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Dobson Methane S166 Directive Dec 2016 Does Not Force Grosvenor To Take Action About Controlling Methane. All It Does Is Tell The Mine To Make Sure Workers Are Withdrawn To A Place Of Safety When Methane >2.5 In Each Place Used By A Person For Normal Work Or Travel And It Is Immediately Reported To The Inspectors.

Dobson Methane S166 Directive Dec 2016 does not force Grosvenor to take action about controlling methane. All it does is tell the Mine to make sure workers are withdrawn to a place of safety when Methane >2.5 in each place used by a person for normal work or travel and it is immediately reported to the Inspectors.

I do not believe that the wording of Inspector Dobson’s Directive is even appropriate for using a Section 166  Directive to reduce risk.

What exactly was the intention of the Inspector Dobson in the December 2016 Directive, and how the Anglo Grosvenor Management Satisfied the Directive, only now Deputy Chief Inspector Dobson can answer.

Inspector Dobson issued and wrote the Directive Five days after the Inspection and Close Out meeting on the 15th Dec 2016, the after further Information was provided by the Ventilation Officer and Mine Manager and Dobson had discussion with UMM Bull.

Inspector Dobson has had 5 days to consider the wording of the Directive and has quite specifically mentioned quite specific parts of the Act and Regulations.

All it requires Anglo Grosvenor Management to make sure that

  1. Workers are removed from each place used by a person for normal work or travel when methane is detected at greater that 2.5% in that work area or outbye the travel and work area.
  2. Workers are not to re-enter until Inspected by an ERZC and declared safe.
  3. The site senior executive notify the inspector of any action taken under this section immediately after the action is taken.

Given DCIOCM Dobson did not provide a Statement for the Grosvenor Inquiry and Dobson was not required to provide evidence to the Grosvenor Inquiry we will never know.

One matter that seems certain, is that Inspector Dobson has come to the belief that the mine is not reporting Methane HPI’s in the Longwall Tailgate as required.

I do not believe that the wording of Inspector Dobson’s Directive is even appropriate for using a Section 166  Directive to reduce risk.

The Dobson Directive does not tell them  to take stated corrective or preventative action.”

166 Directive to reduce risk

If an inspector or inspection officer reasonably believes a risk from coal mining operations may reach an unacceptable level, the inspector or officer may give a directive to any person to take stated corrective or preventative action to prevent the risk reaching  an unacceptable level.

It doesn’t actually require them to do anything except to comply with very specifically identified Sections of the Act S 273 Withdrawal of persons in case of danger and Regulation 366 Withdrawal of persons in case of danger. 

What use is a Section 166 Directive that does not actually direct them to do anything?

How can it ever be used to hold anyone accountable?

Counsel Assisting Hunter QC put the meaning of the Dobson Directive to Inspector Stephen Smith on the 9th of March TRA.500.014.0047

Q. Perhaps I’ll just try it this way, and if you need to see the actual document, we can have it shown to you. I’m going to ask you about a mine record entry from 15 December 2016, when inspector Dobson issued a directive to the mine, that directive being to ensure compliance with the control and management of methane in the longwall tailgateDo you recall that?

A.   No, I don’t.

Q You don’t know.

A .I don’t know, yes.

There is a very logical reason Inspector Smith knows nothing about the meaning of the Directive. He did not start at the Department until 2017.

The previous Mines Minister Lynham was quite specific in the time frames that the Grosvenor Inquiry was allowed to examine.

Requests by the Grosvenor Inquiry Chair for the Terms of Reference to be expanded have been refused by the current Minister.

RSHQ and the Inspectorate, quite deliberately tasked Inspector Smith  to answer questions on the stand about what a lot of the Mines Record Entries for Grosvenor Mines meant.

How this makes sense when in the vast majority of cases he never wrote them, was not even employed as an Inspector when they were written, or did not have direct responsibility for Grosvenor Mine only RSHQ and the Inspectors can answer

Inspectors such as Dobson and Brennan and the Inspectors who have been Inspecting Grosvenor since at least 2016  and the Inspectors responded on the 6th of May and issued a Directive stopping workers re-entering Grosvenor Mine were quite deliberately never called.

Even though all except Dobson had prepared a written Statement for the Grosvenor Inquiry.

What does the RSHQ and the Mines Inspectors not want known to the Coal Mine Workers and and General Public of Queensland?

 

1.7 Close out meeting

The matter of the Methane appearing to be greater than 2.5% in the Longwall Tailgate was presented by VO Webber where the graphs presented were from Real time monitoring system which were different to the CITEC graphs previously provided.

These showed Methane in different concentration levels which was not clarified as to why this was the case.

I required further explanation with respect to reasons for these, the actions taken and duration of each of these events as it was not clear as to why any of these events had not been reported to an Inspector as HPl’s.

Mr Bull committed to provide this as soon as possible.

1.8 Further information provided regarding Methane issues.

An email was received on 19/12/16 from UMM Bull compiled by VO Webber. An explanation of an event on 02/08/16 for an event where Methane greater than 2.5% in the Longwall Tailgate was due to a power outage with no persons underground. The mine was subsequently degassed.

Two further events on 06/09/16 indicate two peaks where the Methane was greater than 2.5% in the Longwall Tailgate for periods of approximately 30 minutes and 15 minutes.

I spoke with UMM Bull on 20/12/16 with regards this and required these matters to be investigated as to why these were not classified as per CMSH Regulation 366 and reported as HPl’s.

I informed that I was issuing a Directive to ensure compliance with the Act and Regulations for this matter.

Pursuant to section 166 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999

1 Management of methane in the Longwall Tailgate.  To ensure compliance with the control and management of methane in the Longwall Tailgate. Due Date 12/01/2017

366 Withdrawal of persons in case of danger

1) For section 273 of the Act, a part of an underground mine required to be ventilated under section 344(1)(b) that has a general body concentration of methane of at least 2.5% is taken to be dangerous.

2) For section 273(6) of the Act, and without limiting the subsection—

a) mines rescue trained persons are taken to be competent persons; and

b) appropriate precautions are taken to have been taken if the persons are working under mines rescue procedures developed by an accredited corporation.

Section 273 Withdrawal of persons in case of danger

(1) If a coal mine is dangerous, all persons exposed to the danger must withdraw to a place of safety.

(4) A competent person must be appointed to assess the danger from the hazard or hazards that have resulted in the withdrawal of persons to a place of safety.

(8) As soon as practicable after being appointed, the person appointed under subsection (4) must enter in the mine record a report on the withdrawal of persons and remedial action taken to eliminate the danger.

Maximum penalty—100 penalty units.

(9) The site senior executive must notify the inspector of any action taken under this section immediately after the action is taken.

Maximum penalty—200 penalty units.

344 Other things for which ventilation system must provide

(1) The ventilation officer for an underground mine must ensure the mine’s ventilation system provides for the following—

b) controlled ventilation—

(i) in each place used by a person for normal work or travel, other than a place where an inspection mentioned in section 307 is being carried out and no-one else is working; and

ii) in each standing working place that is on the intake side of a working place; and in each working place in an ERZ1

307 ERZ controller must carry out regular periodic inspections of explosion risk zones

  1. The ERZ controller for an ERZ must carry out a regular periodic inspection of the zone.

 

 

 

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