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ADDENDUM KEY ISSUE 2 ADEQUACY Of The MINE’S RESPONSE To HPI’s On LW 103 And 104 Between 1st JULY 2019 And 5th MAY 2020

ADDENDUM KEY ISSUE 2 ADEQUACY of the MINE’S RESPONSE to HPI’s on LW 103 and 104 between 1st JULY 2019 and 5th MAY 2020

ADDENDUM KEY ISSUE 2 ADEQUACY of the MINE’S RESPONSE to HPI’s on LW 103 and 104 between 1st JULY 2019 and 5th MAY 2020

MRE Fall Interview- Grosvenor Coal Mine – 13.09.2016.pdf

FINDINGS

There was consistent feedback that –

  1. Neither crew were consulted following recognised risk assessment which should have been triggered by the change of management process

NO WORKER INVOLVEMENT.

 2) Both crews were aware that the change was likely and had been briefed before they commenced the shifts on which the change took place, and, when the early signs of roof movement were detected.

 3) No person predicted nor expected the rapid deterioration and roof failure that followed.

 4) There was total reliance in the technical expertise applied during the change management process.

WHO WERE THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS? Internal or external?

 5) It was understood by the crews that the monitoring of tell-tales used in the reasoning for the change related to roadways where megabolts had been installed and that there was no data associated with convergence measurements relating to only 8x 1.8m steel bolts alone.

 6) Was there an interim support pattern/system which might have been considered?

 7) Why was the change initiated immediately after 18ct conditions were seen as very heavy even in comparison with previous cut throughs?

 

 

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