



Mine Name	Mine ID	Operator	Activity Type	Region	Activity Date
Grosvenor Coal Mine	M102976	Anglo Coal (Grosvenor nagement) Pty Ltd	Inspection	Central	15/12/2016

Vision: Our Industries Free of Safety and Health Incidents

Mine Record Entry

This report forms part of the Mine Record under s68 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999. It must be placed in the Mine Record and displayed on Safety Notice Boards.

Note that inspection or audit activities conducted by the Mines Inspectorate are based upon sample techniques. It remains the primary responsibility of Mine Personnel to identify hazards, and risks associated with Operations and ensure those risks are at an acceptable level.

Site Safety & Health Reps Consulted: Stacey White

Inspector Keith Brennan and I attended Grosvenor Mine today 15 December 2016. I was going to conduct an underground inspection of the development panels and Inspector Brennan was to conduct an underground inspection of the longwall panel.

The inspection resulted in the following MRE items being issued:

Directive: To ensure compliance with the control and management of methane in the Longwall Tailgate.

SCP: To develop a documented standard for cable management on wheeling corners.

SCP: To ensure that planned work activities meet with statutory compliance matters in work activities. This includes communicate of this to statutory officials.

1.0 Introduction

We undertook an opening meeting which was attended by

Mr Adam Garde (SSE)

Mr Wayne Bull (IJMM)

Mr Tim Reeves (Operations Manager)

Mr David Lawrence (SHE Manager)

The SSHRs were Mr Stacey White and Mr Jason Sharpe. Mr White was to accompany us on the inspection and Mr Sharpe was underground with the bull gang.

1.1 Mine status

Mr Garde had only recently been appointed as the SSE and had recently appointed Mr Bull as UMM and Mr Lawrence as SHE Manager.

Mr Garde explained he had three immediate priorities which were in progress, these being:

- From the recent Level 1 exercise it was evident that the effectiveness of mitigating an unwanted outcome was by having a capable 'First response' capability. He was planning to replicate the surface training galleries that were in place at Grasstree mine.
- A reorganisation of the management structure was being implemented with a number of changes, and potential future changes.
- A review of the SHMS. Again a number of documents were in the process of being reviewed with others to be prioritised.

Old Management trick, bring in new Chief by Internal Transfer, reshuffle a few chairs, appearance of new broom sweeps clean, while nothing really changes.

NOTE. Nothing noted about worker involvement (appropriate cross section); or worker review process, or training and assessment.

Mr Garde then gave an overview of the mine operations indicating that at present the limited production activity for Longwall 101 was due to the influence of the seam split in 'Domain A' which had also been impacted by operational matters.

No indication of what seam split influence is. Bad Roof, Gas, From Where? What are the Operational Factors?

Development activities were being conducted in TGI 02 where the 'Backholing' of 'C' heading was being driven from 27 c/t to 26 cit. The install face road had been driven on single pass with widening to be undertaken prior to the Longwall install. Continuous miner operations had been ceased inbye in MG102 and development activities had been recently recommenced in the 'Mains' section of the mine.

Why Backholing? Makes no sense unless because of roof fall or absolutely horrendous scheduling in the development plan

The crews were commencing their first shift where a 'Communication session' was being undertaken prior to the start of production on the afternoon shift.

1.2 Inspector feedback

Inspector Dobson provided feedback on the following issues -

- All Form 5a's (Confirmation each month from the Mine on incidents and accidents) were up to date. It was noted that the IC Absent/Failed defences were not identified in any of the Form 5a's. I questioned how this factor was not present in the investigation process. Mr Lawrence said he would look at some of these and provide feedback.

Why not Review All and provide updated Form 5 A Reports including full Investigations as required by X date?

- 8 of the last 9 HPI's were cable damage of various types with variable factors that had influenced these failures. These incidents demonstrate poor attention to good standards with cable management. The mine needs to ensure that I explained that this was one of the Focus areas in the Inspectorates annual plan, and given the recent incidents this needs to be a focus point for all CMW's.

- The number of HPI's v Anglo HPH's was discussed as this was raised at the previous inspection and a summary of the HPH's was provided. The mine has a procedure which was currently being reviewed. It was also stated that the definition between incident and hazard is also based on whether a release of energy has occurred and that a critical control has failed. I asked for a copy of the current procedure which was provided.

Number of HPI's v Anglo HPH (High Potential Hazard as per previous Inspection (undated)

Procedure currently under review.

How convenient

Anglo stated "Definition between incident and hazard is also based on whether release of energy has occurred, and critical control has failed.

'Also based'? What other criteria apply.

All a smokescreen effort to limit number of HPI's being reported.

Hazards are always present, Roof, Gas, Spon Com, Hydraulic pressure etc etc.

Eliminating/Controlling the hazard is what Mandated Principal Hazard Management Plans, Mandated Standard Operating Procedures and other mandated elements of the Mines Safety and Health Management System

First Indication of basis for DNRME Interpretation of a Non Reportable Incident " Critical Control Failed"

Also, application of "Reasonably Foreseeable".

So called "Critical Controls" supposedly in place nothing is then Reasonably Foreseeable

- The Inspectorates annual plan was developed from the Chief Inspectors Big 10 items . The matters of relevance for the undergrounds were Respirable dust, Strata control, Contractor management, UMM & ERZC forums, Health strategy, and Tyre management.

First 3 Grosvenor all over prime candidate.

Methane, Gas Management and Spon Com, Emergency preparedness do not rate mention.

1.3 UMM and VO meeting

The Inspectors then met with the Ventilation officer Michael Webber and IJMM Bull to discuss information previously provided with regards to Methane issues that were apparent in the Longwall Tailgate from the previous inspection from the ERZ Controllers reports. The graphical representations provided showed that on a number of occasions that Methane appeared to be greater than 2.5% in the Longwall Tailgate. I asked Mr Webber to verify this detail for the dates and time span that this was greater than 2.5%. This was to be provided for the close out meeting.

WHY HAS ANGLO NOT REPORTED THESE AS HPI's

It was noted that Methane makes were not entered on the VO's monthly report that was provided. Mr Webber showed that these were now on current reports.

The weekly ventilation review process that UMM Bull planned to implement was discussed. I was given a copy of one of these reviews.

Another of Mr Bulls planned implementations.

Has Mr Bull given similar assurances in the past?

Mr Webber also informed of the Chief Inspectors VO forum and some of the papers given. Of particular note was the incident of excessive Carbon Monoxide production with the Floxal

1.4 Muster Area

In the company of SSE Adam Garde and Operations Manager Tim Reeves, Inspector Brennan was provided an overview of the muster area including the ERZ Controllers de-brief/communications facility. The facility has colour coded mine plans indications relevant ERZ Controllers areas of inspection. The plan requires the ERZ Controller to sign off on the area of responsibility. Inspector Dobson identified a document 'confirmation of inspection' required countersigning had not been completed, this was raised with Underground Mine Manager Wayne Bull.

Document "Confirmation of Inspection" not signed

The previous night statutory reports were reviewed, Mains Zone 7 Report Number 12766 recorded pull tests were being conducted, however no indication of location, bolt type was recorded on the report, the expectation is the ERZ Controller would record the information. Maingate 102 Zone 5A Report Number 12435 recorded RADCO were setting up for drilling at 26ct stub.

ERZC Report Main, bolt pull tests, no details

Afternoon Shift Longwall 101 report number 11836 recorded tailgate return Ch4 0.5%; CO 20ppm and Goaf Stream Ch4 2.15%. Code Red Trigger Action Response Plan T.A.R.P. recorded for Longwall Face, Rocksill being pumped 63# - 83# an up-throw fault 47# - 48#; Shotfiring of stone lumps 92# - 93#. A copy of the Goaf Stream Bag Sample dated 14/12/12 taken at 4:05am — CO 1.1 ppm; Ch4 2.04% and O2 19.08%. Other information; DIA Ram on 148# replacement during night shift and a cavity had rilled in at 110# - 120#.

1.5 Longwall inspection

In the company of SSE Adam Garde and Operations Manager Tim Reeves Inspector Brennan travelled to Longwall 101. In the cribb room I reviewed details on the statutory report 11838 noting T.A.R.P. Red for face conditions. On the outbye rib an Anglo ACCOM Board from Night Shift 14/12/12 had recorded recent incidents discussed with crews.

We accessed the face via the belt roadway, I was provided an overview of the outbye face monitoring system and the intent is to remove coal mine workers from respirable dust and hazardous conditions.

SSE Garde explained the introduction of Environmental High Pressure Mist Sprays that have been installed through the BSL and transfer location. A small cavity was evident at the

maingate block corner, there were no indicators of excessive weighting in the belt roadway. All face sprags were deployed, the Tonstein Band varied in thickness throughout the seam, stone was visible above the shields where Rocksil had been pumped. Coal mine workers under the supervision of the shotfirer had completed drilling holes in preparation to fire a number of sandstone rocks on the face.

I took the opportunity to speak with Wilson's coal mine workers to gauge their knowledge of the requirements of Grosvenor Coal Mine GRO-7174-FRM — Longwall Familiarisation. The document requires longwall personnel to have a basic understanding of Safety and Operational requirements from CABA; Statutory Reporting, No Go Zones, Isolation etc. The coal mine workers were able to provide satisfactory responses to GRO-7174-FRM — Longwall Familiarisation, in particular Isolation and Emergency Stops.

inbye of the shearer located at 97# coal mine workers were housing down the surrounding area in preparation for Shotfiring. At 149# the side shield was damaged an inoperable, the flushing shield had broken away from the locating pins and when face/goaf conditions allow will be replaced.

After exiting the face SSE Garde and I walked inbye to the last open cut-through. The stopping work area was ventilated with a brattice wing, a mesh barrier had been erected. I raised the use of an ERZ controllers lock to secure the mesh preventing inadvertent access by coal mine workers. I also brought to the attention of SSE Garde the four-way gas monitoring tree should be inbye of 17ct the last open cut-through.

POST GRASSTREE access to goaf.

Gas Monitor Position not kept in correct location as specified by Mine SHMS

1.6 Development Inspection

Inspector Dobson inspected the areas of the mine currently being developed and associated workings accompanied by UMM Bull, Undermanager Neal Bryan, and SSHR White. We commenced with an inspection of the MG 102 district.

1.6-1 MG102

The Outbye District inspection board and Diesel tag board was compliant. The traveling surfaces and adequacy of stonedust applied in the roadways travelled throughout the Mains and the outbye section of this district was acceptable. The NERZ/ERZ boundary was clearly displayed and installed to an acceptable standard. The inbye district inspection board was compliant for the district to be open, however it did not show that an inspection had been conducted on the current shift. The afternoon shift were still on the surface at a Communication session therefore no production was being undertaken.

The crib room was at 26 c/t and the ERZ Controllers report for this work period had not been commenced however the report noted that the district was open until 14:00(3 hours left). The crib room notice boards were in good condition and displayed all relevant information. The Emergency response equipment was compliant. We were met by the District ERZ Controller who explained that he had completed his inspection earlier and had been rectifying an issue with the failure of ventilation ducting. He provided his note book with evidence of the findings of his inspection.

I noted that the area between 26 c/t and 27 c/t had been recently shotcreted however had no stonedust applied (No reference to this being non-compliant was observed in the statutory reports). We discussed this and it became evident that this had been completed over a week ago yet had not been identified as requiring to be stonedusted. Mr Bull committed to have this addressed immediately. This matter was discussed further at the close out meeting.

Not acceptable

SCP ordered.

Even stonedusting does not rate highly

Methane drainage drilling activities were being conducted by a contract workgroup in 26.5 c/t. I spoke to the CMW's, and had a general discussion about the Current work activities and documentation for these tasks. The Contract Coordinator was present who with the aid of the documents explained the Permit to work for the current activities and process for this being authorised. This had been scoped by him being the "Contractors representative", and a "Grosvenor representative". However the "Scoping/Inspection completed" was signed by these two persons on different dates (2 days difference). This did not appear to be the intent of this step in the procedure, and it was not clear as to who were the permit holders. Multiple documents for safe working instructions were referenced on this in the "Procedural Req Methane Drainage Permit to work

Scoping Inspection completed, 2 different people two days apart

Not clear who "Permit Holders" are.

Multiple SWI's referenced which all referenced Grosvenor SHMS.

System for permits does not work. Requirements" section which was all referenced to the Grosvenor SHMS.

I enquired as to how were CMW's deemed to understand the contractors SWI's that had been mapped to the Grosvenor SHMS and was informed that these were activities that all of the contract personnel had to be trained in as part of the appointment process as a driller. I commented that there was no requirement for compliance with Regulation 94 which it was agreed that this should be included. This matter was discussed further at the close out meeting.

Regulation 94 Inspections.

Is Inspector pushing Inspections as part of Mines Inspection regime or is he pushing it to lowest point of workers responsible for own safety

The CMVV's also demonstrated adequate risk management of their current activities and had completed detailed SLAMS for their work activities.

We then inspected the work area at the intersection of 'C' heading and 28 c/t where the Maintenance crew had just removed the LH drill rigs from the Joy 12CM12. Lifting equipment for this activity was compliant. I discussed the work activities with the Tradesmen who had undertaken adequate SLAMS for this work, and had undertaken this task previously.

The Breaker/feeder and fan were positioned in 'C' heading in-between 26 c/t and 27 c/t. These were compliant and housekeeping was acceptable. The Methanometer on the fan displayed 0.15%. Cable protection was also compliant.

We walked the rest of the bleeder road towards the backholing in 'C' heading where centre-line cracking was evident in the roof and centre-line Mega-bolts had been installed where TARP triggers had been initiated.

Centre Line Cracking in C hdg for Backholing. Megabolts for when TARPS enacted.

Always Backholing in Grosvenor. Is it from poor Mine Scheduling.

What happened to megabolts as part of normal pattern?

This was recommendation from Strata Consultants following Roof Falls earlier in year

What about tell-tales every 15m?

The 12CM12 Continuous miner was between 27c/t and 26 c/t in TG102. No activities were being undertaken here. Rib conditions were poor on the right hand rib but were being controlled adequately. The Methanometer on the CM displayed 0.37%. Cable management was acceptable. I noted that no tail sprays were installed on the tail of the miner to suppress any dust from the delivery from the centre chain to the car. This had been identified as a key dust suppression control in the development of the recent Recognised Standard for dust control. Mr Bull committed to investigate this.

No tail water dust suppression sprays on 12CM Miner.

Another BULL Commitment

The intersection of the TG with the install face road was beginning to deteriorate due to water from maintenance activities. The management of these activities was discussed with regards to the focus of minimising these impacts.

We walked the first pass of the install face roadway which had centre-line Mega-bolts installed on advance as part of the development cycle. No centre-line cracking was evident. The fan was positioned on the faceline which was compliant and the Methanometer on the fan displayed 0.43%. The second pass for this roadway was not planned to be mined in the immediate future. Housekeeping for the 'Surge point' on the face line for the shuttle cars was in good condition and cable management on the faceline was being effectively managed.

Install face megabolted centre line on advance no centre line cracking.

Not planned to widen road for near future.

1.6.2 Mains

Development had recently recommenced in the Mains section of the mine after a recent Jiffy conveyor extension in 'C' heading. The travelling surfaces from 19 c/t in 'B' heading needed improving, and this was to be actioned. Mining was being undertaken in 'E' heading with an ED 25 Continuous miner driving from 21 c/t to 23 c/t. One car had been cut when we went to the miner however no further mining took place as the ventilation ducting required to be extended. I spoke to the coal mine workers involved in these activities, and was aware that

one of these was a clean skin labour hire employee. The cleanskin explained what his requirements were for him being managed through this process.

The ERZ Controller was conducting his inspection and we then discussed the cable management standards in this panel as the protection on the wheeling corners was not to the same standard as in the MG102 district. It was evident that the mine did not have a documented standard for this. An SCP was to be issued to ensure these standards are documented and applied consistently.

Mains

Travel road needs grading from 19c/t.

Another Bull Commitment "to fix it.

Cleanskin labour hire employee at face.

1 car cut then had to advance vent ducting.

Cable protection wheeling roads and corners not adequate, not as high as MG102.

The bootend of the Jiffy conveyor extension in 'C' heading was examined where good housekeeping was evident and gas monitoring was compliant. The next cut through outbye of this being 20 c/t had a loose bag and pogo separation stopping. These were also evident outbye to 17 c/t. We discussed the standard of temporary segregation stoppings as these were very poor. Mr Bull committed to immediately have a standard documented and replace these to that standard.

All segregation stoppings 17 to 20c/t all temporary bag stoppings very poor standard, brattice pogo sticks.

Bull promised to implement a standard immediately

Complete failure of segregation.

No alternative intake uncontaminated by Outbye fire etc

Should reflect Reg 350 no more than 2 even though Segregation not ventilation intake return

1.7 Close out meeting

We discussed the general matters from the inspection.

The use of the Permit to work process was discussed with regards to the "Scoping/Inspection completed" section being signed by these two persons on different dates (2 days difference). This did not appear to be the intent of this step in the procedure, and it was also not clear as to who were the permit holders. The requirement for the UMM, VO, and Geo Tech to sign off only if required in the checklist was not signed off before the Scoping/Inspection was undertaken. We discussed this and the perceived order of how this document flowed. Mr Lawrence agreed with these findings and committed to review this. It was also agreed that the requirement for compliance with Regulation 94 should be included.

Permit to Work not done correctly.

Requirements for VO, UMM and Geo Tech to sign off (only if required) not signed off

Lawrence Review it

Section 94

Only sign off if required. How convenient for senior statutory roles.

Is this pointed at ERZC Inspections or worker personal?

The requirement to document the standard for cable protection on wheeling corners was issued as an SCP.

SCP to document cable protection standards.

How can Grosvenor not have this. Besides being required under Regulation, this is a mine that is damaging cables regularly.

The matter of compliance matters in the work cycle for reapplying stonedust after shotcreting and ensuring temporary segregation stoppings were installed to an acceptable standard was discussed. It was unacceptable how the work in these areas had not included these key matters and that ERZ Controllers and other statutory officials had not identified this. An SCP was issued to communicate the expectations of planning for statutory compliance and monitoring this as part of the work process.

Stonedusting shotcrete area.

Not acceptable

SCP ordered.

Even stonedusting does not rate highly

Inspector Brennan was provided details of the corrective actions required from a number of recent High Potential Incidents by HSE Manager David Lawrence, in particular the responses following six electric cable incidents, of particular concern was shuttle car IOSC42 cable torn in half on the November 2016 this is despite a number of controls in place to prevent this occurring.

ELECTRICAL HPI's

Corrective Actions from number of recent (no indication of how long) HPI's.

Training cable torn in half one of 6 cable incidents

SSE Adam Garde committed to a process ensuring gas monitors are re-located as part of the longwall retraction process, the monitors also require a form of easy identification, the monitors are hung high in the rib line.

SSE Garde committed to move gas monitors as part of longwall retraction and easy identification as hung high in rib

Gas monitoring obviously not high priority. Location not really general body

The matter of the Methane appearing to be greater than 2.5% in the Longwall Tailgate was presented by VO Webber where the graphs presented were from Real time monitoring system which were different to the CIT EC graphs previously provided. These showed

Methane in different concentration levels which was not clarified as to why this was the case. I required further explanation with respect to reasons for these, the actions taken and duration of each of these events as it was not clear as to why any of these events had not been reported to an Inspector as HPI's. Mr Bull committed to provide this as soon as possible.

Methane > 2.5% in LW

VO Webber.

Graphs Real Time instead of CITEC

Showed methane in different concentrations to CITEC.

VO could not explain why.

“ I required further explanation with respect to reasons for these, the actions taken and duration of each of these events as it is not clear as to why any of these events had not been reported to an Inspector as HPI's.

NOT INFORMING INSPECTORS

Bull committed to provide this ASAP.

1.8 Further information provided regarding Methane issues.

An email was received on 19/12/16 from UMM Bull compiled by VO Webber. An explanation of an event on 02/08/16 for an event where Methane greater than 2.5% in the Longwall Tailgate was due to a power outage with no persons underground. The mine was subsequently degassed.

Two further events on 06/09/16 indicate two peaks where the Methane was greater than 2.5% in the Longwall Tailgate for periods of approximately 30 minutes and 15 minutes. I spoke with UMM Bull on 20/12/16 with regards this and required these matters to be investigated as to why these were not classified as per CSMH Regulation 366 and reported as HPI's. I informed that I was issuing a Directive to ensure compliance with the Act and Regulations for this matter.

DIRECTIVE

Management of Methane in the Longwall Tailgate

TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONTROL and MANAGEMENT of METHANE in the LONGWALL TAILGATE. (Due Date 12/01/2017 One month

Does that mean <2.5 % CH₄ at all times, or control as company thinks acceptable?

Why nothing about Reporting >2.5% as HPI?

No mention of summary of Commitments given by Management to fix issues identified through the Inspection

<u>Number</u>	<u>Directive</u>	<u>Due Date</u>
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Pursuant to section 166 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999

1	Management of methane in the Longwall Tailgate.	12/01/2017	To ensure compliance with the control and management of methane in the Longwall Tailgate.
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<u>Number</u>	<u>Substandard Condition or Practice</u>	<u>Due Date</u>
2	Cable protection on wheeling corners To develop a documented standard for cable management on wheeling corners.	06/01/2017

Number	Substandard Condition or Practice	Due Date
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3	Planning of statutory compliance with mining related activities	06/01/2017
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To ensure that planned work activities meet with statutory compliance matters in work activities.

This includes communicate of this to statutory officials and their diligence for these matters,

Please provide a written status report on each Directive and SCP together with the actions taken to address each item by their due dates




Shaun Dobson
Inspector of Mines
Central Region

Keith Brennan
Inspector of Mines (Coal)
Central Region

Entw



Queensland Government

Vision: Our Industries Free of Safety and Health Incidents

Mackay District Office
P.O. Box 1801, MACKAY QLD 4740
Phone: (07) 4999 8512, Fax: (07) 4999 8519

Directive

I Shaun Dobson, an Inspector appointed under Section 125, of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 issue a Directive to reduce risk, pursuant to Section 166 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999.

Subject:	Gas	Mine ID:	M102976
Mine Name:	Grosvenor Coal Mine	Operator:	Anglo Coal (Grosvenor Management) Pty Ltd
Activity:	Inspection	Activity Date:	15/12/2016
Record Date:	21/12/2016	MRE Item No.:	1

Title: Management of methane in the Longwall Tailgate.

Directive Given:

To ensure compliance with the control and management of methane in the Longwall Tailgate.

References:

CMSH Act sections 29, 30, 31, & 273. CMSH Regulations 343, 344, & 366.

A person to whom a directive is given must comply with the directive as soon as reasonably practicable. Risk to a person resulting from a hazard at the mine must be within acceptable limits at all times.

Reasonable Time for Compliance - Due Date: 12/01/2017

Completed: Not Completed

Directive -

If an inspector or inspection officer reasonably believes a risk from coal mining operations may reach an unacceptable level, the inspector or officer may give a directive to any person to take stated corrective or preventative action to prevent the risk reaching an unacceptable level.

2. The directive may be given orally or by notice.
3. If the directive is given orally, the person giving the directive must confirm the directive by notice to the person in control of the mine or part of the mine to affected by the directive and to the relevant site senior executive.
4. Failure to comply with subsection 3, does not affect the validity of the directive.

Method of Giving Directive -

This directive was given in writing on 22/12/2016 at 08:30 AM.

Directive Given To -

This directive is given to the operator of the mine.

Method of Identification Used -

In issuing this directive I identified myself as a person appointed under Section 125 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999.

I will produce my identity card for the other person's inspection at the first reasonable opportunity (it not being practicable to produce or display the identity card at the time of exercising the power)

Part of mine affected by directive

Whole of Mine.

A copy of the directive was given to -

A copy of this directive or notice was given to Site Senior Executive on 22/12/2016 at 08:30 AM.

In giving this directive I reasonably believe that a risk from operations may reach an unacceptable level.

The reason for my belief or suspicion is based upon the following -

The monitoring results provided for the Longwall Tailgate

Shaun Dobson:  Date Issued: 22/12/2016

Warning - Failure to comply with this directive is an offence. If you disagree with this directive, you may apply for a review of the directive. A summary of the review provisions is provided below.

Provisions of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 in Relation to Directives

174. Directives

- (1) If an inspector, inspection officer, or industry safety and health representative has given a directive, the inspector, officer or representative -
 - (a) must enter it in the mine record as soon as reasonably practicable after giving it; and (b) must state the reason for the directive in the mine record.
- (2) A person to whom a directive is given must comply with the directive as soon as reasonably practicable. Maximum penalty - 800 penalty units or 2 years imprisonment.
- (3) The site senior executive must enter in the mine record the action taken to comply with the directive as soon as practicable after the action is taken. Maximum penalty 40 penalty units.
- (4) The site senior executive must make copies of directives available for inspection by coal mine workers. Maximum penalty - 40 penalty units.
- (5) A directive remains effective until -
 - (a) for a directive by an industry safety and health representative - it is withdrawn in writing by the representative or an inspector; or
 - (b) for a directive by the chief inspector - it is withdrawn in writing by the chief inspector; or
 - (c) for a directive by an inspector other than the chief inspector it is withdrawn in writing by the inspector or another inspector; or
 - (d) for a directive of an inspection officer it is withdrawn in writing by the inspection officer or an inspector; or (e) for a directive by an industry safety and health representative, an inspection officer or an inspector and not otherwise withdrawn - the chief inspector varies or sets aside the directive after reviewing it under subdivision 4; or
 - (f) the Industrial Coun stays, varies or sets aside the directive.

Subdivision 4 - Review of directives

175. Application for review

A person who is given a directive from an inspector (other than the chief inspector), inspection officer or industry safety and health representative may apply under this division for the directive to be reviewed.

176. Procedure for review

- (1) The application must -
 - (a) be made in writing to the chief inspector; and
 - (b) be supported by enough information to allow the chief inspector to decide the application.
- (2) The application must be made to the chief inspector within
 - (a) 7 days after the day on which the person received the directive; or
 - (b) the longer period, within 2 months after the day, the chief inspector in special circumstances allows.
- (3) The chief inspector must consider the application within 7 days after receiving it and immediately advise the applicant in writing whether the chief inspector considers the applicant has complied with subsection (1).
- (4) If the chief inspector does not consider the application is supported by enough information to allow the chief inspector to decide the application, the chief inspector must advise the applicant what further information the chief inspector requires.
- (5) When the chief inspector is satisfied the applicant has complied with subsection (1), the chief inspector must immediately advise the applicant in writing of that fact.

177. Review of directive

- (1) The chief inspector must, within 14 days after giving the advice mentioned in section 176(5), review the directive and make a decision (the "review decision")
 - (a) to confirm the directive appealed against; or
 - (b) to vary or set aside the directive appealed against.
- (2) The chief inspector may give a directive in substitution for a directive the chief inspector decides to set aside.
- (3) Within 7 days after making the review decision, the chief inspector must give notice of the decision to the applicant.

(4) The notice must -

(a) include the reasons for the review decision; and

(b) if the notice does not set aside the directives tell the applicant of the applicant's right of appeal against the

decision.

(5) If the chief inspector does not -

- (a) review the directive within the time allowed under subsection (1); or
- (b) having reviewed the directive, advise the applicant of the review decision within the time allowed under subsection (3); the applicant may appeal against the directive under part 14.

178. Stay of operation of directive

- (1) If a person applies under this division for a directive to be reviewed, the person may immediately apply to the Industrial Court for a stay of the directive.
- (2) The court may stay the directive to secure the effectiveness of the review and any later appeal to the court.
- (3) A stay -
 - (a) may be given on conditions the court considers appropriate;
 - and (b) operates for the period fixed by the court; and (c) may be revoked or amended by the court.
- (4) The period of a stay must not extend past the time when the chief inspector reviews the directive and any later period the court allows the person to enable the person to appeal against the decision.
- (5) An application made for a review of a directive affects the directive, or the carrying out of the directives only if the directive is stayed.
- (6) However, a directive under section 167 must not be stayed.



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Substandard Condition or Practice

Issued By: Shaun Dobson, Inspector of Mines (Coal)

Subject: Cable Management
Mine Name: Grosvenor Coal Mine

Mine ID: M102976
Operator: Anglo Coal (Grosvenor Management) Pty Ltd

Activity: Inspection

Activity Date: 15/12/2016

Record Date: 21/12/2016

MRE Item No.: 2

Title: Cable protection on wheeling corners

Description of Action Required to be Taken:

To develop a documented standard for cable management on wheeling corners.

References:

CMSH Regulation 179

Risk to a person resulting from a hazard at the mine must be within acceptable limits at all times.

Reasonable Time for Compliance - Due Date: 06/01/2017

Completed: Not Completed

Queensland Government

Vision: Our Industries Free of Safety and Health Incidents

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Substandard Condition or Practice

Issued By: Shaun Dobson, Inspector of Mines (Coal)

Subject: Compliance Documentation	Mine ID: M102976
Mine Name: Grosvenor Coal Mine	Operator: Anglo Coal (Grosvenor Management) Pty Ltd
Activity: Inspection	Activity Date: 15/12/2016
Record Date: 21/12/2016	MRE Item No.: 3
Title: Planning of statutory compliance with mining related activities	
Description of Action Required to be Taken: To ensure that planned work activities meet with statutory compliance matters in work activities. This includes communicate of this to statutory officials and their diligence for these matters.	
References: CMSH Regulations 308 & 309.	

Risk to a person resulting from a hazard at the mine must be within acceptable limits at all times.

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NEW SSE

Old Management trick, bring in new Chief by Internal Transfer, reshuffle a few chairs, appearance of new broom sweeps clean, while nothing really changes.

NOTE. Nothing noted about worker involvement (appropriate cross section); or worker review process, or training and assessment.

LW 101

**Limited production due to Domain A seam split influence also by operational matters
No indication of what seam split influence is. Bad Roof, Gas, From Where? What are the Operational Factors?**

TG102. "Backholing" C heading being driven 27 to 26/ct

Why Backholing? Makes no sense unless because of roof fall or absolutely horrendous scheduling in the development plan

INSPECTOR FEEDBACK

Why not Review All and provide updated Form 5 A Reports including full Investigations as required by X date?

ANGLO HPI vs DNRME HPI

Number of HPI's v Anglo HPH (High Potential Hazard as per previous Inspection (undated)

Procedure currently under review.

How convenient

Anglo stated *"Definition between incident and hazard is also based on whether release of energy has occurred, and critical control has failed."*

'Also based'? What other criteria apply.

All a smokescreen effort to limit number of HPI's being reported.

Hazards are always present, Roof, Gas, Spon Com, Hydraulic pressure etc etc.

Eliminating/Controlling the hazard is what Mandated Principal Hazard Management Plans, Mandated Standard Operating Procedures and other mandated elements of the Mines Safety and Health Management System

First Indication of basis for DNRME Interpretation of a Non Reportable Incident "Critical Control Failed"

Also, application of "Reasonably Foreseeable".

So called "Critical Controls" supposedly in place nothing is then Reasonably Foreseeable

CHIEF INSPECTORS BIG 10

The Inspectorates annual plan was developed from the Chief Inspectors Big 10 items .

The matters of relevance for the undergrounds were Respirable dust, Strata control,

Contractor management, UMM & ERZC forums, Health strategy, and Tyre management.

First 3 Grosvenor all over prime candidate. Gas Management and Spon Com, Emergency preparedness do not rate mention.

1.3 UMM and VO meeting

The Inspectors then met with the Ventilation officer Michael Webber and IJMM Bull to discuss information previously provided with regards to Methane issues that were apparent in the Longwall Tailgate from the previous inspection from the ERZ Controllers reports. The graphical representations provided showed that on a number of occasions that Methane appeared to be greater than 2.5% in the Longwall Tailgate. I asked Mr Webber to verify this detail for the dates and time span that this was greater than 2.5%. This was to be provided for the close out meeting.

WHY HAS ANGLO NOT REPORTED THESE AS HPI's?

It was noted that Methane makes were not entered on the VO's monthly report that was provided. Mr Webber showed that these were now on current reports.

The weekly ventilation review process that UMM Bull planned to implement was discussed. I was given a copy of one of these reviews.

Another of Mr Bulls planned implementations.

Has Mr Bull given similar assurances in the past?

MUSTER AREA

Document "Confirmation of Inspection" not signed

ERZC Report Main, bolt pull tests, no details

LW 101

POST GRASSTREE access to goaf.

Gas Monitor Position not kept in correct location as specified by Mine SHMS.

METHANE DRAINAGE WORK ACTIVITIES

Scoping Inspection completed, 2 different people two days apart

Not clear who "Permit Holders" are.

Multiple SWI's referenced which all referenced Grosvenor SHMS.

System for permits does not work. Requirements" section which was all referenced to the Grosvenor SHMS.

Regulation 94 Inspections.

Is Inspector pushing Inspections as part of Mines Inspection regime or is he pushing it to lowest point of workers responsible for own safety

INSTALLATION FACE

Centre Line Cracking in C hdg for Backholing. Megabolts for when TARPS enacted.

Always Backholing in Grosvenor. Is it from poor Mine Scheduling.

What happened to megabolts as part of normal pattern?

This was recommendation from Strata Consultants following Roof Falls earlier in year

What about tell-tales every 15m?

RESPIRABLE DUST SUPPRESSION

I noted that no tail sprays were installed on the tail of the miner to suppress any dust from the delivery from the centre chain to the car. This had been identified as a key dust suppression control in the

development of the recent Recognised Standard for dust control. Mr Bull committed to investigate this.

No tail water dust suppression sprays on 12CM Miner.

Another BULL COMMITMENT

Install face megabolted centre line on advance no centre line cracking.

Not planned to widen road for near future.

MAINS

Travel road needs grading from 19c/t.

Another Bull Commitment "to fix it.

Cleanskin labour hire employee at face.

1 car cut then had to advance vent ducting.

Cable protection wheeling roads and corners not adequate, not as high as MG102.

All segregation stoppings 17 to 20c/t all temporary bag stoppings very poor standard, brattice pogo sticks.

Bull promised to implement a standard immediately

Complete failure of segregation.

No alternative intake uncontaminated by Outbye fire etc

Should reflect Reg 350 no more than 2 even though Segregation not ventilation intake return

CLOSE OUT MEETING

Permit to Work

Not done correctly.

Requirements for VO, UMM and Geo Tech to sign off (only if required) not signed off

Lawrence Review it

Section 94

Only sign off if required. How convenient for senior statutory roles.

Is this pointed at ERZC Inspections or worker personal?

The requirement to document the standard for cable protection on wheeling corners was issued as an SCP.

SCP to document cable protection standards.

How can Grosvenor not have this. Besides being required under Regulation, this is a mine that is damaging cables regularly.

ELECTRICAL HPI's

Corrective Actions from number of recent (no indication of how long) HPI's.

Training cable torn in half one of 6 cable incidents

GAS MONITORING SYSTEM

SSE Garde committed to move gas monitors as part of longwall retraction and easy identification as hung high in rib

Gas monitoring obviously not high priority. Location not really general body

Methane > 2.5% in LW

VO Webber.

Graphs Real Time instead of CITEC

Showed methane in different concentrations to CITEC.

VO could not explain why.

“ I required further explanation with respect to reasons for these, the actions taken and duration of each of these events as it is not clear as to why any of these events had not been reported to an Inspector as HPI's.

NOT INFORMING INSPECTORS

Bull committed to provide this ASAP.

DIRECTIVE

Management of Methane in the Longwall Tailgate

TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONTROL and MANAGEMENT of METHANE in the LONGWALL TAILGATE. (Due Date 12/01/2017 One month

Does that mean <2.5 % CH4 at all times, or control as company thinks acceptable?

Why nothing about Reporting >2.5% as HPI?

No mention of summary of Commitments given by Management to fix issues identified through the Inspection

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