shotcreting was being prepared.

Mr Bull and myself walked Bhdg inbye, Mr Bull pointing a trial of a 'mist' spray to reduce road respirable dust. The section ERZ controller was erecting a sign across the roadway advising of the presence of a shuttle car trailing cable. I enquired of the controller if a joint JSA had been completed with the three Eimco operators transporting concrete in kibbles to the concrete spraying machine in C heading. There is considerable interaction between the shuttle car traveling between the face in B heading and the boot-end in C heading.

At B heading face the MODE lights had been repaired, the crew were readying for production. I took the opportunity to discuss the recent high number of bolting related injuries occurring in the industry, emphasizing the importance of safety, focusing on the repetitive nature of their work.

I inspected B - C 20ct, the cut-through had been no-roaded due to low ventilation <0.3 m/s. The vent ducting had an end cap, the cap was not fitted correctly, the gap between the tube and end cap was the ventilation path. The ERZ controller was informed the cap was to be correctly fitted and ventilation controlled by the slider.

**B to C 20c/t no-roaded due to low ventilation < 0.3m/s.**

**End cap not fitted correctly (left deliberately?) told ERZC to fit cap correctly use slider plate.**

**Even knowing Inspectors coming and previous shift doing some work**

I inspected the two section auxiliary fans, as we walked to the fans I raised best safety practice with Mr Bull, direction the shuttle car wheels were facing, straight down C heading, safety requires the wheel to be turned facing the rib line. AFK03 internal general body CH<sub>4</sub> 0.3%; AFK01 internal 0.35%. I noticed a static respirable dust monitor attached to the Shuttle Car not parked with wheels into rib.

**Mining 101 walk side of the boot end, respirable dust monitoring was being conducted on shift.**

We walked to the location of the concrete spraying machine. I noticed two different logos on the shirts of personnel at the machine. I enquired of the Grosvenor employee as to his familiarity of his role during spraying operations. The coal mine worker was able to produce a SLAM detailing the hazards while working around the machine, the CMW also explained the machine operator had taken him through the SWI for the concrete sprayer.

A brief review of the SWI I noted was a requirement by the machine operator to respond a short question and answer at the back of the SWI.

We discussed the opportunity for the CMW to be the spotter for Eimco access to the hopper of the concrete sprayer eliminating interactions between the shuttle car and Eimcos. This was an opportunity that would have been identified if a group SLAM had been carried out. I raised my concerns with Mr Bull as to the No Go Zones in and around the concrete sprayer and the interaction of the CMW in No Go Zone advising I will be issuing a Recommendation to review the SWI for the operation of the concrete sprayer.

**No group Slam for all high-risk traffic area work, 3 Eimco loaders and shuttle car.  
Another INSPECTOR "Recommendation"**

### 3.2 Maingate 102

On arrival in the crib room I had a discussion with the ERZ controller regarding the previous afternoon shift report focusing on vent tube rubbers and gas layering. I had copies of the two previous statutory reports for night and afternoon shifts. The ERZ controller was able to positively respond to my questions adding ventilation velocity was 0.4 m/s at the face and that the ERZ controller had cleaned out the de-gassing box on the fan, this action increased the ventilation to 0.6 m/s. at the face C hdg 31ct.

**0.4 m/s at SOS. ERZC Cleaned out degassing boxes increased to 0.6 m/s.**

**Were the vent rubbers the main problem all along?**

**Should be part of any ERZC inspection as close to Start of Shift (SOS)**

I noticed a gas detector (Altair 5) on the crib room table enquiring as to the ownership? The ERZ controller responded it was his as the instruments are failing to complete a 12 hour shift. The requirement of the CMSHR section 228 (3) requires a person provided with a portable gas detector must keep the detector in the person's possession or under the person's direct control while it is in use underground.

**Chipped ERZC that Gas Detector must keep it under personal control.**

**Why is a gas detector with less than 12hr battery life is being used?**

**Is this a common problem or it his own allocated Gas Detector that is the problem?**

**No questions to Mr Bull (UMM)**

I was escorted down C heading to the auxiliary fans by the ERZ controller and Mr Bull. I recorded AFK02 internal CH4 0.23% and TAAF-023 0.25%. Inbye C heading CMW were installing 8 metre Megabolts, positive communication between CMW workers returning from the CM and drilling operators to access past the drill was well communicated.

Outbye at 29 - 30ct gas stub we inspected the pressure grouting in preparation for the installation of 6 x 12 metre standpipes. I sighted the Permit to Drill and the Scope of Work. UMM and ERZ controller identified the requirement for bolted rib mesh to extend to floor level.

### 3.3 Longwall 101

Accompanying Inspector Gouldstone to the longwall was Mr John Fitzpatrick (Longwall Superintendent)

Mr Shane Stevens (Shift Engineer)

On arrival at the crib room Inspector Gouldstone addressed the bull-gang crew who had just left the longwall. The approach to mitigation of respirable dust was referred to and



the clear progress that had been made at this and other mines in the Bowen Basin. It was also stressed that it was very much in everyone's interest to ensure that all monitoring was conducted properly to guarantee accurate data.

I also made reference to the strata control review underway generated out of the three roof fall incidents which occurred in last six months of 2016.

**Strata Control Review has been underway since August 2016.**

**It is now 6 months since the last roof fall and 8 months since the first.**

**Mine has been allowed to continue operations as it has seen fit since then while they "Conduct the Review"**

Visible airborne dust levels were very low for the length of the BSL. As we moved through to the longwall all of the spray, scrubber and encapsulation equipment was explained.

We met with the bull-gang ERZ Controller Mr Darren Bridgeman who gave me a comprehensive explanation of all the routine maintenance aspects in regard to control of respirable dust equipment that they would routinely deal with on his shift.

He was also consistent with his explanation of the status on the face demonstrating that there had been effective hand over from nightshift official Mr Julian Barnsdale.

We observed -

- Support frames for two thirds of the longwall clean and hosed with activity yet to reach the final third
- Bretby carrier spill plate which was saturated by sprays with no accumulations of dust.
- Sherwood curtain erected to a good standard at the MG. No deflector was in place at the MG to funnel ventilation away from the transfer but that did not look as if it was required.
- All operatives were wearing appropriate PPE and applying sensible personal positioning.

Unfortunately as we moved along the face it was reported, and later we saw, a cavity had occurred as the shearer got to 120 support. It stretched from 126 to 134 support and was 6m high and 314m forward of the beam tips. Production was halted and preparations to pump the cavity had already commenced. I spoke with an electrician and he was setting up communications for the same. He showed me the Slam he had completed for the task which was of a good standard.

**Cavity from #126 to # 134 around 6metres high and nearly 1m in front of Canopy tips.**

I spoke with the shearer crew and they, as with all other coal mine workers I met with were very positive about work towards improving respirable dust control.

I observed the damage to the flushing shield on the last support at the TG end of the longwall which has been causing problems of drag, and then shear pin failures. This in turn slows progress on turn around and then leads to higher probability of roof falls. It was explained that the flushing shield will shortly be replaced. This is a recurring feature on many longwalls - Moranbah North would appear to have managed this matter better than most.

**Damage to flushing shield.**

**Drag and shear pin failures. Slows advancement and higher probability of roof falls.**

**Flushing shield to be replaced shortly.**

**Moranbah North manages this better than most**

**DID THE CHANGE OUT FIX THE PROBLEM.**

**Is the Roof fall prediction prophetic**

#### 4.0 Briefing Meeting and Close-out

We were joined by the following personnel -

Mr Adam Garde SSE (Inspector Gouldstone briefed Mr Garde on the longwall aspect of the inspection before Inspector Brennan had exited the Mine)

Mr Bull - UMM

Ms Laine Webb

We acquainted all present of the observations, recommendations and requests for information made in this MRE.

**NO Legal Standing to get any action taken**

There were no circumstances for giving a Directive or an SCP. Standards seen and attitudes of the workforce were good.

**What about content of Statutory Reports again?**

**What about Ventilation and Installation, Inspection of Auxiliary Fan ventilation**

Mr Bull provided a copy of the letter requesting an extension to the s172 Directive given by Chief Inspector of Coal Mines in relation to an engineering study on strata control at the mine.

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**HOW MUCH LONGER WILL THE REVIEW TAKE?**

**WAS an Extension Granted?**

We departed the Mine at 4pm.

Safety Alerts, Safety Bulletins and Safety Newsflashes.

Copies of all documents mentioned below were supplied to Mr Bull.

### **Inspectors handing over what DNRME considers applicable to UG Mines**

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### **Is Grosvenor part of Improvement? Not likely**

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#### **ANOTHER DRILLING RIG INJURY LESS THAN 3 WEEKS SINCE SERIOUS FOOT INJURY**

#### Developments

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#### **UNDERGROUND INSPECTION**

##### **MG 103**

##### **Brennan and Bull**

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WAS an Extension Granted? <u>Due Date</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Recommendation</u>
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I Grosvenor Underground Operations are to Review the SWI for Concrete Spraying Activities.

Review the SWI for concrete spraying operations to define the Role and No Go Zones of the second person involved in concrete spraying activities.

Please provide a written status report on each SCP together with the actions taken to address each item by their due dates

Please provide a written status report on each Directive together with the actions taken to address each item by their due dates

Please provide a written status report on each Directive and SCP together with the actions taken to address each item by their due dates



Richard Gouldstone  
Brennan

Keith Brennan

Gouldstone Keith

Inspector of Mines  
Central Region

Inspector of Mines (Coal)  
Central Region