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Mine Name	Mine ID	Operator	Activity Type	Region	Activity Date
Grosvenor Coal Mine	M102976	Anglo Coal (Grosvenor Management) Pty Ltd	Inspection	Central	10/02/2016

Vision: Our Industries Free of Safety and Health Incidents

Mine Record Entry

This report forms part of the Mine Record under s68 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999. It must be placed in the Mine Record and displayed on Safety Notice Boards.

Note that inspection or audit activities conducted by the Mines Inspectorate are based upon sample techniques. It remains the primary responsibility of Mine Personnel to identify hazards, and risks associated with Operations and ensure those risks are at an acceptable level.

Site Safety & Health Reps Consulted: Jason Sharpe

Today Wednesday 10 February 2016 arriving at 8am Inspectors Richard Gouldstone and Shaun Dobson commenced an inspection at Grosvenor Mine which was focussed upon -

- Inspection of Developments 101,102
- Structured Inspection Guides for Ventilation and Contractor Management
- Management of Respirable Dust

The inspection included completion of an investigation into elevated gas emissions in MG 101C heading which is recorded in a separate MRE dated 09/02/2016.

The Inspection continued into 1 1 February 2016 where it was joined by Inspector Fritz Djukic.

1.0 Introduction Meeting

An introduction meeting was held attended by ●

Inspector Richard Gouldstone o Acting Mackay

District Inspector Shaun Dobson

- Mr Adam Foulstone (SSE)
- Mr Brad Watson (Operations Manger)
- Mr David Thomasson (TSM)

An overview of activity at the Mine was given which can be summarised as -

a) Development TGIOI - Two Continuous Miners, C heading now at 24CT to cross B heading onto faceline Drivage, B Heading just holed at 24CT which leaves the faceline and bleeder still to develop for 101 LW.

b) Development MG 101 - Two Continuous Miners, C heading at 23CT 130m chainage, on stand due to elevated gas emission incident and B driving 23 to 24 CT.

c) Development MG 102 - One Continuous Miner in 1 1 CT driving from B heading to C heading.

d) Mains development has been completed to 20CT accessing LW 103 gate road positions

A total of approximately 25Km of roadways have so far been driven.

Strata control has been more challenging than originally anticipated with support density increased accordingly.

A surface LW mock-up has been constructed in preparation for the first installation at the Mine incorporating specific airborne dust precautions.

1.1 Surface Inspection

Statutory reports were examined for all Zones and observations were as follows

- Several references to outbye dusty roads not specific but also rough roads
- Unsupported ribs no-roaded where required but not specifically listed
- No standard for defining where ventilation quantities are required to be measured
- Inconsistent reporting of Slams/VFL/POPS data
- Stonedusting reported as required and signed as actioned by Undermanager

Conveyor reports

- The line for countersigning by oncoming shift supervisor was not signed on any report

However the general quality and content of reports was good and consistent.

Two failures from stonedust samples were identified in sub-zones for MG 101 23 C heading MGI 02 22 B heading. No evidence was visible to indicate these area had been redusted in the appropriate timeframe.

A critical tell tale monitoring plan was posted in the meeting room. Mr Bull indicated that this was for guidance as the reading of these tell tales was covered by the ERZ Controllers and strata management requirements.

The TARP board had one strata event active at level 2 in MGIOI in C heading between 23 and 24 CT. This was due to rib conditions.

1.2 Control Room

There was information which showed real time meteorological information and full main fan health monitoring data. Evidence was provided of effective

- Alarm logging
- Emergency folder updating - monthly audit
- Current UPEE Register - EEM updates limiting authorised equipment/personnel
- TARP Folder - monthly audited
- Emergency Response Folder including cache plan - Positive feedback given on level 2 exercise

1.3 Pre-start briefing visual aids

Mr Bryan showed the current shift briefing information used on-screen for crews which was comprehensive.

2.0 Underground Inspection

2.1 General Comments

All roadways were tidy, had been watered showing follow-up on previous shift and provided a good running surface for traffic.

Most roadway profiles were good in the Mains but significant rib deterioration was visible in gate roads with cross-cuts particularly prone to roof bagging and floor lift.

It had been well explained by Mr Watson how the Mine was balancing risks regarding the need to arrive at the preferred development cutting horizon while considering support versus floor-lift/gas emission considerations.

DOES IT MEAN THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE CUTTING THE LOWER PART OF THE SEAM AND INTERBURDEN. SO NOT TO BE PUTTING COAL WITH EXTRA IMPURITIES THROUGH THE WASHPLANT WITH ASSOCIATED DILUTION, REJECTS AND RECOVERY PERCENTAGE FALL (Efficiency).

There were many instances of both danger and caution tape being placed without a fully completed reference tag, many in relation to the need to re-support failing ribs or damaged rib bolts. The comment applies equally to other defects. Greater discipline is required to, place the appropriate type of tape with a detailed tag explaining the hazard and directing coal mine workers. Redundant tape should be completely removed.

THIS HAPPENS DESPITE THE PAUL McGUIRE FATALITY AT THE GRASSTREE MINE (Anglo)

Progressive shotcreting of ribs was observed in gate roadways.

All auxiliary ventilation system were of a high standard.

There is inconsistency in the application of risk assessment processes examples of which follow in regard to a number of specific items listed below.

2.2 MG 101

On arrival at the crib room, 21 CT we were met by ERZ Controller Mr Alan McPhail.

The roadway conditions were boggy between 19/21 CT.

The information boards were in good order and up to date. They included •

ACOM Boards with safety performance and initiative information

- Escape plan & CABA location
- Sequencing plan
- Permit to Mine
- 6x general information folder

The plan to alter this to fixed standard was later explained in TG 101 where the standard was not as good.

An explanation of how the bull gang official covered the district and personnel until the dayshift arrived was given and that today activity at 12 CT Techserve (secondary support) and 8 CT where a tripper drive was being installed.

As we progressed to inspect the C heading we encountered three bull gang personnel extending services. It was clear that while working as a team, the evidence of risk management, provided on their very different SLAMS suggested a less than coordinated approach.

An electrician by contrast produced an excellent SLAM highlighting a full appreciation of hazard recognition and associated effective controls,

We inspected C heading the details of which are included in a separate MRE dated 9 February 2016.

An inspection of the ED 25 Continuous miner operations in B heading inbye of 23 CT was undertaken. The operators involved in this gave detailed explanations of their work activities and demonstrated good knowledge of the recent serious accident with the automated rigs and controls required to prevent this recurring. The dust suppression on the miner was in good working order which was providing adequate suppression. Ventilation standards were good with no obvious defects in the system. Two auxiliary fans were operating, and both were compliant. Methane readings at the fans were 0.44% for B heading and 0.22% for C heading. The application of incombustible matter outbye of the fans was adequate.

The bootend was outbye of 23 CT where the area was free of spillage/fines. Scrapers and skirts on the bootend were serviceable and all guarding was in place. Cable anchorage for the shuttle car was an acceptable standard and rib cable protection was in place.

An inspection of the Tripper Drive at 8 CT in B heading was undertaken where this activity was being conducted by Techserve contractors. The 8 CT contained an inspection board with risk assessment and procedural documents, Permit to work, and detail of the activities being undertaken. An ERZ Controllers inspection board was also evident on the double doors to the working area in the return which was compliant.

Lifting equipment in this area was compliant and a discussion with the contractors involved in this work showed work activity risk management was adequate. A further discussion with regards to the controls in the risk assessment for working in the returns revealed inconsistencies in the application of the controls for this matter. This would be investigated further with other work groups who were conducting working activities in return roadways during Development production.

2.3 TG 101

The crib room at contained similar information to that in MG 101 but was not as well maintained.

Inspector Dobson in conversation with bull gang ERZ Controller Troy Kurtz discussed his statutory report and the inspection procedure. It was noted that the recording of strata defects was not covered in detail however Mr Kurtz provided the reporting of these matters in detail in a duplicate book for strata defects. It was noted that this is not referenced in the statutory report.

On approaching the B heading we were alerted to an incident in C heading.

During the flitting of the Continuous Miner an electrician had fallen/slipped from the RHS walkway on the Continuous Miner and in doing so had put out his left had to arrest the fall. this resulted in him sustaining a dislocated left shoulder. He was quickly and effectively attended to, transported out of the mine where on-site paramedics relocated the joint before despatching him to hospital as a precaution.

The mine commenced their investigation process into the matter. Initial findings from the Inspectors revealed inadequate application of risk management and documented procedural requirements for the activity. Poor housekeeping was also evident with excessive components placed on the platforms.

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Two auxiliary fans were operating, and both were compliant. Methane readings at the fans were 0.86% for B heading and 0.51% for C heading. The application of incombustible matter outbye of the fans was adequate.

In B heading the continuous miner an ED25 was in 24 CT and had on a previous shift stripped out the right hand rib in preparation for the Longwall install. Approximately 3 metres of the inbye end of right hand rib had not been supported and was demarcated with no road tape and pogo stick approximately 1 metre from the rib. We discussed the appropriateness of this as a control and Mr Bull said he would find out why this practice had been implemented. Ventilation standards to the area were adequate. Evidence of a geological anomaly was present in the cut through and this had been adequately supported. When walking out of the cut through damaged fibreglass bottom rib bolts were evident where these were apparent over approximately 20 metres of the block side rib. Mr Bull arranged for these to be immediately replaced.

2.4 Close out meeting

We discussed the findings of the inspection and investigation with the following matters requiring further action:

A recommendation was made to implement a change to the strata defect reporting books to include serial numbers to the report book pages. This would then require the ERZ Controllers to reference this serial number in their statutory report when report defects. Mr Bull concurred with this.

WAYNE BULL UMM CONCURRED WITH IMPLEMENTING CHANGE TO STRATA DEFECT REPORTING. NO TIME FRAMES MENTIONED.

WAS THIS ACTION FOLLOWED UP BY WAYNE BULL OR THE DNRME?

The practical application of risk management in the work place was not adequate. This was especially apparent in the accident that had occurred. A Directive was issued to review the implementation of risk management practices and demonstrate that the methods being used are adequately implemented by coal mine workers in their workplace. This will require them to have regards to the magnitude of the hazard and the appropriateness of the controls required to prevent an unwanted outcome.

Number	Recommendation	Due Date
I	Strata defect reporting	NIA

To implement a change to the strata defect reporting books to include serial numbers to the report book pages. This would then require the ERZ Controllers to reference this serial number in their statutory report when report defects.

Number	Directive	Due Date

Pursuant to section 166 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999

2	Implementation and practical application of appropriate risk management practices in the work place.	10/03/2016

To review the implementation of risk management practices and demonstrate that the methods being used are adequately implemented by coal mine workers in their workplace. This will require them to have regards to the magnitude of the hazard and the appropriateness of the controls required to prevent an unwanted outcome.

HOW DID THE SSE ENSURE THIS OCCURRED AND WHAT DID HE PRESENT TO INSPECTORS TO SATISFY THEIR DIRECTIVE?

Please provide a written status report on each Directive together with the actions taken to address each item by their due dates

Richard Gouldstone
Inspector of Mines
Central Region

Fritz Djukic
Inspector of Mines
(Occupational Health)
Central Region

Shaun Dobson
Inspector of Mines (Coal)
Central Region

1. DOES IT MEAN THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE CUTTING THE LOWER PART OF THE SEAM AND INTERBURDEN. SO NOT TO BE PUTTING COAL WITH EXTRA IMPURITIES THROUGH THE WASHPLANT WITH ASSOCIATED DILUTION, REJECTS AND RECOVERY PERCENTAGE FALL (Efficiency).
2. THIS HAPPENS DESPITE THE PAUL McGUIRE FATALITY AT THE GRASSTREE MINE (Anglo)
3. WAYNE BULL UMM CONCURRED WITH IMPLEMENTING CHANGE TO STRATA DEFECT REPORTING. NO TIME FRAMES MENTIONED.
4. WAS THIS ACTION FOLLOWED UP BY WAYNE BULL OR THE DNRME?
5. *"To review the implementation of risk management practices and demonstrate that the methods being used are adequately implemented by coal mine workers in their workplace*
   HOW DID THE SSE ENSURE THIS OCCURRED AND WHAT DID HE PRESENT TO INSPECTORS TO SATISFY THEIR DIRECTIVE?