

Mine Name	Mine ID	Operator	Activity Type	Region	Activity Date
Grosvenor Coal Mine	M102976	Anglo Coal (Grosvenor Management) Pty Ltd	Inspection - Unannounced	Central	03/05/2017

Mackay District Office

Vision: Our Industries Free of Safety and Health Incidents

## Mine Record Entry

This report forms part of the Mine Record under s68 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999. It must be placed in the Mine Record and displayed on Safety Notice Boards.

Note that inspection or audit activities conducted by the Mines Inspectorate are based upon sample techniques. It remains the primary responsibility of Mine Personnel to identify hazards, and risks associated with Operations and ensure those risks are at an acceptable level.

Today Wednesday 3 May 2017, Inspector of Mines Paul Brown conducted an unannounced inspection at Grosvenor coal mine.

The Inspection resulted in one Directive issued to the SSE for Controlling and Managing Methane issued in general Body over face equipment and Coal Mine Workers from floor heave events. The Directive was given at the close out meeting conducted 4 May 2017, the close out meeting and Directive is documented in a separate Mine Record Entry (MRE) for that day.

On arrival at 05:00hrs, I introduced myself to the Senior Mine Officials, Undermanagers Mr Karl Barnsdale - Nightshift (N/S) and, Mr Neil Bryan - Dayshift (D/S). I left the Undermanagers to continue their handover and introduced myself to the Control Room Operator Mr Peter Hall to ensure he was also aware I was on site. I reviewed the TARP board in the muster area and noted 5 active TARPs, at the same time the board was being updated by off going N/S Undermanager, the information

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displayed was concise and legible.

Date:	Location	TARP	Trigger	Comments/Actions
2/5/17	L4101 FACE	LEVEL 2	CAVITIES ACROSS FACE	RECOVERY PLAN IN PLACE
2/5/17	M6103, C-20A FACE	LEVEL 1	PIE SPILL > 50mm	FOLLOW TARP
2/5/17	M6101, 20m S. M6102, 26.5m S. M6103	LEVEL 1	< 501 CM	FOLLOW TARP, BAG SAMPLES
2/5/17	M6102 FACELINE - 10, 50, 50, 60, 70, 80, 15m, 100 MINNES	LEVEL 1	> 30mm PROTRUSION	EXTRA SUPPORT WORK REQUIRED
2/5/17	M6102 FACELINE 50m DRAINAGE	LEVEL 2	100mm MOVEMENT (TODAY)	FOLLOWING TARP

Copies of Statutory reports were on display and available. Plans of Deputy Districts were on display and up to date. The Statutory notice board was observed to be lacking current information, this was raised with the UMM at the end of the inspection.

**NO INDICATION OF WHAT WAS NOT UP TO DATE**

**1.0 Supervisors Meeting**

The Supervisors meeting commenced at approximately 05:30hrs, there were 34 attendees at this meeting. The meeting was chaired jointly by both N/S & D/S Undermanagers. The information shared at this meeting was kept brief but relevant, their was a high level of discipline demonstrated in the flow and content of the meeting. Contributions to the meeting to confirm detail was actively encouraged.

All ERZ Controllers and Supervisors participated in the meeting to discuss their work plans for the shift, any conflicts identified were immediately addressed.

I requested a copy of the shift plan from D/S Undermanager Mr Bryan after the meeting was completed. A copy of the plan was provided as requested.

**2.0 Start of shift briefing to crew**

Starting at 06:00hrs a shift briefing was conducted by the D/S Undermanager and ERZ Controllers to the oncoming shift, this again was conducted in a disciplined and efficient manner.

**3.0 Statutory reports and Gas Alarms in the Control Room**

I read through the past 48hrs of Statutory reports and Production reports, of particular note was the references to the floor heave events on Afternoon shift 2/5/17 and Afternoon shift 1/5/17. The event on the 1/05/17 tripped the CM heads, the

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event on 2/05/17 however tripped the CM and tripped power to the auxiliary fan. I discussed the two events with UMM Ivers and stated we would inspect the panel as part of this inspection.

### **FLOOR HEAVE and GAS EVENTS**

**01/05/2017 Tripped heads CM**

**02/05/2017 Tripped CM and Aux Fan**

Inappropriate. Recommendations now legal basis.

All this needs to be directed straight to Ivers (UMM) or Garde (SSE) not the CRO.

Control room alarm logs were reviewed with CRO Mr Peter Hall, while there is no doubt the alarms have been recorded and actioned as demonstrated by Mr Hall, there is room for improvement in recording TARP levels and action taken. The pro forma for recording alarm logs does not allow enough room to go back to a previous line to record actions taken in most circumstances. I recommended to Mr Hall to follow up with other CROs and his supervisor to identify an appropriate solution.

### **YET ANOTHER RECOMMENDATION**

**SHOULD BE DIRECTED AT SSS GARDE OR UMM NOT THE CRO.**

While in the Control Room, SSE Garde and UMM Ivers provided me with an update of the mine:

- Mr Ivers temporarily filling in as UMM, Mr Bull also filling in as SSE.

**MAKES LITTLE OR NO SENSE. GARDE IS ON SITE SO HE IS THE SSE**

- Longwall 101 MG chainage is 998m 1 1-12ct. The longwall has had strata issues ongoing for some months now however the past 3 weeks has been the most severe for cavities. Mr Garde explained the engineering issues currently progressing and under further investigation, as well as the process controls to be implemented to ensure the Tip to Face is closed up for the Shields.
- Faceline 102 has recently been widened, the majority of Tell Tales have already reached Level 1 TARP trigger as well as level 2 triggers now initiated as well. Mr Garde explained the timing of the widening and the correlation to the 101 face position. Unfortunately the 101 conditions deteriorated further after the widening commenced. The faceline is currently monitored shiftly and, installation of passive support during Pan install is currently being considered.

**HARDLY SURPRISING GIVING ROOF STABILITY ISSUES**

**WHY EXACTLY IS 102 FACELINE BEING WIDENED NOW?**

**HOW LONG TILL THE LW INSTALLATION IS PLANNED?**

**IS THIS A KNOWN AFTER EFFECT FROM CUTTING LW 101 BLOCK SHORT, WITH THE 102 BLOCK BEING SOME 1km LONGER?**

Mr Ivers explained the current dewatering strategy in progress in MG101/102, this was also identified in the Supervisors pre-start meeting.

- Development 103 MG, the two most recent floor heave events were discussed, an inspection of the area will be done this shift, further review of the shift reports and Incident Investigation will be conducted when returning to the surface.
- e Work is currently in progress to restart development in the Mains, drivage to get MG 104 underway is a priority for longwall float.
- The mine was in the process of preparation for the Mines rescue Competition being held at the site the following day 4/05/17.

**MOST MINES MAKE A CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO HAVE THE MINE AS "TIDY" AS POSSIBLE FOR A MINES RESCUE COMPETITION, SO THIS WOULD BE GROSVENOR MINE AS POLISHED AS IT EVER WOULD BE WITH PEOPLE FROM ALL OVER THE UNDERGROUND INDUSTRY IN QLD ATTENDING**

#### 4.0 Underground Inspection

Accompanying myself on the inspection were:

Shift Undermanager Mr Neil Bryan

I-JMM Mr Cec Ivers

As a general comment the underground roadways in most circumstances were in good condition, Mr Ivers had explained the work in progress to correct the water issues in MG102. The condition of roadways in MG103 were not as well maintained as outbye areas however were still trafficable.

ERZ Controller inspection boards were up to date at every entry point. Diesel Particulate Matter boards were observed to be used and enforced.

#### MG 101 Longwall

We accessed the Longwall face via the MG belt road, the longwall was in production, respirable dust controls were observed to be functioning at the BSL, combination of foam spray and fine sprays at the discharge hood. Strata conditions above the MG BSL displayed some deterioration from lack of advance on the face, minor fretting / gutters in the rib-lines for the last 15m prior to entering the faceline, the primary and secondary support did not show signs of weight and the tell tale at the intersection were still in Normal TARP.

Creep was in order of 200mm to TG and the MG ventilation wing was in place and tight.

The MG crusher and turn around point dust controls were functioning and no visible airborne dust was present. While the longwall was not operating at full capacity it was evident the dust controls were effective.

The shearer was cutting toward the TG, an electrician was manning the MG controls which was latter explained by the onshift Longwall Consultant required to establishing the Variable web Bi-Di.

While walking up the faceline the observation of an undercut and close Tip to Face of shields were consistent with the description given by SSE Garde at the start of the shift. We were met by ERZ Controller Mr Darryn Bridgeman, Mr Bridgeman explained the process of the Variable Web cutting method. Conditions on the face were generally good however the face position was still under the influence of the cavity fill and consolidation zone.

Persons observed on the faceline complied with the No Standing Zones for respirable dust. Cleaning of shields was in progress at all times while on the faceline, there was no dust lifting into the airway from this task. We exited the face again via the MG and left the panel.

### MG 102 Install Faceline

At 2 lct MG 102 we stopped at an active gas drainage nich where 4 x Radco Employees were working. We spoke with a drillers offsider initially about the ERZ Controllers inspection conducted prior to our arrival, the CMW provided his SLAM which created discussion on how the ERZ Controllers discharge their obligations to demonstrate they have indeed reviewed and discussed the detail with each CMW, this was being followed up further by UMM Ivers. The CMW was able to describe the process for draining the Elgin dewatering unit in the nich at the 2 lct intersection, the CMW also was able to direct us to the pack of work documents available at the active drilling site, the documents included:

### **MG102**

#### **ERZC Gligor Turcas**

**SEEMS TO INDICATE LITTLE/NO EVIDENCE THAT ERZC REVIEWD AND DISCUSSED AND REVIEWED THE DETAIL WITH EACH MINEWORKER CMW.**

**DID HE TEST FOR METHANE IN PRESENCE OF CMW AND CROSS CHECK FIXED MONITORS THAT SHOULD BE IN PLACE AND ALSO ANY PERSONAL DETECTORS CARRIED BY THE DRILLER'S?**

#### **WHAT WAS UMM IVERS GING TO FOLLOW UP**

- Permit to Drill.
- Scope of Work.
- Strata Advice.
- Risk Assessment.
- SWIUIS drilling.

While at the drill site I spoke with the Driller Mr Ian Goreman, Mr Goreman was able to explain his drilling log in a competent manner, Mr Goreman identified the structure just drilled through within his mapping, the P-seam #33 was at 129m mark. I thanked the CMW's for their time and left to travel further inbye.

Water in the travel road was struggling to be pumped, UMM Ivers had explained the current plan to address this.

At the MG102 crib room a CMW was moving crib pods from 26 to 31ct, when challenged the CMW was able to produce the documentation authorising the moving of CABA emergency pods.

We entered the belt road via 26ct, between 26 and 30ct there were a number of items left behind by Development, 3 lifting chains were found amongst this equipment and were out of inspection code, this was found to be an isolated issue as all lifting equipment found elsewhere throughout the mine was in code, all persons challenged were aware of the lifting code for the Quarter.

### **STRUGGLING TO DEWATER**

### **BELT ROAD 26 to 31 C/T POOR HOUSEKEEPING AND 3 LIFTING CHAINS OUT OF DATE. INDICATES POOR COMPLIANCE STANDARDS IN THIS SECTION OF MINE**

Two Techserve CMW's at 27ct were tracking the belt. The conveyor had just been rejoined with a closure while accessing the 102 faceline. The two CMW's produced their SLAM's, I reviewed and discussed the hazards associated with their tasks, both CMW's were able to answer correctly the level of isolation required to work on or around conveyors. When asked the last time they had been sampled with Gravimetric testing pumps for respirable dust, neither CMW had been tested, both CMW's had worked at Grosvenor for approximately 2 years.

I discussed this with UMM Ivers, it is understandable that at its peak of around 750 employees and 200+ samples taken per year people can be missed. I noted this for discussion in the close out meeting.

### **WORKERS WHO HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED FOR 2 YEARS IN BELT ROADS HAVE NOT BEEN TESTED**

We then walked up to the 102 install face which has already been widened recently. The standards along the faceline were clean & tidy, a stopping had just been completed at the MG end of the faceline and a ventilation was still to be constructed from the inbye chute back to the stopping, by the end of our inspection this was in progress.

### **VENTILATION NOT IN PLACE BEFOREHAND AND SEEMS TO BEING CONSTRUCTED BECAUSE THE INSPECTOR HAS MADE AN UNANNOUNCED INSPECTION**

We met ERZ Control Mr Gligor Turcus, Mr Turcus had just completed reading the faceline 1st and 2nd pass tell-tales. Mr Turcus was able to explain the actions required for the triggers represented on the faceline.

At approximately 230m chainage in the 2nd pass, leaking gas was heard from a Mega bolt. Mr Bryan investigated with his Altair and confirmed the hole was breathing out however the methane was quickly diluting into the G/body. Intake side of the hole

methane was 0.3%-0.4%, within 1 meter of the hole return side the methane was 0.5%. A similar methane leak was found in the bleeder road (around 213m) at a roof bolt, in this location there had been prior attempts to pressure grout. The volumes produced while ventilation maintained was minor, the potential impact of this during an extended fan outage could be problematic for the 101 longwall the way the ventilation is established. UMM Ivers was following up on the matter.

**INDICATES A FAULT/STRUCTURE IS RUNNING AT AN ANGLE ACROSS THE BLOCK AND ROADWAYS.**

**WHY HAVE ERZC'S NOT HEARD THE METHANE COMING FROM THE BOLTHOLES AND INVESTIGATED AS WELL?**

**HAS PRESSURE FROM METHANE COMING FROM BOLTHOLES PREVENTED THEM BEING SUCCESSFULLY GROUTED OR IS THE ROOF FRACTURED AND THE GROUT BEING LOST.**

**FROM METHANE NICHE, VENTILATION STOPPINGS BEING ERECTED ON SHIFT, GAS COMING FROM MEGABOLT HOLES SHOWS POOR STANDARDS OF INSPECTION AND COMPLIANCE BY ERZC'S, SHIFT AND MINE MANAGEMENT.**

**COMMENTS ABOUT EXTENDED FAN OUTAGE. IS THIS AGAINA CONSEQUENCE OF CUTTING THE FIRST LONGWALL SHORT**

#### MG 103 Development

We met ERZ Controller Mr Alan McPhail at the crib room, Mr McPhail gave us a panel update and briefing on the floor heave events.

Walking along the travel road it was easy to identify the floor heave even with some remedial work having already been conducted. Electrical installations (DCB) were well demarcated and area tidy, all locks were in position.

We inspected B/hdg production face 23-24ct, the wheeling roadway was well maintained, this is obviously a function of the Shuttle Car drag bar. Very little evidence of the floor heave was still present at the face. Strata conditions were supported to Plan A and general body of methane was sitting on 0.3%.

**SIGNS OF FLOOR HEAVE OLD AND NEW.**

We walked to C-B 24ct production face, there were signs of old floor heave looking at the cross grade of the wheeling road however no recent evidence at the production face was visible. I discussed the mining conditions with CMW's at the face and I asked them how familiar they were with the serious accident from Grasstree Mine 2016 when a CMW sustained a fractured arm while bolting rib mesh from a continuous miner, neither could recall the incident. Due to the similarities of the process in bolting steel mesh panels it would be prudent for the Development Department to revisit the findings of this accident for learning outcomes.

**BOLTERS HAD NO IDEA OF INCIDENT AT GRASSTREE MINE (ANGLO) FROM 2016.**



**“PRUDENT” FOR DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT TO REVISIT. NOT ADDRESSED TO SUITABLE STATUTORY OFFICIAL SUCH AS UMM IVERS.**

**NO DIRECTIVES TO MAKE CMW AWARE OF SAFETY ALERTS OR TO REVIEW**

Frequency of first aid training and self-contained breathing apparatus raised by workers as being insufficient. Brown promises to raise it with SSE Garde.

The CMW's also raised a concern about the frequency of training in first aid and CABA / SCSR, I stated this would be raised with the SSE.

### General

All ERZ Controllers met underground were asked if they read the Inspectors MRE's, there were mixed responses to this. I encourage all ERZ Controllers and CMW's to read the MRE's, there is relevant information for all CMW's on the site.

**IF SOME ERZC'S ARE NOT READING THE INSPECTORS MRE'S WHAT CHANCE IS THERE THAT COAL MINE WORKERS DO?**

**DOES INSPECTOR CHECK ON WHERE THE MRE'S ARE POSTED AND HOW EASY IS IT FOR CMW'S TO READ?**

### 5.0 Post Inspection discussion

I gave UMM Ivers a brief of observations from the inspection, I also stated my intention to review Statutory reports further for Floor Heave events and Gas trips resulting from these events.

The surface Statutory Notice Board in the Muster area was not up to date, there was an MRE absent, the V.O's monthly report was more than 3 months old and the Safety Bulletins were not the most recent Bulletins issued. Mr Ivers gave an undertaking this would be addressed.

**SURFACE STATUTORY NOTICE BOARD NOT UP TO DATE**

- 1) MRE NOT POSTED AS PER THE ACT**
- 2) VO REPORT 3 MONTHS OLD (2 MONTHLY REPORTS OUT OF DATE)**
- 3) RECENT SAFETY BULLETINS NOT POSTED**

**UMM IVERS SAID HE WOULD ADDRESS THESE**

**THESE TYPE OF ISSUES SEEM TO COME UP CONTINUALLY**

Gas leaking from bolt holes on MG 102 install face has been planned to pressure grout on the faceline, noted in the oncoming Nightshift planning notes.

**ONLY NOW ARE THESE MEGABOLTS BEING PRESSURE GROUTED.**



I requested a copy of the two incident reports raised for the floor heave / gas trip events, I-JMM Ivers committed to making these reports available and would check on availability of the Gas Drainage Engineer.

Due to the time of day I expressed my intention to return to site the following day to conduct the close out meeting with the SSE.

Prior to leaving site I met with Gas Drainage Engineer, Mr Salani Mudongo. We discussed the 2 most recent floor heave events that occurred in MG 103 on the A/Shift of 1/5/07 and A/Shift 2/5/17. Mr Mudongo explained the lithology of the seams and Interburden in the vicinity of the 103 floor heave events, the cause of the floor heave and the gas reservoir is to be determined. Mr Mudongo provided me with a copy of both Incident reports, I photocopied all Statutory reports that had reference to Floor Heave from 3/05/17 back to 6/03/17 with the intention to read all documents this evening..

I left site at 17:30hrs planned to return the following day for the close out meeting.



Paul Brown  
Inspector of Mines  
Central Region

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