

Mine Name	Mine ID	Operator	Activity Type	Region	Activity Date
Grosvenor Coal Mine	M102976	Anglo Coal (Grosvenor nagement) Pty Ltd	Investigation	Central	08/09/2016

Vision: Our Industries Free of Safety and Health Incidents

Mine Record Entry

This report forms part of the Mine Record under s68 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999. It must be placed in the Mine Record and displayed on Safety Notice Boards.

Note that inspection or audit activities conducted by the Mines Inspectorate are based upon sample techniques. It remains the primary responsibility of Mine Personnel to identify hazards, and risks associated with Operations and ensure those risks are at an acceptable level.

Today the 8th September 2016, Department of Natural Resources and Mines Inspector Keith Brennan traveled to Grosvenor Underground operations to investigate an anonymous complaint regarding coal mine workers in Return/Homotropal roadways.

Opening Meeting:-

An opening meeting was held with Underground Mine Manager (UMM) Wayne Bull. I described the nature of the complaint from a concerned coal mine worker with regard working in return roadways and respirable dust monitoring. I was advised by UMM Wayne Bull No work is carried out in Maingate 102 Homotropal Roadway and work in Tailgate 101 is only undertaken during non-production periods.

Inspector seems to take Bull at his word. Does not appear to confirm that by looking at any Statutory Reports.

I requested the following information:-

- Results Summary - Respirable Dust - July 2016 (Respirable Dust and Silica Results)
- Hazard Management Plan - Use of Polymeric Chemicals. UMM Wayne Bull informed me Wilson Mining Services were currently pumping Rocksil on Longwall 101 face cavities. I requested a copy of the HMP for Polymeric Chemicals.
- Personal Gas Detectors - Operators Training Manual Altair 4 & Altair 5X
- Standard Work Instruction (SWI) - Working in Returns
- Risk Assessment for SEG grouping (GCG)

- Investigation into Void Sample Number 1688202 - 23/08/2016 - in Pit Services and Secondary Support

e Prior to travelling underground I requested a copy of Grosvenor Coal Mine - CHK Working in Returns and

- Grosvenor Coal Mine - SWI - Working in Returns

I read and countersigned the Statutory Reports for 101 Maingate, Tailgate and 102 Development, the mains development is currently stood.

The Control Room Operator (CRO) provided gas readings for Tailgate 101 C heading 17 18ct Ch4 1.43% (Deputy Notified) and Shaft 6 - 3.9ppm CO. The Restricted Access Zone (350 meters) for pumping Rocksill Foam established C heading (return) outbye 18ct.

Alarms (Vent changes to allow workers into the Return?)

CO Alarm on Intake shaft. How?

Underground Inspection:-

In the company of UMM Wayne Bull and Outbye Superintendent Stephen Livingstone Blevins we travelled to 101 Tailgate 17ct C heading, on arrival a group of coal mine workers involved in pumping cans for passive tailgate support were exiting the tailgate.

We entered the tailgate and I was immediately aware of the high ventilating pressure on the man door. In the tailgate I was provided an overview of the can pumping process by Outbye Superintendent Stephen Livingstone - Blevins, inbye two coal mine workers were setting up a pump.

Why does this not set off alarm bells?

Pressure, is it high to pull high quantities of Air around the longwall face?

How are the Regulators set?

Are they set with minimal resistance openings, or are they set at high restriction?

Is the mine ventilation system total resistance vastly increased by the methodology of Regulator being set at far higher resistance opening size than necessary?

Is the Ventilation system fit for purpose.

The pump was located in a low spot in the roadway, I enquired of the workers who was carrying the Altair gas detector as required by Grosvenor Coal Mine - SWI - Working in Returns Task - 5. Accessing into Returns dot point 1?

The workers responded neither had the required gas detector, I explained the requirement for compliance with the SWI. I requested to inspect the Dust Curtain as required in Grosvenor Coal Mine - SWI - Working in Returns Task - 7 - Installing Dust Curtain with water spray. UMM Bull and Superintendent Stephen Livingstone - Blevins were carrying Altai gas detectors, we allowed the coal mine workers to continue their work while we walked inbye to inspect the water curtain.

The water curtain was erected inbye 17ct meters outbye the Restricted Access Zone, we discussed the effect of the curtain on ventilation quantities, the curtain acts in a similar manner as a regulator, however has minimal effect on longwall ventilation during maintenance tasks. Water was filtering across the curtain, while the curtain was in place it did not comply with the design parameters in Task 7 of Grosvenor Coal Mine - SWI - Working in Returns Task - 7.

I suggest if a design is incorporated into an SWI the design parameters shall be evaluated if the design is practical for all applications?

All persons exited the tailgate where we had a discussion with all the coal mine workers with regard the requirement of SWI - Working in Returns Task - 5 - Accessing into Returns dot point one? We identified a coal mine worker who was carrying an Altair gas detector, UMM Bull impressed the importance of communication within a work group, the work group in the return without an Altair gas detector was a compliance failure.

I enquired of the Deputy where the "Working in Returns Inspection Board" is located as documented in Grosvenor Coal Mine SWI - Working in Returns Task - 4. Accessing Panel dot point two? Workers explained the Grosvenor Coal Mine - CHK - Working in Returns requires the ERZC to Check and sign off, therefore No Inspection Board is Required? I suggested the coal mine workers familiarize themselves with the Checklist document.

Grosvenor Coal Mine - CHK - Working in Returns, under the heading Dust/Inhalable Particles dot point five requires the following "Working in Return Inspection Boards in work area have been filled out and advanced with workgroup if required" I suggest the removal of "if required" from the document. Note the requirements of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2001 Schedule 5 Matters to be covered in inspections. The results of the inspection shall be provided in a prominent location for all coal mine workers to read prior entry, in this case to return roadways.

No gas detectors on workers in Returns as required.

Water curtain to suppress respirable airborne dust not installed properly also acts as a Regulator.

No one properly aware of requirements to work in Return.

ERZC Inspection Boards not required, Statutory Reports by ERZC not available to workers going into Returns.

Still does not stop Grosvenor putting workers in Returns no matter how many procedures are not trained and followed and how not compliant with Inspection Regime.

We traveled to 16ct Maingate 101 cribb room to access the conveyor roadway, as we walked inbye UMM Bull explained that additional 8 meter bolts were currently being installed. A mobile platform allowing work above the running conveyor was undergoing proving trials. The platform will allow installation of 8 meter mega bolts centrally located maximising roadway support during longwall retreat.

Installing 8m bolts above conveyor bel by trialing platform.

Been used at Nth Goonyella and Moranbah North for years.

Are they pre-installing centre megabолts on advance in other development panels?

I was impressed with the outbye maingate control centre currently being trialled, the introduction of the outbye maingate control will remove coal mine workers from face activities in particular respirable dust exposures.

I observed guttering along the face/block at the maingate, otherwise all sprags were deployed the face areas stable. We were met by the face deputy who provided details from his notebook of his inspection and the progress of Rocksil pumping between cavities from #70 98# shields. We walked inbye to the Zone of Operation (ZOO) No Road Tape was established identifying the ZOO. I spoke with Wilsons workers with regard exclusion zones, Formaldehyde concentrations in Rocksil and personal health monitoring frequency.

Guttering along Maingate

Cavity runs from Chock #70 to #98.

If there are 149 chocks on the face ,then that would be approximately 72 metres long. (28 x 2.5m).

No mention of how high or wide the fall is.

No Road tape near Zone of Operation for Rocsil pumping.

Does not seem to check on whether the 350m on the return side of the ZOO is in fact in place stopping workers being within 350 on the Return side.

I requested to inspect the construction of the seal inbye the last open cut-through, Matermyne workers were pumping a batch of cement product from a LHD hopper. I raised the absence of a Deputy's inspection board at the work site with UMM Bull, workers need to be aware of the date and time of inspection in their work areas including the presence of flammable or noxious gases, the workers had ventilated their workplace, additional passive supporting cans had been stood inbye and outbye the seal.

Inbye Seal Construction.

No ERZC Inspection Board.

No indication of gas detectors being worn by workers.

How does this happen after Paul McGuire fatality at the Grastree Mine (Anglo)?

Document Review:-

I have reviewed the following documents:-

- Hazard Management Plan - Use of Polymeric Chemicals, During the opening meeting I discussed the pending Recognised Standard for the use of Polymeric Chemicals currently in Draft with UMM Wayne Bull. The Recognised Standard currently in draft has been developed by a tripartite group on the Inspectorate, Industry and the CFMEU. The Grosvenor Coal Mine Hazard Management Plan (HMP) reflects favourably with the Draft Recognised Standard. I explained to UMM Wayne Bull the NSW Department of Industry (DPI) Mine Safety Operations Branch are responsible for issuing licences and simply if a product does not comply with the licensing conditions issued by Mine Safety Operations Branch, the product cannot be used in Queensland Mining operations.
- Grosvenor Coal Mine Standard Work Instruction (SWI) - Working in Returns. I have raised my concerns with this document in the body of the Mine Record Entry (MRE) and Recommend a Review of this document including any linked documents. I will issue a Recommendation form.

Working in Returns. Inspector has concerns and Recommends Review.

Description of Action Recommended to be Taken:

Review the content of Operators Training Manual Altair 4 & Altair 5X. The document has references to operating a vehicle? The document also contains other questionable statements.

References:

The Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2001 Section 82 Training.

Recommends, no legal standing. Takes no action stop this work until the proper procedures and training and assessment put in place. This includes all the things the Inspector found wrong.

- Investigation into Void Sample Number 1688202 - 23/08/2016 - Pit Services and Secondary Support. I received the following explanation from UMM Wayne Bull about the voided sample as follows - The respirable dust sample on the 23/08/16 was void as the sampling head was returned with the grit pot was missing, this captures the larger particles which do not represent any part of the respirable dust sample. If the grit pot is missing, when the sampling train is recalibrated it does not meet the recommended flow rate and therefore needs to be voided.
- Personal Gas Detectors - Operators Training Manual Altair 4 & Altair 5X. Page 5 of 53 - Training Instructions - Paragraph four second line. Where deemed competent in the operation of the vehicle the trainee must then be authorised to operate the vehicle on a solo basis by the SSE or nominated representative. This passage is NOT referring to a Gas Detector! Paragraph five (5) is totally dedicated to the operation of a vehicle! Page 12 NOTE - Where it is not possible for the fault to be rectified by the operator it must be reported for action. The problem area must be tagged as appropriate if it represents a safety hazard? What is this? If the operator cannot rectify the problem the instrument is Tagged Out of Service with a description of the fault on the tag. The second Note Box while reporting, does this comply with the tagging procedures of faulty equipment at Grosvenor Coal Mine?

The use of the terminology "Horn" never head of a horn alarm on a gas detector. Alarm Yes. Page 18 the document refers to an alarm, I accept the symbol is consistent with a horn. This is a training document, the requirements are simple do no confuse trainees. The flow of the document/information is also questionable. Page 26 provides instrument Response Times. However there are no instructions on how the lag in response times may effect the instrument operator and/or other coal mine workers present?

Page 25 Danger. The second box is superfluous, the actions in Box one requires a coal mine worker to "leave the area immediately and retreat to fresh air". During my underground inspection a number of coal mine workers carrying Altair gas detectors were not statutory officials, the actions in box one are appropriate. Box two "if a combustionable reading reaches or exceeds 100% LEL or 5.00% CH₄ the area becomes an explosion hazardous area".

The expectations are coal mine workers would not be exposed to CH₄ levels >2.0% Ch₄. The information box fails to mention the atmosphere would be irrespirable if 5.00% Ch₄ was present, what is the immediate hazard?

I made contact with IJMM Wayne Bull on Tuesday 13th September 2016 at 12:22pm expressing my concerns with regard the document content. I informed UMM Wayne Bull, I will issue a Recommended Action to review Operators Training Manual Altair 4 & Altair 5X. I have not questioned the Equipment Introduction and Operating instructions.

[: Review Grosvenor Coal Mine - CHK - Working in Returns and Grosvenor Coal Mine - SWI - Working in Returns include any linked documents](#)

[Description of Action Recommended to be Taken:](#)

[Review Grosvenor Coal Mine - CHK - Working in Returns and](#)

[Grosvenor Coal Mine - SWI - Working in Returns as identified in the Mine Record Entry.](#)

[References:](#)

[The Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 Section 42 Obligations of the Site Senior Executive \(a\)\(f\)\(iv\)](#)

- Document Altair Care - dated 21/1/16 - "There has been an increased number of Altair's being damaged underground. The comments go on to reflect the requirements of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2001 section 228 (3) A person provided with a portable gas detector must keep the detector in the person's possession or under the person's direct control while it is in use underground. Failure to comply with the CMSHR 228 (3) is an offence against the Act section 60 - 2 (a) (b).

Personal Gas Detectors.

Procedures and Training deficient.

Damage occurring to gas detectors during everyday use. Implied it is by workers not ERZC's.

Company quotes CMR 2001 228 (3).

Unbelievable hypocrisy of Grosvenor Management is shown.

While the Management has the Mine not in Compliance with many Regulations and indeed the ACT continuously, they threaten workers with offences against both ACT and Regulation and immediate termination.

- Risk Assessment for SEG grouping (GCG). I have reviewed the GCG Initial Occupational Hygiene Risk Assessment. The sample sheet provided on Thursday 8 September 2016 — Results Summary Respirable Dust — July 2016 does not include Returns respirable dust monitoring. GCG Initial Occupational Hygiene Risk Assessment, Page 28/36 the SEG# P5 - Under the Heading Non-Routine SEGs and Contractors. I request a copy of the results of the SEG group identified in P5 Returns — Samples 7 by close of business Monday 19th September 2016.

Still not being done properly. Still fine to have workers in Returns according to Inspector

Close Out Meeting:-

A brief close out meeting was held with UMM Wayne Bull, I was provided copies of the documents requested. I thanked I-JUM Wayne Bull for his assistance during my underground inspection.

Wayne Bull advised that no one works in homotropical roadways and not in return during Longwall operation.

Inspector seems to take Bull at his word. Does not appear to confirm that by looking at any Statutory Reports.

UNDERGROUND INSPECTION

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Keith Brennan
Inspector of Mines
Central Region