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“Longwall 104 accumulated 14 methane exceedance HPIs.  Those HPIs on longwall 104 were preceded by another 13 on longwall 103 between 2 July and 7 November 2019, and, further, those 13 HPIs on 103 were themselves preceded by multiple similar events on not only longwall 103 but also 102 and 101.” Grosvenor Inquiry Counsel Assisting Hunter

  • July 27, 2021

There is a noticeable lack of action both from Anglo Grosvenor and Inspectorate to get adequate methane pre-drainage of the Goonyella and surrounding seams over 2016 to 2020. The need…

I said words to the effect We are issuing a Directive tonight to suspend operations. No-one is to access the underground workings.” I recall Glen Britton challenging me by asking, with words to the effect of  “On what Grounds? Who would make the decision? And where was the risk?  Inspector A and I responded that it was on the ground of an unacceptable level of risk. I said that we did not have any relevant data to interpret as yet and we did not know what had caused the ignition. At the conclusion of the conversation, Mr Britton laughed and walked away.

  • July 22, 2021

There is a large amount of material available to the Grosvenor Inquiry that has never been tendered as evidence and has not been made public. This includes the Statements from…

In addition, the manager, albeit prompted by others, arranged for a risk assessment of the proposed extraction design.  The assessment made scant reference to spontaneous combustion and then only with a low level probability that it could arise from the extraction of bottom coal.  Moreover, the consequence of an occurrence was rated at the lowest safety level, mentioning short panel life and use of continuous gas monitoring as existing safeguards

  • July 21, 2021

This Mining Inquiry comment has a familiar ring  after the Grosvenor Inquiry. Mine Manager being prompted about spontaneous combustion risk assessment. Spontaneous Combustion rated low. Use of continuous gas monitoring…