Why haven’t Inspectors Dobson, Brennan and Kennedy given any evidence at the Grosvenor Inquiry. Why hasn’t Peter Newman (Chief Inspector) given any evidence about Grosvenor Mine?
There are in my count at least 4 Inspectors with direct knowledge of Grosvenor Mine who have not given evidence about Grosvenor Mine.
How can anyone fully answer these questions for making a public submission about the adequacy of the Anglo Management and the Mines Inspectors when we have not heard from the Mines Inspectors directly involved who actually Inspected the Mine and wrote the referred to Mine Record Entries?
- The causes of the 27 methane exceedance HPIs on longwall 103 and 104 at Grosvenor mine between 1 July 2019 and 5 May 2020.
- The adequacy of the mine’s responses to those HPIs.
- The adequacy of the Inspectorate’s role in responding to those methane exceedances.
These Inspectors in my opinion ,should be immediately scheduled to give evidence at the Grosvenor Inquiry and the closing date for submissions delayed until at least a week after the last Inspector has testified
First
Inspector Mathew Kennedy in the words of Inspector Stephen Smith was the Inspector who issued the Directive suspending mining operations and that no-one was to return Underground.
The injured workers were transported to the surface by colleagues and taken from there to hospital. The first inspector to the scene was Inspector Matthew Kennedy, who just happened to be in Moranbah that afternoon. After making initial inquiries and in consultation with the chief and deputy chief inspectors, a directive was given at about 6:15 pm suspending mining operations and directing that no-one was to return underground. TRA.500.014.0008
Why has Inspector Kennedy not given evidence or even scheduled to give evidence?
- He was first Mines Inspector at the Grosvenor Mine on the same day methane explosion.
- Inspector Kennedy was the one who (in person) issued the Directive to the Anglo Management preventing workers returning underground, This after consulting on the phone with CIOCM Peter Newman and DCIOCM Dobson.
- Kennedy can give direct evidence about what he observed and heard at the Grosvenor Mine.
- Inspector can give direct evidence about the discussions with Anglo Management before and after the Directive was issued, in particular any response to the Directive from Anglo Management
Second
Peter Newman Chief Inspector of Coal Mines who it seems instructed Inspector Kennedy to issue the Directive suspending mining operations and directing that no-one was to return underground.
Why isn’t CIOCM Newman to give further evidence?
Third and Fourth
During Inspector Smiths Evidence and in his Statement, two long term Inspectors were frequently mentioned. Inspector Smith was subsequently cross-examined about their actions (including content of associated Mine Record Entries) from 2016 till 2020.
They are Shaun Dobson (2013 start, Current Deputy Chief Inspector of Coal Mines) and Keith Brennan (Mackay based Mines Inspector)
Inspector Smith started his employment with the Mines Inspectorate around October 2017 and was initially based out of the Rockhampton and started at the Mackay Office as the Northern Regional Inspector of Mines in July 2019.
Why is Inspector Smith being questioned about Grosvenor Mine actions by the Mines Inspectorate from before he was even employed let alone before he was an Inspector responsible for Grosvenor?
Why are we not hearing from Inspectors Dobson and Brennan about their MRE from December 2016?
Why have we not heard from Inspector Brennan about all the methane HPI’s directly reported to him in July 2019?
Why do we have Inspector Smith discussing the actions taken to reverse the airflow from intake to return in the bleeder road at Inspector Brennan’s suggestion in 2019?
- Why have both Inspector Brennan and Inspector Dobson not given evidence at the Inquiry at all?
- Why are they not scheduled to give evidence themselves?
- Are the Inspectors concerned about what their evidence would be?
- Do they just want to keep personal knowledge hidden from the Inquiry?
Would they be able to provide better answers than the frequent responses provided by Inspector Smith when asked about the history of Grosvenor.
“NO. I don’t know”
During cross examination Inspector Smith was asked about Mine Record Entries dating back to 2016 that Inspectors Dobson and Brennan had written and issued.
Inspector Smith was asked about the Dobson 2016 Directive “to ensure compliance with the control and management of methane in the longwall tailgate.
Q. Perhaps I’ll just try it this way, and if you need to see the actual document, we can have it shown to you. I’m going to ask you about a mine record entry from 15 December 2016, when inspector Dobson issued a directive to the mine, that directive being to ensure compliance with the control and management of methane in the longwall tailgate. Do you recall that?
A. No, I don’t.
Q. If you look at the first paragraph, it says Inspector Keith Brennan and I attended Grosvenor Mine today …
Q. If we go to the last page, please, page 8, do you see the two persons referred to are Shaun Dobson and Keith Brennan?
A. I do.
Q. And go back to the front page, please, and just scroll down a touch. Do you see there at about point 25 on the page “Directive”?
A. “Directive: To ensure compliance”?
Q. To ensure compliance with the control and management of methane in the Longwall
A. I do, yes.
Q. So that’s December 2016. Is it your understanding that that direction was given against a background of high 37 potential incidents involving events of that nature that went back as far as February 2016?
A. I’m afraid I’d have to —
Q. You don’t know.
A. I don’t know, yes.
Q. Let’s see if you accept this proposition: notwithstanding the giving of that direction, there were multiple HPIs of a similar sort in the months, indeed years, that followed?
A. I would accept that, yes.
Q There were, can I suggest, 27 methane HPIs on longwall 102?
A. The total number, I’m afraid I can’t affirm or deny.
Q. Let’s have a look at the mine record entry for 9 May 2018, which is RSH.002.273.0001. Do you recall seeing that?
A. I have seen that MRE, yes.
Q. If we go to page 3, do you see at paragraph 5 there was an acknowledgment that continued HPIs with methane greater than 2.5 per cent was not satisfactory and the mine must ensure that such HPIs are minimised and preferably eliminated going forward?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. If we go back to the first page, please, and scroll down so we can see the text at the foot of the page, please, do you see there it is said:
We explained that the mine had reported 32 HPIs since LW 102 had commenced production in January 2018. And this is May 2018.
This represented 60% of all HPIs in Queensland associated with Methane greater than 2.5% in the Longwall tailgate.
A. Yes.
Q. Immediately following the first two HPIs that you went through in July and Inspector Brennan’s inspection at the mine and discussions with the people at the mine, the mine, after the second exceedance, ceased production voluntarily for 36 hours and they formed an incident management team. The minutes of the meeting that were composed by that incident management team were forwarded to the inspectorate and I think directly to Inspector Brennan.
A. Now, I’ve seen those and been through those, and that contains the basic elements of a plan to improve both ventilation and gas drainage at the mine for longwall 103, and it references ahead into longwall 104 as well. So with that knowledge, it doesn’t surprise me to see the repetition in the form 5As.
Q. Notwithstanding the development of this plan, the HPIs continued to occur, though?
A. They did. They did. The initial suggestion of Inspector Brennan, which was for the mine to reverse the ventilation that was currently coming past longwalls 101, 102 and around the back of 103 into the face was bringing half a per cent of methane with it, and his suggestion and advice to the mine was that if they had a look at their ventilation management, they may be able to reduce that significantly by sending the ventilation the other way so that what was coming on to the longwall face was intake air at zero or 0.1 per cent methane. He made the point, if I recall correctly, that had that actually been the case, several of these exceedances would not have been
Q. The ventilation change was implemented.
A. It was.
Q. And it didn’t stop a recurrence of the HPIs, did it?
A. It didn’t – they did not cease. The nature of the HPIs following the ventilations changed compared to the ones pre the ventilation change.
Q. Finally in respect of the HPIs which were notified to your office on 21 April, we have document 001.009.0323. If we go perhaps straight over to the next page, to the bullet points, we can see that again it was the section 243A sensor which recorded the exceedance?
A. Yes
Q, But on this occasion, the peak value was 5.04 per cent?
A. Yes. TRA.500.014.0110
Q. And that that duration lasted 10 minutes?
A Yes.
Q. That’s a significant HPI to be notified about, isn’t it, Mr Smith?
A, Yes, yes.
Q, An exceedance — Lower explosive limit of the gas.
A. Yes,
Q, An exceedance reaching 5.04 per cent means that the lower explosive limit had been reached on that occasion?
A. Yes.
Q. And that the methane exceeded 2.5 per cent for 10 minutes on that occasion?
A. Yes.
Q. Did that or should that HPI have set off any alarm bells in your office, Mr Smith?
A. That exceedance – an exceedance that reaches that level does set off alarms,
Q. Maybe if I could just bring you back to my initial question, my question was whether or not an exceedance at a peak of 5.04 per cent but for a duration of 10 minutes above 2.5 per cent in the tailgate roadway ought to have set off alarm bells, and I think you said yes, it does?
A. My answer to that is yes.
Q. All right. After having done that, what did the inspectorate do in response to notification that there had been methane within the explosive range at the mine for a period of time on that day?
A. At or about that time, I’d been requested by the chief inspector to attend the mine, more in relation to the 243A sensor and the directives that I’d issued to three mines at that time. So there was already an intervention planned. So, to my mind, I’m going to the mine in the next few weeks, anyway, so this will certainly be something I’ll be talking to the mine about.
Q. And is that the extent of the action that was taken by the inspectorate? TRA.500.014.0112
A At this stage – at that stage, yes.
Q. To be quite clear, we’re talking about a planned inspection that was going to occur at the mine on 13 or 14 May?
A. At that – yes, that’s right.
Q. More than a week or so after 6 May?
A. A couple of weeks away. Yes, a few weeks. The following week.
Q. After 6 May?
A. Yes, the following week.
Q. Perhaps I’ll just try it this way, and if you need to see the actual document, we can have it shown to you. I’m going to ask you about a mine record entry from 15 December 2016, when Inspector Dobson issued a directive to the mine, that directive being to ensure compliance with the control and management of methane in the longwall tailgate. Do you recall that?
A. No, I don’t.
Q. Mr Operator, could I trouble you please for document RSH.002.255.0001. Do you see in the top right-hand corner the date of 15 December 2016? TRA.500.014.0047
A. I do.
Q. Do you see it’s an MRE concerning Grosvenor coal mine?
A. I do.
Q. If we go to the last page, please, page 8, do you see the two persons referred to are Shaun Dobson and Keith Brennan?
A. I do.
Q. And go back to the front page, please, and just scroll down a touch. Do you see there at about point 25 on the page “Directive”?
A. “Directive: To ensure compliance”?
Q. To ensure compliance with the control and management of methane in the Longwall
A. I do, yes.
Q. So that’s December 2016. Is it your understanding that that direction was given against a background of high potential incidents involving events of that nature that went back as far as February 2016?
A. I’m afraid I’d have to —
Q. You don’t know.
A. I don’t know, yes.
Q. Let’s see if you accept this proposition: notwithstanding the giving of that direction, there were multiple HPIs of a similar sort in the months, indeed years, that followed? TRA.500.014.0048
A I would accept that, yes.
Q. If we go back to the first page, please, and scroll down so we can see the text at the foot of the page, please, do you see there it is said
“We explained that the mine had reported 32 HPIs since LW 102 had commenced production 25 in January 2018.“ And this is May 2018.
This represented 60% of all HPIs in Queensland associated with Methane greater than 2.5% in the Longwall tailgate.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall seeing that?
A. I do.
Q. Had you seen that prior to the preparation of your statutory declaration, though?
A. I would have, yes.
Q. Sorry?
A Yes.
Q. Thank you. I assume you accept this proposition, that despite what is contained in that document, methane HPIs involving the longwall tailgate continued to occur? TRA.500.014.0049
A. They did.
Q. So I’m now going to ask you about the longwall 103 HPIs. Could the witness be shown AAMC.001.009.0255, 5 please? We can see at the top of the page that it’s a form 1A?
A. That’s right.
Q. Ms O’Gorman will ask you some questions after lunch about longwall 104, but the position is that the changes to goaf drainage didn’t stop the HPIs, either, did they?
A. They didn’t cease completely, but – absolutely not, but — They had another 14 in a couple of weeks? In terms of longwall 103, they had had, if I recall correctly, seven gas exceedances in June, they had that series of nine in July, and then there was another three – one in August, one in October and one in November. So there was a significant reduction in the generation of HPIs in those last four months.
Q. So are you suggesting that a reduction to an HPI rate of one a month was acceptable?
A. I’m suggesting it’s much better than eight or nine.
Q. But you’re not suggesting it was acceptable, surely?
A. It’s not wanted, and it would be in the mine’s interest to do whatever they could to eliminate them.
Q. Particularly if the mine had been given a directive by an inspector that they were to ensure compliance with the control and management of methane in the longwall tailgate TRA.500.014.0062
A. Yes.
Q. Just one last question before I propose an adjournment. What are the consequences of failing to 5 comply with a directive? What can they be?
A. The consequences of failing to comply with a directive can be prosecution under the provisions of the legislation
Q. In particular, section 128 of the Act, I would suggest to you, is the section which sets out the functions of
A. Yes.
Q. And there’s a number of them, of course.
A. There is.
Q. The first one being to enforce the Act?
A Yes TRA.500.014.0063
Q. There are two further ones that are particularly relevant for our purposes, of course. One of those functions, set out in paragraph (c), is the function to inspect and audit coal mines to assess whether risk to persons is at an acceptable level?
A. Yes.
Q. And in respect of paragraph (g), there is a statutory function couched in these terms:
If unsafe practices or conditions at coal mines are detected, to ensure timely 13 corrective or remedial action is being taken and, if not, require it to be taken.
A. Yes.
Q. You know, of course, that sections 166 and 167 of the Act give you and other inspectors the power to give directives where required?
A. Yes.
Q. And we know that you’re well aware of that because in the course of longwall 104, as we will come to, you did in fact issue a directive to Grosvenor mine on 9 April 2020?
A. I did.
Q, What was that conclusion ultimately?
A. That the methane was either reporting to the outbye sensor, possibly from leakage through the seals between 104 and 103, or potentially exiting the 104 goaf into what they call C heading and circumventing – being able to pass down a roadway with no sensor in it before rejoining the roadway inbye of the outbye sensor.
Q. Do you know whether any questions were asked by anyone at the inspectorate of anyone at the mine as to why that had occurred?
A. I did not ask any questions at that time, no.
Q. On that occasion, you didn’t take any action?
A No. TRA.500.014.0088
Ventilation network for longwall tailgates to assess for risk of failure when using dual return roadways.
A. Yes.
Q. Amend the gas drainage TARP to add guidance for high flow goaf hole maintenance
A. Yes.
Q. If you just keep that in mind as we move through the next form 5As, I’ll ask for the next one to be brought up, and it is AAMC.001.009.0392. This is the form 5A received on 15 April in respect of the exceedance that occurred on 19 March, Mr Smith?
A. Yes. TRA.500.014.0097
Q. If we go to page 3 and if we could zoom in towards the top there, you can see under the heading “Task/environment conditions” these words:
P seam gas drainage not completed to proposed strategy to allow longwall 104 unconstrained production from gas delays.
A. Yes.
Q, Lateral hole drilling experiencing numerous delays when drilling through fault planes.
A. Yes.
Q. You understood either at the time or understand now that that’s a reference to the fact that the mine had not in fact undertaken pre-drainage of the P seam as it had intended?
A. Yes.
Q. That’s being listed there as one of the causes underlying the exceedance on 19 March 2020?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Of course that’s a cause which goes far beyond the precise and specific cause related to the maintenance of the goaf hole and the sled?
A. That’s right.
Q. It’s really identification of a fundamental problem that the mine had identified in respect of its investigation of the HPI?
A. Yes. It should be, yes.
Q. Well, it is, isn’t it?
A. Yes
Q. They’re the words there?
A. That’s what’s in here, yes.
Q. That’s what the mine is telling you it had identified as being the cause of that HPI on 19 March?
A. Yes.
Q. Let’s bring ourselves back to 104, though, because by 15 April, indeed by 7 April, the inspectorate had been notified of 10 exceedances on longwall 104?
A. Yes.
Q. Ten. And that’s in the period between 9 March and 17 April, a period of a little less than a month?
A. Yes.
Q. I’d ask you to comment on whether that indicates that the mine had its methane management issues under control?
A, They weren’t under control, but the reasons they were not under control were explained, if you like, in terms of the goaf drainage, the issue with the goaf drainage sleds as a discrete series of exceedances. That came in a flurry and was resolved and was resolved in a fairly short time.
Then the next couple of exceedances were exceedances with less than adequate ventilation controls around the goaf edge that allowed methane to exit the goaf, head down C heading and go out the tailgate. So by the time these have arrived, there’s been essentially two discrete groups of exceedances – associated with the sled and associated with controlling the methane that can exit the goaf and depart via C heading.
And those things, in my mind, should be operationally controllable relatively easily, so not a significant – they’re not a highly technical thing to manage
Ventilation is basic mining.
Managing brattice stoppings in a heading to prevent methane from moving into areas you don’t want it to is basic mining skills.
The failure of the sleds, the issues with the sleds, is recognising the need for basic maintenance. In terms of recognising a hazard, it was obvious that the mine hadn’t considered the possibility that if they lost one sled out of three, the methane would report out the tailgate. They found that out as soon as they blocked the arrestors, that that’s what would happen, so they’ve then gone into, “We need to fix this”, so I guess, to me, it’s eminently fixable by the mine relatively easily. TRA.500.014.0102
Q. So can I ask you this, then: by 7 April, the mine had had 10 methane exceedance HPIs on longwall 104?
A. Yes.
Q, MS O’GORMAN: My question was geared to the inspectorate’s satisfaction for the HPIs to continue. I asked that question because as of 7 April we’re up to 10 HPIs, but, as we know, there were more to come.
My question was whether it was the inspectorate’s attitude then and now that so long as there was a specific immediate cause for each HPI which was notified to you, and so long as you considered that each cause had a simple technological fix, it wasn’t necessary for the inspectorate to intervene?
A I didn’t believe it was necessary for us to intervene at that point on the basis of the types of exceedances that we’d seen and had been notified to us. My expectation was that we would not see further exceedances as a result of issues with maintenance of the goaf sleds; that the mine has had clearly demonstrated to them the importance of making sure that their goaf drainage system and sleds operate appropriately, to ensure that they did what they were supposed to do and maintained extraction of gas from the goaf. TRA.500.014.0103
A. Similarly with the exceedances where the methane reported around via C heading, again it’s relatively simple mining practice to ensure that those devices do their job.
I would suggest that had those – particularly that variety of exceedance continued to occur, we would have, or I would have certainly raised it with the mine when I was intending to visit for an inspection in early May, that they needed to either re-educate their workforce and supervisors, because they can’t continue to have basic – have exceedances because of basic mining practice, poor basic mining practices.
I mean, they’ve already told us that they are going to have a challenge managing the gas in longwall 104 because of the amount of drainage that they did or did not do, which left them very few options in terms of if they want to mine it and not have exceedances, which means to me that they have to be on top of their game with respect to everything from the very simple erection of a brattice stopping, to the maintenance of their goaf sleds, to the setting of the appropriate – putting the appropriate settings into their system on the face so that the shearer stops where it’s supposed to stop, that their calculations are appropriate so that when they slow the shearer down, it will slow the shearer down before the methane will exceed, and so on.
They’re the more technological things, and they haven’t particularly been exposed as a weakness, if you like, other than the very first one, but certainly the other ones, to me, were basic mining practice. Again, if they continued, yes, there would be a reaction from the Inspectorate
Q. When you say “if they had continued”, you’re referring very specifically to repeated HPIs due to the same specific cause?
A. Well, causes that could be related, if you like. I mean, poor mining practice is not just poor erection of brattice stoppings. There are other things that they can do that they shouldn’t do.
