“The Level 2 and 3 triggers for Methane for the Longwall return that require the Shearer speed to be reduced by 30% or to stop the shearer do not occur when the shearer is in the TG Shuffle Zone; Has the Methane ignition risk been assessed for this in the risk assessment when developing this TARP?” Les Marlborough Inspector of Mines 12th September

Now Mines Inspector issues a written Section 168 Directive to Grosvenor Mine SSE on the 12th of September 2017.

The mine is to review the GRO-750-TARP-General Body Contaminant and the controls in place to ensure that the above points are addressed, with supporting data from the mine’s gas monitoring system to ensure that an acceptable level of risk is achieved

This was after requesting that the SSE provide a copy of the Grosvenor Procedures for General Body Contaminant Tarps.

Inspector Marlborough identifies that the controls of lowering the shearer speed or stopping the shearer while it is in the Tailgate Shuffle Zone.

He then asks whether the TARP Risk Assessment assessed the risk of a Methane Ignition.

 Has the Methane ignition risk been assessed for this in the risk assessment when developing this TARP?       

Inspector Marlborough lists out 4 areas of concern he asks to be addressed in the Directive Response.

He also requests copies of gas monitoring data in the LW Panel and Return for the last 12 weeks.

The Directive has a due date of the 3rd of October 2017.

MRE-Grosvenor Coal Mine LM CH4 tarps – 12.09.2017.pdf

I, Mr Leslie Marlborough, Inspector of Mines, have been reviewing the document, GRO-750-TARP-General Body Contaminant which was supplied to me on request by SSE Mr Adam Garde on 1 1 Aug 2017.

Having reviewed this document, I have identified several areas of concern;-

1. The Level 2 and 3 triggers for Methane for the Longwall return that require the Shearer speed to be reduced by 30% or to stop the shearer do not occur when the shearer is in the TG Shuffle Zone, referred to in the TARP as PRS#131 — 149.           Has the Methane ignition risk been assessed for this in the risk assessment when developing this TARP?                                                                                                                    Were any alternatives considered, such as; preventing shearer access into the TG should Methane levels be approaching 2 or 2.5% as the shearer approaches the TG;   tripping the cutter heads at a lower Methane GB concentration to allow the shearer to be flitted clear of the TG Shuffle Zone;   the use of a Sherwood Curtain or other ventilation method in the TG end of the Longwall?
2. Does the mine have gas monitoring data that shows the extent of the TG Shuffle Zone and the flushing of Methane from the goaf area when the shearer is in this area?
3. Is the stopping of the shearer an instantaneous automatic function when the shearer is in the TG Shuffle Zone?
4. The TARP, with regards to Methane concentrations, appears to be focused on compliance with s343 of the CHSHR. The mine must also ensure that the hazards associated with Methane in excess of 2.0% are addressed in the management of general body methane levels to achieve an acceptable level of risk.

I also request that the mine supply me, by Friday 15 September 2017, with screen shots of weekly gas trends from the Citect gas monitoring system for each week, for the 12 weeks prior to Sun 10 Sept 2017.

These 12 separate screen shots must show Methane readings for the LWIOI TG Inbye and Outbye Methane monitors, the TG 101 Outbye Tube Bundle point Methane reading, the shearer face position and the Barometer reading.

Pursuant to section 168 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999    

Review of general Body Contaminant TARP Due 03/10/2017

The mine is to review the GRO-750-TARP-General Body Contaminant and the controls in place to ensure that the above points are addressed, with supporting data from the mine’s gas monitoring system to ensure that an acceptable level of risk is achieved